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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
CONCURRENT PARTICIPATION IN FEDERALLY-FUNDED
WELFARE PROGRAMS AND EMPOWERMENT
TOWARD ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY
by
Rigaud Joseph
Florida International University, 2017
Miami, Florida
Professor Miriam Potocky, Major Professor
The purpose of this research was to determine the odds for low-income households to
become and remain economically self-sufficient as a result of participating in federallyfunded welfare programs. An evaluation in nature, this study assessed the merits and
shortcomings of federally-funded welfare programs. Using the public-use version of the
2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) Panel, this quasi-experimental
investigation compartmentalized 4,216 low-income households into two groups: an
intervention group (n = 2,436) and a comparison group (n = 1,780). Households in the
intervention group received one or more federal means-tested welfare benefits for the
most part of the 2008-2013 quinquennium. By contrast, those in the comparison group—
although eligible for these benefits—did not receive them. Based on the premises of the
theory of policy design and social construction, the culture of poverty theory, the racial
classification model, and the social control thesis, the following two hypotheses were
formulated: (1) Low-income households who receive one or more lower-tier federal
means-tested benefits will be less likely to attain and maintain economic self-sufficiency
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than their counterparts who do not participate in federal welfare programs and (2) Lowincome households that enroll in more welfare programs will have worse self-sufficiency
outcomes than their counterparts that participate in fewer programs. The survey
respondents were measured repeatedly over a 56-month period to assess whether welfare
receipt impacts their household income steadily beyond 150 percent of the federal
poverty level, after controlling for known predictors. Findings from binomial logistic
regression displayed medium effect sizes indicating that participation in public assistance
did decrease the likelihood of attainment and maintenance of economic self-sufficiency
among low-income American households. These findings were interpreted within the
context of pre-existing differences that may have existed between the intervention group
and the comparison group which were not accounted for in the multivariate analysis.
Macro-implications of these findings for poverty and social welfare stakeholders were
discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
The primary goal of this study is to contribute to the literature by expanding the
body of research on poverty, welfare, and economic self-sufficiency. An evaluation in
nature, this research sought to examine the impact of participation in federal means-tested
welfare programs on the attainment and maintenance of economic self-sufficiency among
low-income households. Embracing Schneider and Ingram’s theory of policy design and
social construction, Lewis’ culture of poverty theory, Soss, Fording, and Schram’s racial
classification model, and Piven and Cloward’s social control thesis, this investigation
tested two welfare-related hypotheses: (1) low-income households who receive one or
more lower-tier federal means-tested benefits will be less likely to attain and maintain
economic self-sufficiency than their counterparts who do not participate in federal
welfare programs and (2) low-income households that enroll in more welfare programs
will have worse self-sufficiency outcomes than their counterparts that participate in fewer
services.
The current study includes eight interrelated chapters. Chapter One—The
Paradox of Poverty Persistence in America—introduces readers to poverty as a social
and public health problem across the United States (US). The chapter particularly
provides compelling statistics with respect to the scope of poverty, including its incidence
and prevalence across the country. Also included in this chapter are graphical estimates
about populations living below the federal poverty level. This chapter concludes with a
descriptive assessment of the multifaceted impact of poverty on children.
Chapter Two entitled Historical Development of the American Welfare State
presents a panoramic glimpse of America’s most prominent antipoverty policies at the
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federal level since the 1930s. More specifically, this chapter highlights the New Deal
programs implemented in the 1930s in response to the Great Depression; covers the War
on Poverty policies pushed through by the Johnson administration in the 1960s; explains
the devolution revolution agenda promoted by the Reagan administration in the 1980s;
dives into the welfare reform enacted by Congressional Republicans and accepted by
President Clinton in the 1990s; and reviews the Stimulus Package implemented under the
Obama administration. Chapter Two ends with a synopsis of the current American
welfare state with a special focus on the means-tested programs targeted on persons in the
lower-tier.
Chapter Three is a thorough review of the body of literature on concurrent
program participation and economic self-sufficiency among welfare beneficiaries. This
chapter also identifies gaps in the existing scholarship, lays down the rationale for this
project, and describes its significance in light of the economic costs of antipoverty
policies in the United States.
Chapter Four contains a critical analysis of the most common theoretical
perspectives pertaining to poverty and social welfare. This chapter—the longest in this
current research project—critically reviews as many as eleven theoretical perspectives on
poverty and social welfare. These theories take center stage in explaining the etiology of
poverty, the expansion of welfare, the transfer of administrative power and racial
disparities in the implementation of welfare policies, and the acquisition of savings and
accumulation of assets among low-income households.
Chapter Five elaborates on the study hypotheses. This chapter presents proposed
connections between the study hypotheses and the theory of policy design and social
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construction, the culture of poverty theory, the racial classification model, and the social
control thesis.
The methodology is presented in Chapter Six. This section starts with a synthesis
of the research design followed by a complete description of the longitudinal dataset used
in the current investigation. Besides providing an in-depth description of the sample, this
chapter explores methods of missing data management. All of the study variables—
independent, dependent, and confounding variables—are also discussed in this section.
While Chapter Seven details the statistical software and procedure employed in
the analysis of the data, Chapter Eight explains the findings of this investigation. The
final chapter of this research project—Chapter Nine—presents a thorough discussion and
interpretation of the findings. In addition, this chapter appraises the merits and
shortcomings of the research by analyzing both the implications and the limitations of the
results. Finally, this chapter proposes directions for future research.
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CHAPTER I. THE PARADOX OF POVERTY PERSISTENCE IN AMERICA
Scope of Poverty in America
Poverty poses a serious threat to the nation’s well-being and has become a
recurring social and public health phenomenon in the United States of America (US)
since at least the late nineteenth century (Bremner, 1956; Patterson, 2000). Using data
from the Current Population Survey (CPS), Proctor, Semega, and Kollar (2016) found
that 43.1 million Americans were poor in 2015. This number represented 13.5 percent of
the total US population. This number also constituted a slight improvement in the fight
against poverty from the 2014 figure where 46.7 million people across America were
poor. In other words, there was a 1.3 percentage point decrease in poverty estimates
between 2014 and 2015 (Proctor et al., 2016).
However, a close look at the poverty data reported for the 2005-2015 decade
indicated that the 2015 poverty estimates remain higher than the pre-Great Recession
poverty rates in a statistically significant way (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & Smith, 2008,
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013; DeNavas-Walt & Proctor, 2014, 2015; Proctor et al.,
2016). Indeed, for the fiscal year 2007— the year that marked the beginning of the latest
recession— the national poverty rate was 12.5 percent, a 1.0 percentage point poverty
change in comparison with the fiscal year 2015 (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2008; Proctor et
al., 2016). Figure 1 below presents a panoramic glimpse of poverty rates in the US
between 2005 and 2015. This figure is based on estimates reported by the US Census
Bureau for the aforementioned years. As evidenced in this figure, the fiscal year 2006
witnessed the lowest rate of poverty over the decade (12.3 percent). On the other hand,
the highest poverty rate for the same period of time was recorded in 2010.
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Figure 1. Poverty Rates in the United States
during the 2005-2015 Decade
(Source: US Census Bureau)
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National data tend to mask the scope of the problem at lower levels of jurisdiction
such as region, state, county, city, and zip code. According to Bishaw and Glassman
(2016), some states have a history of having significantly higher poverty rates than the
national average. As of the fiscal year 2015, this list includes Mississippi (22.0 percent),
New Mexico (20.4 percent), Louisiana (19.6 percent), Arkansas (19.1 percent), Alabama
and Kentucky (18.5 percent). By contrast, states such as New Hampshire, Maryland,
Vermont, Minnesota, and Connecticut have been historically known for registering lower
rates of poverty than the national average. In 2015, the poverty levels for these states
were 8.2 percent, 9.7 percent, 10.2 percent, 10.2 percent, and 10.5 percent, respectively
(Bishaw & Glassman, 2016).
From a regional perspective, over the past decade most of the states with high
rates of poverty were located in the South, while the Northeast was home to states with
low rates of poverty (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013;
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DeNavas-Walt & Proctor, 2014, 2015; Proctor et al., 2016). Figure 2 below displays
decade-long poverty estimates for the US regions.

Percent

Figure 2. Poverty Rates in America by
Region during the 2005-2015 Decade
(Source: US Census Bureau)
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According to US Census Bureau (2015a), the United States of America is divided
into four regions: Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. The Northeast encompasses 9
states: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont,
New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. The Midwest englobes 12 states which are
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota. The South is the largest region with 17
states: Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee,
Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. Finally, the West contains the remaining 13
states identified as Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah,
Wyoming, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington.
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Deep poverty is another way to unmask national data and assess the severity of
poverty among American households. Long dismissed as a developing-country issue,
deep poverty has been a real concern in American society. Deep poverty is operationally
defined as the state in which a household annual income falls under 50 percent of the
federal poverty level (FPL) (Proctor et al., 2016). There had been an increase in deep
poverty across America from 5.2 percent in 2006 to 6.6 percent in 2014 (DeNavas-Walt
et al., 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013; DeNavas-Walt & Proctor, 2014). Not until
2015 did the country experience a .5 percentage point decrease in the deep poverty rate to
6.1 percent in 2015 from 6.6 percent one year earlier. The trajectory of deep poverty in
America over the past decade is demonstrated in Figure 3. As seen in this figure, it is
evident that the nation has not made enough progress toward reducing this social problem
(DeNavas-Walt et al., 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013; DeNavas-Walt & Proctor,
2014, 2015; Proctor et al., 2016).

Figure 3. Deep Poverty Rates in the United States
during the 2005-2015 Decade
(Source: US Census Bureau)
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Children as poorest citizens. Children continued to be overrepresented among
the poor, as child poverty rates are historically higher than the poverty rates for adults age
18-64 and older people age 65 and above. In 2015, 19.7 percent of children under age 18
lived in poverty, as opposed to just 12.4 percent of adults in the 18 to 65 age range, and
8.8 percent of citizens who were 65 years old and over (Proctor et al., 2016). This trend
of higher child poverty rates has been consistent throughout the 2005-2015 decade
(DeNavas-Walt et al., 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013; DeNavas-Walt & Proctor,
2014, 2015; Proctor et al., 2016).
Children also had the highest rate of deep poverty, as 8.9 percent of them lived in
households with income less than 50 percent of the FPL in 2015. For the same year, the
deep poverty rate was 5.9 percent (for age 18-64) and 2.8 percent (for age 65 and over)
(Proctor et al., 2016). Comparative displays of poverty and deep poverty rates per age are
presented in Figures 4 and Figure 5, respectively. The estimates in the graphs were
collected for the 2005-2015 decade (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012,
2013; DeNavas-Walt & Proctor, 2014, 2015; Proctor et al., 2016).
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Figure 4. Poverty Rates in America by Age
during the 2005-2015 Decade
(Source: US Census Bureau)
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Figure 5. Deep Poverty Rates in America by Age
during the 2005-2015 Decade
(Source: US Census Bureau)
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African Americans as poorest racial group. The incidence and prevalence of
poverty among the African American population has been historically remarkable.
Although poverty affects all racial and ethnic backgrounds, its impact has historically
been the greatest on African Americans (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011,
2012, 2013; DeNavas-Walt & Proctor, 2014, 2015; Proctor et al., 2016). As shown in
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Figures 6 and Figure 7 below, the rates of poverty and deep poverty for African
Americans were almost three times higher than poverty rates for non-Hispanic Whites.
Compared to Asian Americans, African Americans were on average twice poorer
between 2005 and 2015. Meanwhile, Hispanics had lower rates of poverty and deep
poverty than African Americans, but significantly higher levels of poverty than nonHispanic Whites and Asian-Americans (see Figure 6 and Figure 7). It is worth
mentioning that all racial groups experienced a decrease in poverty rates for the fiscal
year 2015. The same applied for deep poverty, except for Asian-Americans (Proctor et
al., 2016).

Figure 6. Poverty Rates in America by Race
during the 2005-2015 Decade
(Source: US Census Bureau)
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Figure 7. Deep Poverty Rates in America
by Race for the 2005-2015 Decade
(Source: US Census Bureau)
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The persistence of poverty in America is perplexing because this country United
States is one of the richest countries in the world. Some scholars use the term “paradox”
to explain the presence of poverty in affluent countries (Davis, 1969; Peterson, 1991;
Prasad, 2012; Weisbrod, 1966). Despite the nation’s gradual economic recovery
enhanced by the 2009 stimulus package which moved 6.9 million Americans away from
poverty in 2010 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities [CBPP], 2011), the statistics
above depict a worrisome picture for American citizens. Having children’s well-being at
risk at the aforementioned high percentages should be a source of concern for household
members, community leaders, researchers, politicians, advocates, religious organizations
and—more important—lawmakers at local, state, and national levels. It is therefore
understandable that child well-being has been identified as a context for great social work
challenges not only for the American society but also the entire human race (Sherraden et
al., 2014; United Nations, 2013).
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Multifaceted Impact of Poverty on Children
Although children are perceived to be a naturally a resilient population (Evans &
Fuller-Rowell, 2013), there is a strong body of evidence that shows that poverty has
disastrous short-term, mid-term and long-term impacts on them. Using data collected
between 2011 and 2012 by the National Survey of Children’s Health (NSCH) through
interviews with 95,677 families with dependent children, Sacks, Murphey & Moore
(2014) conducted a large-scale study on adverse childhood experiences (ACE) in the
Unites States. Findings showed that poverty, also called economic hardship, is the most
dominant form of ACE, ahead of divorce and/or separation, domestic violence,
neighborhood violence, parental substance abuse, parental mental illness, death of a loved
one, and parental involvement with the criminal justice system. More rigorous national
and international studies on child development demonstrate the multifaceted effects of
poverty on several aspects of children’s lives, including health, education, behavior,
family and social relationships, and subjective well-being. Some of these studies are
reported below.
Impact of Poverty on Child Health
Researchers found associations between poverty and vulnerability to a broad
range of healthcare issues, including mortality and morbidity, developmental delays and
low birth weight (Aber, Bennett, Conley, & Li, 1997; Bradshaw, 2002; Duncan &
Brooks-Gunn, 2000). Poor children are more likely to be exposed to hazardous living
conditions, catch infectious diseases, and die by asphyxia than their non-poor
counterparts. In addition, children who grow up in poor households are less likely to be
taken to doctors’ appointments and therefore end up having less access to complete,
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wraparound prenatal care as compared to their peers in self-sufficient homes (Bradley &
Corwyn, 2002).
Other research findings have examined health disparities and suggest a significant
correlation between socioeconomic status and access to maternal care. Disadvantaged
pregnant and breastfeeding women and their children were found to have less access to
maternal care and mental health services than their counterparts with higher socioeconomic backgrounds (Bamfield, 2007; Huston, 1991). A lack of prenatal care can
seriously jeopardize the health of children during successive stages of their development
(Bamfield, 2007). Similarly, low birth rate can predispose them toward developing
chronic health conditions such as heart problems and pulmonary diseases (Osmond,
Barker, Winter, Fall, & Simmonds, 1993; Wadsworth & Kuh, 1997).
Another area of concern is obesity. In fact, studies on child development revealed
that poverty-stricken children are more likely to develop obesity during later stages of
development than are children not born and raised in poverty (Hernandez & Pressler,
2014; Lee, Andrew, Gebremariam, Lumeng, & Lee, 2014). One explanation for this
finding is the fact that low income children, particularly those in developed countries, are
mostly fed with innutritious foods. A lack of nutrients in the daily diet can result in
obesity (Bradshaw, 2002). Meanwhile, Torres & Wong (2013) found that children
experiencing pre-teen poverty are at a greater risk of struggling with depression when
they become adults as opposed to their counterparts who did not endure poverty before
the age of 10.
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Impact of Poverty on Child Education
Better-quality schools can influence the relationship between poverty and
educational outcomes in a desirable way. In most countries, however, poor children
usually attend underperforming schools (Prentice, 2007). Since parental backgrounds
play a major role in determining academic performance for children (Ansalone, 2001;
Buchmann & DiPrete, 2006; Fuligni, 1997), parents who did not go far in school tend to
undermine the importance of a good education. Therefore, under normal circumstances,
children from underprivileged families are at greater risk of being absent from school.
Accumulation of absences over a given school period results in less likelihood that
impoverished students will achieve satisfactory educational outcomes (Attree, 2006,
Horgan, 2007). Poor school achievement during early childhood could lead to future
academic struggles and be an important factor for school dropout (Bynner, Elias,
McNight, Pan, & Pierre, 2002). Exposure to poverty also negatively affects the
development of children’s brains (Noble, Norman, & Farah, 2005; Hanson et al., 2013)
and, consequently, diminishes their intellectual ability and academic performance
(Anderson, Leventhal & Dupéré, 2014; Campbell et al., 2001). Chronic poverty is also
found to be associated with early learning deficiencies, especially in the areas of
mathematics, print concepts, reading, writing, vocabulary and oral fluency (Danziger &
Danziger, 1995).
Impact of Poverty on Child Behavior
Contemporary researchers have found associations between poverty and lack of
cognitive control, resulting in internal and external maladjustment in behaviors (Flouri,
Midouhas, & Joshi, 2014; Henninger & Luze, 2014; Lipina et al., 2013). Internal and
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external maladjusted behaviors can be exhibited at home, in school, and/or in other
settings. Maladjusted behaviors tend to be found more in children from low
socioeconomic backgrounds (Duncan and Brooks-Gunn, 2000). When exhibited on
school grounds, these behaviors (especially external maladjusted behaviors) may result in
school suspension or worse (Bradshaw, 2002).
Impact of Poverty on Family Relationships
Poverty contributes to family dysfunction either directly or by moderating or
mediating the relationship with other variables (Banovcinova, Levicka, & Veres, 2014;
Russell, Harris, & Gockel, 2008). Conger and associates (1994) proposed the Family
Stress Model to explain the influence of economic hardship in creating emotional distress
for parents, impeding their caregiving abilities in the process. The Family Stress Model
was empirically tested within racially diverse populations, including African-Americans
and European Americans. Results from a study that contained a sample size of 422 twoparent families corroborated the basic tenets of the model, as findings showed an
association between poverty and inappropriate parenting strategies (Conger et al., 2002).
A more recent study by Wadsworth et al. (2008) indicated that poverty triggers stressful
conditions for family members thereby affecting the overall functioning of children,
especially those with Hispanic and White non-Hispanic ethnic groups. These findings
imply that African American children tend to be more resilient to adverse effects of
poverty than are their Caucasian and Hispanic counterparts. One possible explanation for
this ethnic difference was provided by Grant et al. (2000) whose research findings
showed that African American boys tend to use avoidance as a coping mechanism for
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stressful situations. However, such findings should be interpreted with caution due to a
lack of replicative studies in this particular area.
Meanwhile, economically deprived families are more likely to be involved with
child protection services due to maltreatment. In other words, children from economically
disadvantaged families are at a greater risk of home removal and foster care placement
than are their peers from higher-income households (Barth, Wildfire, & Green, 2006;
Besharov & Laumann, 1997; McGuinness & Schneider, 2007; Moraes, Durrant,
Brownridge, & Reid, 2006). These findings do not imply that only poor people abuse and
neglect their children. Rather, these studies suggest that low income families are more
likely to be reported and investigated for child maltreatment, even though the whole
process could involve biases against them.
Impact of Poverty on Social Relationships
Poverty can play a big role in impacting children’s ability to make and keep
friends from higher socioeconomic statuses. Poor children have a tendency to feel
ashamed of bringing their friends home or having to deal with friends’ requests to visit
their homes (Horwath, 2007, p. 114). For this reason, low income children tend to
associate themselves with peers from similar backgrounds. Meanwhile, poor children
usually live in neighborhoods where resources are limited and thus are less likely to have
access to recreational facilities than their wealthy peers (Wager et al., 2007). Due to
budget constraints, low-income parents cannot afford to pay for their children to
participate in social activities (Attree, 2006). In addition, living in disadvantaged
neighborhoods exposes children to higher doses of crime and drug-related activities
which, ultimately, may limit their scope of community involvement (Brooks-Gunn et al.,
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1997). That is, some children may prefer not to socialize beyond the scope of the home
environment. Children who do not socialize, especially those who are poor, may develop
low self-esteem (Ansalone, 2001; Ermisch, Francesconi, & Pevalin, 2001), suffer from
social exclusion (Brooks-Gunn &Duncan, 1997), and become targets for bullying attacks
from peers.
This chapter depicted poverty as a serious issue in the United States. Statistics
have shown that children are affected by poverty in larger numbers and found to be the
most vulnerable individuals among the poor. Despite a slight decrease in the past two
years, today’s poverty rates are still higher than before the Great Recession. Deep poverty
can no longer be perceived as a problem germane only to less-developed nations, as
millions of American households have fallen below 50 percent of FPL over the past
decade. The next chapter reviews efforts undertaken by the federal government to address
poverty in America.
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CHAPTER II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN SOCIAL
WELFARE STATE
Before the Great Depression, the federal government had little involvement in
providing welfare services. Authorities at state and local levels delegated power and
resources to private, non-for-profit organizations for poverty-relief purposes. Even the
Depression of 1873 which followed the US Civil War did not trigger federal responses.
Instead states took the lead in addressing personal, family and community problems
through voluntary agencies. One particular agency, the Charity Organization Societies
(COS), was established in 1877 with the mission of coordinating relief efforts at micro,
mezzo, and macro levels (Farley, Smith, & Boyle, 2012). Expanded to most American
cities by the 1890s, the COS attempted to organize the charities of the city, understand
the phenomenon of poverty, and develop constructive anti-poverty measures. By the
early 20th century, a number of states established departments of public welfare, which
managed state institutions and developed community-level relief programs, including
Mothers’ Pensions, the forerunner to “Aid to Dependent Children” (ADC).
The first major federal initiative arguably came with the establishment of the
Children’s Bureau by the Taft administration on April 9, 1912 (Public Law [P. L.], 62116; U.S. Children’s Bureau, 2014). This law authorizes the said bureau to embrace a
whole-child philosophy with an emphasis on research related to maternal and child
health. In short, this law targets the well-being of all children, regardless of their socioeconomic status (U.S. Children’s Bureau, 2014). The 1926 publication of the Public Aid
to Mothers with Dependent Children by the Children’s Bureau was to raise public
awareness concerning benefits for female parents that assumed the role of primary
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caregivers of their children. This document was also a precursor for the “Aid to
Dependent Children” component of the Social Security Act of 1935 (U.S. Children’s
Bureau, 2014). From the 1930s onward, however, the U.S. Congress has passed a
panoply of anti-poverty and welfare-related measures, the most notable ones being the
Social Security Act of the 1935, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act [OBRA] of 1981, and the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.
The Social Security Act of 1935 and the New Deal
The Great Depression, which struck in 1929 and persisted until 1941, took
the U.S. economy by storm, shaking the banking system in which all faith to handle
or reverse the situation was lost. Unemployment rates skyrocketed, as the
workforce was crippled in every aspect. Famine hit people in urban as well as in
rural areas throughout the country. Prisoners on parole opted against leaving the
jail environment for fear of being deprived of basic resources. It looked as though
this great nation was about to plunge into despair (The Roosevelt Institute, 2014).
In the midst of such economic adversity, the newly elected president, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, along with Congress, rose to the occasion with a cascade of legislative
measures and presidential executive orders forming the “New Deal.” The first of
these was the Banking Act of 1933, which was intended to restore equilibrium in
the banking system. This law made bank failure less likely by ensuring deposits.
Equally important was the Federal Emergency Relief Act (FERA), the first
federal grant in aid program enacted by Congress in 1933. FERA provided states with
funds for relief of the unemployed and the act encouraged states to set up work relief
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programs. In other words, under FERA, states were recipients of grants and loans for
public assistance, anticipating the public assistance titles of the Social Security Act of
1935. Meanwhile, FERA regulations stipulated that grant in aid funds must be spent by
public agencies. That is, these funds could not be used to contract with private agencies
like the Red Cross or another charity organization. As a temporary relief policy, FERA
was replaced by the Works Progress Administration (WPA) in 1935.
The flagship social policy in the New Deal was arguably the Social Security
Act of 1935 which created the Social Security Board, which in turn was re-named the
Social Security Administration (SSA) in 1946. The Social Security Act of 1935
established three key public assistance programs: Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), Old
Age Assistance (OAA), and Aid to the Blind (AB). These were run by the states with
federal financial participation. The law guaranteed pensions for older adults and
unemployed workers who have been employed in covered employment. The 1935 Social
Security Act also included the Old Age Insurance. This program, together with the OAA,
shielded senior citizens against eventual negative life outcomes by providing them
financial protection in case of loss of income (Murray & Pancoast, 1945). Congress
added Survivors Insurance (SI) to the Social Security Act in 1939. Aid to the
Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD) and Disability Insurance (DI) were later
added in 1950 and 1956, respectively (P. L. 73–66; P. L. 74-271).
With respect to child poverty, ADC proved to be a significant legislation
purported to safeguard the well-being of children whose fathers were dead, incapacitated
or irresponsible. The program sought to prevent family economic dysfunction by
providing monthly payments to mothers in order for them to remain in the home
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environment and care for their children. ADC had been in existence for nearly 30 years
when Congress revised and upgraded the program with the establishment of the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program as part of the Public Welfare
Amendments of 1962 (P. L. 87-543). This move by Congress was to circumvent claims
that ADC was an incentive for out-of-marriage pregnancies and a disincentive for the
formation of two-parent families. Hence, contrary to its predecessor which focused
mostly on children, AFDC saw the family as a unit. One of the reforms brought by AFDC
was to provide a stipend for the caretaker(s). AFDC also provided an option for the
states to provide benefits to two parent families, though only about half of the states did
so. The Public Welfare Amendments of 1962 allowed states to increase social services,
provide job-related training programs to recipients, and professionalize the program.
Under AFDC, states were required to continue meeting federal requirements such
as fair hearing, availability of the program across subdivisions, uniform standards, review
of state plans (P. L. 87-543). In other words, all of these requirements were in the 1935
law. With AFDC states should also be in compliance with the civil service standards,
which was administratively required by the Social Security Board. The estimated income
need and the amount of the ADC or AFDC benefit was to be set by the states. Although
the states differed widely in the amount of the benefit, in all states benefits were below
the poverty line (after the FPL was established in the 1960s).
Other significant components of the New Deal that had a direct bearing on
poverty include but are not limited to the Works Progress Administration (WPA), the
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA ),
the Farm Security Administration, and the National Youth Administration (The
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Roosevelt Institute, 2014). It should be noted that FHA is not necessarily an antipoverty program. Its intent was to stabilize the housing market by providing federally
insured mortgages and to stabilize the banking system. Congress did support public
housing projects that provided rental housing for the poor during the 1930s, especially the
Housing Act of 1937.
As with several other nationally funded programs, the New Deal was
criticized by both sides of the political spectrum. Conservatives complained that the
programs went too far (federal overreach). Radicals and liberals, on the contrary, argued
that the programs were too short in length to generate satisfactory results. The
WPA, the largest work relief program, continued into the 1940s. The Social Security Act
and federal aid to public housing authorities continued well beyond World War II.
Despite this, some critics contended that the New Deal programs did not go far
enough for the nation to fully recover from the unprecedented economic crisis in
the shape of the Great Depression (The Roosevelt Institute, 2014).
A growing number of authors, however, argued that the New Deal, as
implemented under the Roosevelt administration, remains a national and international
benchmark of accomplishment for today’s social challenges (O'Brien, 2014; Rose, 2009).
Moreover, Amenta (1998) argued that the work relief programs of the New Deal, such as
the WPA, were much bolder than contemporary European responses to the Great
Depression and gave the New Deal its particular character. Furthermore, Boushey (2014)
noted that the family-centered policies in the New Deal package represent a significant
part of the groundbreaking work for the country’s strong economic platform that existed
up to the 1970s. The social welfare measures of the New Deal, in particular the old age
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insurance program, together with increased regulation of banking and home lending
constituted a huge contribution in preventing a return to depression conditions after the
World War II. Therefore, the New Deal stimulus package has been a considerable
watershed in American public welfare history.
The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and the War on Poverty
Three decades after the passage and successful implementation of the 1935 Social
Security Act, Lyndon Baines Johnson wanted to create a “Great Society” and therefore
declared a “War on Poverty” on behalf of the American people. Much of the planning for
the War on Poverty had been undertaken during the Kennedy administration (1961-63).
Walter Heller, Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors (1961-64), recommended a
War on Poverty to Johnson the day after Kennedy was assassinated and Johnson
enthusiastically endorsed the idea (Farmbry, 2014). In his January 8, 1964 State of the
Union address, the 36th United States President contended:
This administration today, here and now, declares unconditional war on poverty
in America. I urge this Congress and all Americans to join with me in that
effort….Our aim is not only to relieve the symptoms of poverty, but to cure it and,
above all, to prevent it. No single piece of legislation, however, is going to
suffice. (Johnson, 1964, para 17, 25).
President Johnson and his staff, however, anticipated that the aforementioned war
would be a long struggle. In fact, the president was quoted saying, ''The war on poverty is
not fought on any single, simple battlefield and it will not be won in a generation. There
are too many enemies: lack of jobs, bad housing, poor schools, lack of skills,
discrimination; each intensifies the other'' (New York Times, 1989, para 3.). Being
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cognizant of the multifaceted nature of poverty as a social problem, the president urged
Americans not to underestimate the economic war in which the nation was about to
engage. Nonetheless, the Johnson administration was convinced that America could
eventually win this war. Indeed, the military language (War on Poverty) used to describe
the wraparound anti-poverty public policies undertaken under his administration is
emblematic of the war-winning mentality that seems to be a mainstream American value
(Johnson, 1964).
The Economic Opportunity Act (EOA)—signed into law on August 20, 1964—
was the centerpiece of the war on poverty. In fact, the EOA encompassed several key
programs such as Head Start, Job Corps, Work Study, Neighborhood Youth Corps,
VISTA, Community Action Program, and Legal Services Program, most of which were
administered by the Office of Economic Opportunity (P. L. 88-452). The Social Security
Amendments of 1965 expanded the original legislation by creating two fundamental
health programs: Medicare, which provided health insurance to the elderly, and
Medicaid, which provided health benefits to the poor (US Social Security Administration,
n. d.). Two other Great Society laws that are worth mentioning are the Food Stamp Act of
1964 and the Older Americans Act of 1965.
Following the successful completion of pilot studies between 1961 and 1964
under the auspices of the Secretary of Agriculture, the original the Food Stamp Act was
signed into law on August 31, 1964. This law promotes food security and improves the
overall health of low income children and families through nutritious foods (P. L. 88-525;
United States Department of Agriculture [USDA], 2014). In 2008, Congress changed the
name of the program which now becomes the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance
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Program or SNAP (P. L. 110-246). Meanwhile, the Older Americans Act targets the wellbeing of individuals who are 60 and over, providing them with a broad range of homebased and community-based services such as meals, transportation, caregiver support,
abuse prevention, job training and volunteer opportunities, and legal services (P. L. 8973). Originally enacted in 1965, the Older Americans Act has since been reauthorized by
Congress on multiple occasions with the latest modifications being made on April 2016
(P. L. 114-144). During Johnson’s presidency, Congress passed about two hundred bills
in just two years (1965-1967), all of which were components of the “Great Society”
project (The Washington Post, 2014).
The war on poverty was further extended in the early 1970s with the addition of
several key programs such as (1) the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) which is
designed to bolster the financial situation of working low-to-moderate income individuals
and families; (2) the Housing Choice Voucher Program (HCV) which subsidizes quality,
affordable housing for very low-income families; (3) the Special Supplemental Nutrition
Program for Women, Infants and Children (popularly known as WIC) which improves
the health of pregnant women, breastfeeding mothers, and young children through
nutritious diets; (4) the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program which collects
financial child support on behalf of custodial parents; and (5) Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) which provides economic assistance to old, blind and disabled people. SSI
consolidated three public assistance programs – OAA, AB, and APTD – and placed the
new program under federal administration. The Nixon administration has proposed a
Family Assistance Program that would have federalized all four public assistance
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programs (including AFDC). Congress did not accept President Nixon’s proposal, but
did ultimately approve SSI.
Today, some fifty years after the declaration of war on poverty, some
Americans might feel the same way as did former president Ronald Reagan who
once said that America had lost the war against poverty (Reagan, 1986). However,
statistics have shown that the poverty level decreased from 19 percent in 1964 to
11.2 percent ten years later (1974) and then increased to 14.5 percent in 2013
(DeNavas-Walt & Proctor, 2014; Luhby, 2014; Washington Post, 2014). In other
words, despite their effectiveness having been particularly hampered by the
economic burden of the Vietnam War and the 1973 Oil Crisis, the war on poverty
programs succeeded in almost halving the poverty rates in the first decade that
followed their implementation (please see Figure 8 below). These data speak for
themselves and prove that, despite all the criticism, the Johnson administration
inflicted a major blow to poverty as a social problem (Ashmore, 2008; Bauman,
2008; Germany, 2007; Orleck, 2005; Washington Post, 2014). The graph below
(Figure 8) depicts poverty rates in America from 1964 to 2012.

26

Figure 8. Poverty Rates in America (1964 -2012)
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Figure 8. Child and overall poverty rates in America from 1962 to 2012. All rates are rounded to the
nearest whole number. There was a significant drop in rates in 1974 following the implementation of the
War on Poverty programs. Then there was a rise in rates between early 1980s and early 1990s due to
austere welfare policies. In 2000, the national poverty rates dropped to 11 percent only to rise again in the
following years, most notably during the Great Recession.

The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 and Neoliberalism, Austerity, and
Devolution Revolution
Ronald Reagan’s ascendency to power in 1981 led to a paradigm shift in social
welfare policies from liberal views to conservative approaches. This period was
characterized by the rise or rebirth of neo-liberal policies which emphasize devolution.
That is, the role of the federal government in providing social services was supplanted by
the delegation of administrative power to states, local governments and the private
sector (Hasenfeld & Garrow, 2012; Kincaid, 1998; Morgan & Campbell, 2011). In
simple terms, the theory behind neoliberalism is that government spending for welfare
services distorts the labor market by rewarding idleness. Therefore, it is in the best
interests of the federal government to privatize social services because advocates of
privatization would favor introducing free market ideas into the welfare system.
Efficiency and cost savings are a secondary benefit, as the government would avoid
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having to rent, buy or build offices, recruit and train staff for service delivery, and settle
lawsuits in or out courts. The privatized services will still need staff, but public bodies
will not be burdened with paying for staff members’ health insurance, retirement plans
and other benefits. Expansion of public employment distorts markets in the neoliberal
thinking, while privatization reduces the costs of government and increases economic
opportunity for contracting enterprises.
The amendment of Title XX of the Social Security Act in 1981. Title XX of the
Social Security Act became law in 1975 under the Social Services Amendments of 1975
(P. L. 93-647) and as a complement of the 1974 Community Development Block Grant
Act (P. L. 93-383). The purpose of this law was to strengthen and stabilize states’ budgets
for social services. In effect, Title XX requires that federal money allotted to social
services be given to states in the form of a block grant, hence the name Social Services
Block Grant Program (SSBG). Block grants started in the Johnson Administration, but
were pushed more vigorously by Presidents Nixon and Ford. Reagan, however, pushed
block grants further than any of his predecessors. In retrospect, Title XX was a
transitional measure, between the categorical grants that characterized the New Deal and
the 1960s and the new block grants of the Reagan administration of the 1980s. Being the
first program that capped federal social service funding, Title XX did shift considerable
power to the states, but it also required state matching of federal dollars. The Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act [OBRA] of 1981 expanded the program slightly, eliminated
the state matching requirement, and cut federal appropriations for social services (P. L.
97-35). The amendment of Title XX of the Social Security Act by the 1981 OBRA
demonstrated the Reagan administration’s brand of federalism, which involved an
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expanded role for the states. The strategy included an emphasis on austerity because of
the administration’s commitment on lowering taxes and its goal of reducing the federal
deficit. This, of course, resulted in tremendous cuts to social welfare programs.
Ironically, the administration ended up increasing the deficit due to huge tax cuts and
increases in defense spending.
Although in existence since 1966, block grants in social welfare became a more
acute policy prescription with the Reagan administration which, as early as 1981, already
sought to merge as many as 85 existing programs into just seven block grants. The
OBRA of 1981 combined 77 small federal programs into nine block grants which
accounted for 17 percent of the federal aid pie (Finegold, Wherry, & Schardin, 2004).
This was the beginning of the devolution revolution that has characterized social welfare
policies in America since. The total amount of these block grants was significantly (25
percent) less than what the monetary value of these programs would have generated if
added separately (Conlan, 1998). This was a sharp departure from Nixon who actually
allocated more money to states through block grants (Finegold, Wherry, & Schardin,
2004).
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 and
Welfare Reform
Public assistance to economically disadvantaged families in the United States
underwent its biggest paradigm shift yet when Congress created the Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program as part of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act [PRWORA] in 1996 (P. L. 104–193). The
introduction of TANF to the federal safety net system has dramatically changed the social
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welfare landscape that the country adopted during the Great Depression and modified in
the 1960s. The enactment of the PRWORA fulfilled a presidential campaign promise
made by Bill Clinton to end welfare “as we know it” and return power to the states. In his
first State of the Union address on January 25, 1994, the president reiterated his
willingness to replace welfare with work (Clinton, 1994, 2006). Two earlier versions of
PRWORA were vetoed by the president; however, the third and final bill that reached his
desk was deemed veto-proof because Clinton was facing a tough re-election race in
November 1996 and republicans hoped to use a veto against him as a campaign issue.
PRWORA was, in fact, a section of the “Contract with America,” a campaign document
drafted and used by the Republicans in the 1994 elections (West's Encyclopedia of
American Law, 2005). The central measure of PRWORA—also called the welfare reform
act—was the creation of the TANF program as a block grant to states. The decision to
sign this so-called “bipartisan bill” into law on August 22, 1996 by President Clinton
stirred controversy among some members of his staff and precipitated the departure of
Wendell E. Primus, David Ellwood, Peter Edelman and Mary Jo Bane from the
Department of Health and Human Services. These four high-ranking welfare advisors
resigned in protest to the president’s decision to “end welfare as we know it” (Vobejda &
Havemann, 1996).
Movement toward TANF. The movement toward TANF in the 1990s
corresponded to the problem of caseload growth in the American social welfare system.
TANF replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) which, as mentioned
above, was an upgraded version of the ADC. One could raise the question: what was
wrong with the AFDC program? Some believed that the program was more a part of the
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problem it sought to address than of the solution. Moffitt (1987) argued that AFDC had
created dependence on federal benefits and potentially led to counterproductive outcomes
by fostering generational poverty. The 1950 decade saw only a 17 percent increase in the
AFDC rolls. However, with the Johnson administration launching a War on Poverty in
the middle of the 1960s, AFDC participation rate grew exponentially over the next ten
years or so. In fact, the number of families on public assistance exceeded 3.35 million in
1975, a significant rise from the 745,300 family recipients in 1960 (Administration for
Children & Families, 2014).
The take-up rate is a measure of the percentage of eligible persons who take
advantage of a particular social welfare program. Boland (1973) found that an estimated
84% of eligible families and 91% of eligible single mothers received AFDC benefits in
1970. Much of the increase in AFDC caseloads between 1967 and 1970 resulted from
increased likelihood that eligible persons would apply and be approved for benefits. Such
intensification of the AFDC aggregate take-up rates was consistent with the spirit of the
War on Poverty. Community Action Programs and other organizations provided more
and better publicity about AFDC eligibility to poor families. In addition, the Office of
Economic Opportunity’s Legal Services Programs supported the appeals of applicants
who had been rejected for assistance, resulting in changes in eligibility procedure which
resulted in more favorable decisions on applications for assistance (Bamberger, 1965).
Such substantial growth in public assistance was a mismatch between reality and
America’s welfare philosophy. In fact, the country has long adopted a residual view of
poverty and social welfare which tends to blame those who live on public assistance.
Diffused via the mainstream media, this view traces the root of poverty to the person’s
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own failure to thrive in society and questions welfare recipients’ attitude toward hard
work as a core American value (U. S. House Budget Committee Majority Staff, 2014).
The residual view also claims that extending public assistance to able-bodied individuals
will more than likely lead to dependency on the federal government. For this reason,
proponents of this approach recommend a strong labor market as the main poverty
reduction policy (Moffitt, 1987). Policymakers, however, had struggled to reshape the
program over the years. Not until 1996 was the U. S. Congress able to make major
changes to the then 34-year-old program with the enactment of the PRWORA. Indeed,
although the explosion of welfare was somewhat halted with the rise of neoliberalism
under the Reagan administration, AFDC continued to register high participation rates in
the 1980s. In 1995, as many as 84.3 percent of eligible individuals and families claimed
their cash benefits (US Department of Health and Human Services [USDHHS], 2014a).
Hence, the steady expansion of AFDC caseloads between 1965 and 1995 was the main, if
not the only, event that paved the way for the welfare reform act of 1996.
Although heralded as the most significant piece of welfare legislation since the
Social Security Act (SSA) of 1935, TANF has constantly been the subject of vehement
controversies among researchers as studies of its effectiveness have yielded mixed
results. Despite early success claims (Bitler, Hoynes & Kuka, 2014), there has been a
growing concern in the literature about the effectiveness of the program in helping lowincome families reach self-sufficiency (Aratani & Aber, 2014; Ozawa & Yoon, 2005;
Sheely, 2012).
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The Stimulus Package
In response to the Great Recession that hit America between December 2007 and
June 2009, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act [ARRA] (P.
L. 111-5). Popularly known as the Stimulus Package, the ARRA was a $789 billion bill
which was signed into law by President Obama on February 17, 2009. Like the New Deal
in the 1930s and the EOA in the 1960s, the ARRA was considered a Keynesian-type of
macro intervention intended to address a crisis of national proportion. The main purpose
was to curb unemployment, jumpstart the economy, and keep American families afloat
throughout the recession (Carter & Tippins, 2012; Karger, 2014). Although not a social
welfare policy per se, the Stimulus Package did in fact extend most of the public
assistance programs.
The recovery of the economy under the stimulus package was, at best, slow. In
fact, during the enactment of the ARRA in 2009, the national unemployment rate reached
8.3 percent. Three years later, in February 2012, the nation still faced the same rate of
unemployment (Bureau of Labor Statistics [BSL], 2014), prompting talks of a jobless
recovery (Carter & Tippins, 2012). Although recent economic data indicate that the labor
market has consistently shown improvement over the last couple of years, a large number
of Americans are still unemployed or underemployed. However, compared to Europe, the
American recovery from the recession is far ahead.
Indeed, UNICEF’s researchers Bitler et al. (2014) found that the 2009 stimulus
package did mitigate to some extent the effects of the recession on child poverty in
America. Karger (2014) argued that the interminable crippling state in which some
European countries find themselves nowadays is due to their own failure to embrace
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Keynesianism following the Great Recession. Keynesianism is the economic principle
developed during the Great Depression that posits that deficit spending can lead to
recovery by stimulating demand and creating jobs (Keynes, 1936). In sharp contrast is
the economic austerity or discipline which asserts that a country should not spend beyond
its financial realm, the same way a household’s expenses should not exceed its income. In
fact, European countries impose discipline through cuts on government services and
through increased taxes, abiding by the economic orthodoxy principle. According to
Karger (2014), some European countries deliberately ignore that cuts on spending will
lead to unemployment. By preferring or being forced to adopt Austerity over
Keynesianism, countries like Greece and Portugal are sinking into poverty.
Today’s Safety Net Programs
Today’s federal safety net consists of a vast array of programs that appear
under various forms: Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Child Tax Credit (CTC),
Head Start and Early Head Start, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF),
School Meals Programs, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Unemployment
Insurance (UI), Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP), Housing
Choice Voucher (HCV), Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), Child Care Assistance
and Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). Although not
traditionally classified under the rubric of welfare, entitlement programs such as
Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, GI Bill, Job Corps and Pell Grant are all considered
part of the federal safety net.
Taken as a whole, the aforementioned programs constitute the backbone of
today’s social safety net and can be classified—for simplicity purposes—into the
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following five categories: cash assistance programs (EITC, UI, cash portion of TANF,
Social Security, SSI), food assistance programs (SNAP, WIC, School Meals), education
assistance programs (Head Start and Early Head Start, GI Bill, Job Corps, Pell Grant),
medical assistance programs (Medicaid, Medicare, Affordable Care Act) and housing
assistance programs (HCH, LIHEAP). The aforementioned safety net programs can also
be classified into two broad categories: means-tested and non means-tested. Means-tested
benefits are available only to households that fall within a certain bracket in terms of
income and wealth. Examples of means-tested programs include TANF, SNAP, Head
Start, SSI, HCV, WIC, Medicaid, Pell Grant and the refundable portion of EITC. Non
means-tested programs, in contrast, are not based upon household earnings or assets and
may include UI, Social Security and Medicare, although there are retrospective work
requirements for participation in these programs. Yet, some lists of safety net programs
exclude the social insurance programs, though they clearly have had a major role in
limiting poverty for certain groups (e.g., the elderly). In other words, narrowly captured,
the social safety net refers primarily to the means-tested benefits which aim at helping the
nation’s families with dependent children cope with economic difficulties.
Furthermore, the American welfare state is bifurcated into a two-tiered system: an
upper-tier and a lower-tier (Howard, 1999; Sherraden, 1991, p. 53). Upper-tier programs
include Social Security (OASI), Medicare, Disability Insurance, Workers’ Compensation,
and Unemployment Benefits. These programs are universal and offer substantial benefits.
Stigma are generally not associated with receiving these benefits. Lower-tier programs, in
contrast, include SNAP, School Meals, Medicaid, SSI, TANF, WIC, and Housing Choice
Voucher. These programs are residual and target people who are at the bottom of society.
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Recipients of these benefits are often stigmatized in the eyes of the public (Howard,
1999; Sherraden, 1991, p. 53)
This chapter pinpointed the most significant antipoverty policy prescriptions
designed and implemented under the auspices of the federal government. The federal
government was slow to react vis-à-vis poverty until the Great Depression. Between
1930s and early 1970s, the federal government adopted Keynesian-inspired policies to
alleviate and prevent poverty at the same time. The Social SSA and the EOA are two
examples of broad-based policies intended to address poverty in America. Beginning
1980s, however, the pendulum of social welfare has swung toward neoliberalism,
austerity, and devolution, culminating in the welfare reform of 1996. Coping with
poverty seems to become the focus of the central government since then. The next
chapter meticulously explores the literature on concurrent program participation and selfsufficiency.
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CHAPTER III. LITERATURE REVIEW
Research on poverty and safety net programs has mushroomed over the past
twenty years, following the 1996 welfare reform and the latest recession. In America,
there are currently seven research-based poverty centers that generate cutting-edge
findings on the federal safety net. Three of these centers—University of California-Davis
Center for Poverty Research, University of Michigan National Poverty Center, and
University of Wisconsin-Madison Institute for Research on Poverty—are sponsored by
the United States Department of Health and Human Services. The other four—Center for
the Study of Poverty and Inequality, National Center for Children in Poverty, West Coast
Poverty Center, and Center for Poverty Research—are housed at Stanford University,
Columbia University, the University of Washington, and the University of Kentucky,
respectively. Additionally, scholars from across the globe have shown interests in
studying the American way of addressing poverty. Therefore, the literature on poverty
policies and interventions is richly populated with local, national and international
studies.
Toward Concurrent Program Participation
Most studies related to the federal safety-net target the effectiveness of single
programs. For example, extensive research has been conducted on the effectiveness of the
Earned Income Tax Credit (Dahl & Lochner, 2012; Eissa & Hoynes, 2006; Evans &
Garthwaite, 2014; Hoynes, Miller, & Simon, 2015; Meyer, 2008; Simpson, Tiefenthaler,
& Hyde, 2010). The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) has equally
received considerable attention from researchers in a predominantly quantitative manner
(Almond, Hoynes, & Schanzenbach, 2011; Gregory & Deb, 2015; Mykerezi & Mills,
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2010; Nord, 2012; Ratcliffe, McKernan, & Zhang, 2011; Shaefer & Gutierrez, 2013;
Tiehen, Jolliffe, & Gunderson, 2012). So has the Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families program [TANF] program (Aratani et al., 2014; Banerjee & Damman, 2013;
Bitler et al., 2014; Bloom, Loprest, & Zedlewski, 2011; Rodgers & Tedin, 2006; Sheely,
2012; Siegel, Green, Abbott, Mogul, & Patacsil, 2004). A similar trend is followed with
studies related to the Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and
Children—popularly known as WIC (Bitler & Currie, 2005; Figlio, Hamersma, & Roth,
2009; Hoynes, Page, & Stevens, 2011; Joyce, Racine, & Yunzal-Butler, 2008; Lee &
Mackey-Bilaver, 2007; Ludwig & Miller, 2005), and those that pertain to the Children’s
Health Insurance Program [CHIP] (Baicker & Finkelstein, 2011; Howell & Kenney,
2012; Joyce & Racine, 2005; Levine & Schanzenbach, 2009; Lindrooth & McCullough,
2007; Yang & Gaydos, 2010).
Some scholars have called for more research on concurrent enrollment in social
welfare programs. In reviewing three recent books on poverty in the United States,
Meyers (2014) concluded that the persistence of poverty in American may be connected
to social researchers’ failure to ask the right questions on the subject. Her review points
to the fact that the poverty literature is too narrow in scope as research is often limited to
descriptive studies of the incidence and prevalence rates of poverty. As a result, more
important areas that need to be investigated are overlooked. Meyers’ (2014)
recommendations for future research include asking investigative questions about the
relationships between social welfare policies and their impacts on participants. Similarly,
after reviewing several safety net programs, Gassman-Pines and Hill (2013) urged future
researchers to turn their attention toward investigating how children and families are
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affected by the relative impact of their participation in multiple safety net programs.
Furthermore, while examining changes in nine safety net programs in the wake of the
1996 welfare reform legislation, Aratani and associates (2014) noted gaps in the body of
research on welfare policies. Looking forward to closing such gaps in the literature,
Aratani and associates (2014) recommended that future research be guided toward
answering questions that deal with participation in multiple safety-net programs.
Nevertheless, despite these suggestions, there are as yet a relatively small number of
researchers who have investigated the simultaneous participation of low-income people
in multiple safety net programs.
Aratani and associates (2014) examined whether the implementation of the 1996
welfare reform has resulted in the expansion or the shrinkage of the other safety net
programs at the national level. State-level data collected on nine programs between 1994
and 2002 revealed that the constriction of benefits under TANF has led to a reduction in
enrollment in other federally-funded welfare programs. Aratani and associates (2014)
study proposed one of the following two explanations for the decrease: (1) states decrease
funding and limit access to social programs or (2) poor people have become selfsufficient or have not applied for programs. However, there could be a combination of
both sets of explanations. In addition, some public welfare programs (before TANF)
provided access to other safety net benefits. Applicants for AFDC might be informed
about their eligibility for Medicaid and Food Stamps. In some states, this was automatic.
Public assistance caseworkers (at least before the separation of payments and services)
were expected to inform AFDC and other public assistance clients of benefits available to
them. With falling TANF enrollment, otherwise eligible Medicaid and Food Stamp
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beneficiaries might not be informed of their eligibility for these programs. Meanwhile,
the 1994-2002 time-period analyzed in this study may not be reflective of what the
current situation really is today for two reasons. First, TANF was still considered a
success during that timeframe. Therefore, there was no perceived need for states to
increase funding in other programs. Second, this 1994-2002 time-period preceded the
Great Recession during which there was somewhat of an expansion of services as
promoted by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Hence, the findings
from the study by Aratani and associates need to be replicated.
Gilbert, Nanda and Paige (2014) used administrative data from the State of
Maryland to investigate concurrent participation in other public assistance programs
among WIC recipients. Since participation in WIC automatically meets the eligibility
requirements for TANF, SNAP and Medicaid (USDA, 2015), Gilbert and associates
(2014) measured the enrollment of WIC beneficiaries in these programs. Results
demonstrated a minuscule percentage of cross-program participation between fall 2009
and fall 2010, as only 8% of WIC recipients were enrolled in all three of the other
programs (SNAP, TANF and Medicaid). In addition, 28 percent of WIC beneficiaries
were found to have no enrollment whatsoever in any of these programs.
The importance of these findings can be understood in light of the growing
concerns associated with low participation in welfare programs, even in times of
recession. Arguably, one of the goals of these programs is to support low-income families
who endure economic hardship. So when benefits are not claimed by eligible people,
there is reason for program stakeholders to worry. However, Gilbert and associates’
(2014) study of concurrent enrollment in multiple safety net programs has a few
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shortcomings. First and foremost, the study did not account for cross-participation among
recipients of TANF, SNAP, and Medicaid only. In fact, the study was focused on the
trajectory of WIC clients alone in the federal welfare system as opposed to a thorough
analysis of all four programs under consideration. Second, the sample only included
participants whose household income was at or below the FPL.
It is true that such an income criterion could ensure cross-program uniformity, but
this could also affect the overall validity of the study due to disparities in eligibility
requirements across programs. For example, there are more restrictions associated with
participating in TANF than there are for WIC, SNAP, and Medicaid. As Gilbert and
associates (2014) noted, the 5-year TANF time limit may have precluded WIC recipients
from being eligible for enrollment in both programs. Therefore, this low-participation
finding should be interpreted with caution. Finally, despite claims of statistically
significant differences in mean family income among enrollees in multiple programs as
opposed to WIC-only recipients, no effect sizes were reported. Instead, the significance
of such findings were reported in terms of p-values. This was a questionable decision by
Gilbert and associates (2014), considering the absence of randomization in the original
sample.
Shaefer and Edin (2013) studied the combined role played by means-tested
income transfer programs in mitigating extreme poverty among American households.
Extreme poverty is defined as the condition in which households with children live on
income less than or equal to $2 per day, per person (Shaefer & Edin, 2013). Using the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), Shaefer and Edin (2013) found that,
in 2011, safety net benefits reduce extreme poverty almost by half for 3.55 million
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children in 1.65 million families. These are interesting findings because extreme poverty
has long been considered a developing-country issue and not a concern for the American
people. To generate such striking results about the living conditions of citizens in one of
the richest countries in the world, Shaefer and Edin’s (2013) research has significant
implications for the social welfare arena. Indeed, in 2013 the number of children who
lived in households with an annual income below 50 percent of the poverty threshold is
estimated at 6.5 million—8.8 percent of the child population and 32.6 percent of all
people in deep poverty (DeNavas-Walt et al, 2008).
Shaefer and Edin (2013), however, did not include in their study all the non-cash
benefits that low-income American families actually receive. With SNAP, TANF, SSI,
SSDI, UI and simulated refundable credits as independent variables in the study, other
fundamental programs such school meals, WIC, and Head Start were not incorporated in
the research. The inclusion of such vital programs would have decreased the country’s
rate of extreme poverty to a greater extent than what the findings from Shaefer and
Edin’s (2013) study actually revealed. Therefore, with respect to extreme poverty,
America’s social safety net could be stronger than first appeared.
Under a cross-sectional design, Slack, Kim, Yang, and Berger (2014) conducted a
quantitative study on the various sources of income for low-income families in the United
States. A nationally representative sample of 3000 primary caregivers were selected,
using the longitudinal Fragile Families and Child Well-Being dataset. After eliminating
some participants due to missing data, the final sample of 2,864 was classified into four
clusters, based on the participants’ income sources. Participants in cluster 1 (n = 948) rely
heavily on both work wages and welfare benefits such as food assistance and healthcare
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assistance. Individuals in the cluster 2 group (n = 261) do not work and maintain survival
only through government aid. In cluster 3, participants (n = 795) have little connection
with the labor force and/or government aid (except for Medicaid). Finally, the cluster 4
group (n = 860) rely strongly on earnings but not much on welfare. Ten different sources
of income were identified through this study—SSI, TANF, SNAP, Medicaid, HCV,
childcare subsidies, child support, EITC, UI, and earnings. The results, therefore,
demonstrated the fundamental role of the safety net programs in helping both employed
and unemployed families meet their economic needs.
Based on this study’s findings, however, some questions can be raised about
whether or not the safety-net program could lead families to self-sufficiency. In fact,
combining cluster 1 and cluster 4 signifies that 63 percent of the participants (n = 1808)
have a strong connection with the workforce and, yet, still receive or qualify for federal
benefits. This could mean that people in these clusters only secure temporary or lowpaying jobs. While Slack et al.’s (2014) study is strong in terms of the inclusion of a
broad range of programs, one shortcoming is its failure to account for informal sources of
economic support such as under-the-table employment or aid received from family
members and friends.
Cancian, Han, and Noyes (2014) investigated the economic situation of lowincome families who have been disconnected from employment as well as from multiple
welfare programs. Using administrative data made available by the Department of Health
and Human Services of Wisconsin, Cancian et al. (2014) analyzed large-scale,
longitudinal samples of TANF and SNAP recipients collected in 2001, 2007 and 2010.
The dataset also includes information related to other federal welfare programs such as
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healthcare assistance, UI, SSDI, SSI, and earnings. The longitudinal nature of this dataset
allows cross-program and cross-cohort comparisons. A family disconnection measure
separated former welfare beneficiaries into four groups: (1) those with no income
whatsoever, (2) those without earnings, TANF, and SNAP, (3) those without earnings,
TANF, SNAP, and healthcare assistance, and (4) those without earnings, TANF, SNAP,
healthcare assistance, and child support. From this study, Cancian et al. (2014) found
that, when compared to SNAP beneficiaries, TANF recipients participated in more other
federal programs, but were less disconnected after leaving the welfare rolls. This is not
surprising, as TANF, at least in some states, may have a linking function that connects
recipients to other sources of assistance.
These findings can be understood within the context of TANF and SNAP
eligibility requirements. While participation in SNAP usually requires an income at or
below 130% of the FPL, eligibility for TANF is determined at the discretion of states.
Maximum benefits vary by state, but earnings of 50% or more of the FPL disqualify
households from receiving TANF in half the states. That is, with the beneficiaries of
TANF further below the FPL, that fact alone would make them eligible for more federal
benefits than their SNAP counterparts. Meanwhile, despite having originated from a
relatively strong source, the results of Cancian et al.’s (2014) research do not reflect the
reality at the national level for several reasons. First, based on the study demographics,
the participants with Hispanic ethnicity varied between 7.8 and 13.5 percent across
programs and cohorts. These numbers neither reflect the proportions of Hispanics in the
population of Wisconsin nor in the national population. In fact, according to the US
Census Bureau (2015b), Hispanics accounted for 17 percent of the US population in
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2014. Meanwhile, Wisconsin’s Hispanics constituted 6.6 percent of its population in
2015 (US Census Bureau, 2015c). Second, the take-up rate for TANF and SNAP in
Wisconsin is exceptionally low (Cancian et al., 2014). Third and finally, the study did not
take into consideration unofficial sources of income the study participants may have
relied upon instead of participating in government benefits. Therefore, these research
results should be interpreted with caution (Cancian et al., 2014).
Toward Self-Sufficiency
As a concept, self-sufficiency has taken the literature by storm. A general search
for the concept on two different electronic databases, Google Scholar and ProQuest,
generated 200,000 and 184,131 results, respectively. Even when narrowed down, using
the Self-Sufficiency Research Clearinghouse, the search still yielded 1907 hits. Clearly,
contemporary welfare states embrace the concept of self-sufficiency as a viable option
toward social citizenship (Betzelt, Bothfeld, & Béraud, 2011; Fleckenstein, 2012; Kildal
& Nilssen, 2011). For all the talk about self-sufficiency, however, this term is not
explicitly defined either by the government or by scholars. That is, there is no precise
definition for this concept which, therefore, remains relatively vague across the literature
(Hawkins, 2005; Hetling, Hoge, & Postmus, 2016; Perry-Burney & Jennings, 2003;
Sandfort & Hill, 1996). Yet, the term self-sufficiency has been mostly associated with
antipoverty policies and, more specifically, welfare-for-work programs (Bowen,
Desimone & McKay, 1995; Cancian & Meyer, 2004; Caputo, 1997; Gowdy &
Pearlmutter, 1993; Johnson & Corcoran, 2003; Parker, 1994).
Although the notion of self-sufficiency has been around since the days of
Aristotle (Wheeler, 1955), its adoption by American policymakers dates to the 1960s.
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President John Fitzgerald Kennedy called for self-sufficiency in his 1962 Message to
Congress on Public Welfare, which led to the Public Welfare Amendments of 1962
(Gilbert, 1966; Kennedy, 1962). Five years later, Congress created the Work Incentive
(WIN) program through the enactment of the 1967 Social Security Amendments (P. L.
90-248). WIN promoted self-sufficiency among welfare recipients through the
establishment of employment and training programs (Ballou, 2014; Gowdy &
Pearlmutter 1993). Since then, this notion has taken center stage in the poverty-reduction
discourse (Hawkins, 2005; Hong, Sheriff, & Naeger, 2009) and become, arguably, the
ultimate goal of the antipoverty welfare programs in America (Hawkins, 2005). The term
self-sufficiency echoes the values and principles fostered in American society which
emphasize economic independence as a means of achieving and living what is known as
the American Dream (Cochran, 1985; Shain, 1994). As understood under TANF, selfsufficiency is the state of having enough income that would make an individual or
household ineligible for cash assistance (Gowdy & Pearlmutter, 1993; P. L. 104–193).
Critics argued that the way in which self-sufficiency is perceived and measured
within the welfare system is obscure and thus should not be relied upon for program
evaluation purposes (Daugherty & Barber, 2001; Gowdy & Pearlmutter, 1993). In 1996,
following Gowdy and Pearlmutter’s (1993) criticism of the dualistic nature of the current
way of measuring self-sufficiency (self-sufficient vs. non self-sufficient), the SelfSufficiency Matrix (SSM) was developed during a 2004 taskforce organized by
Snohomish County, Washington. The SSM is a multidimensional scale which calculates
self-sufficiency based on the following 25 different outcomes: access to service, career
resiliency, childcare, clothing, education, employment stability, English language skills,
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food, daily function ability, housing, self-sufficiency standard income, area median
income, federal poverty income, legal aid services, household management skills, human
relations, goal setting and utilization of resources, mental health, parenting, physical
health, safety, substance abuse and support system. Each of these outcomes is then
measured along a five-stage continuum: In-crisis, Vulnerable, Stable, Safe and Thriving
(Snohomish County Self-Sufficiency Taskforce, 2004). Although a more robust and
holistic scale than the Federal Poverty Threshold which measures income money only,
the SSM is not consistent with the letter or the spirit of current social welfare policies.
Therefore, the SSM is not applicable to the context of this research.
The attainment of economic self-sufficiency among welfare beneficiaries has
been studied by many researchers. Hall, Graefe, and De Jong (2010) used the 1996 and
2001 panels of the SIPP longitudinal dataset to analyze the attainment and maintenance
of economic self-sufficiency among female immigrants who exit the welfare rolls. Their
performance in the labor market in terms of their ability to find and maintain employment
and earn better wages was compared to that of their counterparts in two control groups:
(a) those who were eligible but chose not to participate in TANF (eligible group) and (b)
the newcomers who were ineligible due to not meeting the state residency requirements
(ineligible group). Results indicate that, compared with the control groups, immigrant
women who leave TANF have the greatest likelihood becoming economically selfsufficient. In fact, TANF leavers were as likely to find employment as the eligible group,
but significantly more likely (36 percent) than the ineligible group. Compared to the other
two groups, TANF leavers also earned higher wages. In other words, TANF leavers
earned $2.22 more than the eligible immigrant women and $3.00 more than the ineligible
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immigrant women. However, participants in the treatment group (TANF leavers) were
less likely to secure stable employment than their counterparts in both groups (Hall et al.,
2010).
Despite its relatively strong methodology, Hall et al.’s (2010) study is limited to
female immigrants on welfare and therefore does not reflect the workforce trajectories for
all former TANF beneficiaries, especially women who were born in the United States. In
the same vein, both U.S.-born and immigrant males were excluded in Hall et al.’s (2010)
research. Hence, Hall et al.’s (2010) findings alone—although a significant contribution
the social welfare literature—should not be used to interpret economic self-sufficiency
among recipients of public assistance. More demographically diverse studies need to be
conducted before any unbiased conclusion can be made on the relative success of TANF.
In the meantime, Hall et al.’s (2010) work serves a reference point for future research.
Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Loeb and Corcoran
(2001) studied economic self-sufficiency among AFDC recipients. The ultimate purpose
of the study was to examine the impact of work experience on living wages among two
comparable groups of low-income women: those who received AFDC and those who did
not. Results yielded similar living wages for participants from both groups who had more
or less the same level of experience.
Some considerations should be taken into account in interpreting the results of
Loeb and Corcoran’s (2001) inquiry. First and foremost, the study used data collected
between 1978 and 1992, a timeframe that does not encompass the1996 welfare reform
years. In addition, the sample consisted of women aged between 27 and 34 who were
adolescents at baseline. Considering that most people in the United States work until the
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age of 65, there is a strong age limitation in Loeb and Corcoran’s (2001) findings.
Finally, what was considered work experience between 1970s and 1990s may not be the
case in today’s context, as many experienced workers have been negatively impacted by
the Great Recession. Hence, the conclusions drawn from Loeb and Corcoran’s work may
not be applicable to TANF beneficiaries in the post-Great Recession era.
Johnson & Corcoran (2003) expanded the scope of self-sufficiency by
investigating employment stability and mobility among former welfare recipients in the
state of Michigan. Analyzing data from the Women’s Employment Survey (WES)
collected between 1997 and 2002, Johnson & Corcoran (2003) found that the vast
majority of participants have difficulties maintaining their current employment and,
consequently, fail to move through the employment pipeline. One possible explanation
for the findings of Johnson & Corcoran’s (2003) study can be traced back to the sample.
Despite being randomly selected for the study, the participants were included based on
their low status in the labor market. Indeed, only low-skilled workers in entry-level
positions made up the sample. With no post-secondary degrees, it is understandable that
these participants faced tough barriers related to job stability and mobility. Moreover,
these findings reflect the conditions of ex-TANF recipients in the State of Michigan only
and thus may or may not be generalized to other areas of the country.
Another study conducted by Holzer, Stoll, and Wissoker (2004) in four different
states generated results fairly similar to Johnson and Corcoran’s (2003). Relatively large
numbers of job sites in Chicago, Cleveland, Milwaukee and Los Angeles were selected
via stratified methods. Telephone interviews were conducted with 750 hiring managers
for entry-level positions in each of the aforementioned cities with the objective of
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investigating employees’ performance and persistence in the labor market. Findings
suggested that workers with TANF backgrounds struggled to maintain employment due
to frequent job absences. Among other personal issues, lack of transportation prevented
them from being consistently on the worksites. Consequently, these workers failed to
garner the experience necessary for upward mobility (Holzer et al., 2004). As with most
of the studies described above, one limitation in Holzer et al.’s (2004) research is the fact
that the data used for analysis was collected in the late 1990s. Hence, its conclusions may
have had more implications for the pre-Great Recession decade than now. Nonetheless,
Holzer et al.’s (2004) findings serve as grounds for future research.
Combining longitudinal data collected from surveys between 1999 and 2003 with
administrative data from the New Jersey Division of Family Development, Wood,
Moore, and Rangarajan (2008) explored the economic trajectory of welfare recipients
over a five-year spell. Consistent with previous studies, results demonstrated that more
than half of the participants were not able to remain employed on a consistent basis.
While 88 percent of the participants found employment during their enrollment in the
program, many of them actually worked intermittently during the 60 month period.
Whether these findings are applicable in today’s economic conditions remains to be seen,
as the current economy is very different from the one that the country experienced during
the 1999-2003 quinquennium. Pending more recent research, Wood et al.’s (2008) work
reinforces the idea that most TANF recipients do not reach self-sufficiency over time.
Limitations of Previous Research and Rationale for the Current Study
As mentioned previously, the current scholarship on concurrent enrollment in
multiple antipoverty welfare programs is limited. In addition, the small pool of studies in
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this area falls under the rubric of one the following four trends: (1) availability of and
accessibility to multiple programs; (2) barriers associated with simultaneous participation
in multiple services; (3) income packaging; and (4) impact of multiple programs on wellbeing. Therefore, the existing literature fails to adequately account for the impact of these
programs on attainment and maintenance of economic self-sufficiency among
participants. Hence, studies examining participation in multiple programs have not
investigated in-depth a major purpose of the social safety net in the United States: the
attainment and maintenance of economic self-sufficiency.
Meanwhile, most of the studies reviewed in this proposal used data collected
between the 1970s and 1990s. Considering the impact of PRWORA in reshaping the
public assistance landscape in America, it can be argued that data collected before the
1996 welfare legislation may not be useful for the evaluation of federal programs in the
post-Great Recession era (Slack et al., 2014). This study uses the most current dataset
available to assess the merits and shortcomings of federal policies. The 2008 SIPP Panel
captures the severe socio-economic conditions faced by low-income households not only
as a result of the implementation of the welfare reform but also following the 2008 Great
Recession. Furthermore, the literature has given considerable attention to female-headed
households with children that receive TANF. This research focuses on female
householders, male householders, as well as married couples.
Significance of Current Study
This research will hold macro-implications for poverty and social welfare
stakeholders at local, state, and national levels, including policy designers, social
researchers, social advocates, service providers and end-users of programs. This research
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will be of paramount importance for stakeholders at local, state, and federal levels of
governance. The findings of this study will allow policymakers to reassess poverty and
social welfare interventions from a proximal-distal perspective, i.e., the relatively longterm impact of policy. In fact, most of the current welfare policies are povertyremediation measures. The federal government has spent billions of dollars toward
addressing poverty instead of preventing the issue itself. Thus, it would be important to
determine the long-term impact of poverty-prevention interventions.
Drawing on findings from the literature, Holzer, Schanzenbach, Duncan, &
Ludwig (2008) estimated the economic costs of child poverty on the American economy
to average $500 billion per year, or 3.8 percent of the country’s gross domestic product
(GDP). Holzer et al.’s (2008) methodology was related to the economic efforts made by
the federal government to address healthcare, criminal justice, and workforce
unproductivity costs. According to Holzer et al.’s (2008), childhood poverty is linked to
poor health conditions during adulthood, a higher level of street crimes, and lack of
opportunities in the labor market. In other words, had child poverty not existed, the
United States would have saved on an annual basis 3.8 percent its gross domestic product
(GDP) on healthcare, criminal justice and “foregone earnings and productivity”
expenditures (p. 13). Holzer et al.’s (2008) estimates on federal poverty-triggered
expenses can be open to debate due to three reasons. First, street crimes are not
necessarily a function of poverty, even if most of these crimes tend to be committed by
the poor. Indeed, drug- and alcohol-related motives are also strong predictors of such
crimes. Second, several federal anti-poverty areas such as education, housing, food, and
cash assistance were omitted in Holzer et al.’s (2008) study. Finally, his work was
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conducted before the Great Recession and the subsequent implementation of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Therefore, these estimates on the
annual poverty-related expenses in the country are far from accurate.
Taking a slightly different yet more tangible method, the Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities [CBPP] (2015) also attempted to measure the economic costs associated
with poverty. In fact, using data from the Office of Management and Budget, the CBPP
(2015) estimated the federal expenditures on public assistance programs at $370 billion in
2014. It should be noted, however, that this estimate covered only the following safety
net programs: EITC, CTC, SSI, UI, SNAP, HCV, Home Energy Assistance, School
Meals Program, Childcare Assistance, and Child Welfare Assistance. One fundamental
problem associated with this report can be related to the fact that not all of the programs
listed above target poor families. For instance, households with a yearly joint income of
up to $149,000 are still eligible for the child tax credit (CTC). Similarly, unemployment
insurance (UI) is not limited to the poor but to unemployed individuals with a proven
work history. Furthermore, the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is not necessarily
available to everyone who lives in poverty. There is a means test of assets and income
which determines eligibility for SSI. The program primarily targets three groups of
people: elderly, blind and disabled who lack economic support. Assistance is provided to
these individuals because of age or because their physical conditions may preclude them
from being economically self-sufficient. Another major flaw associated with the CBPP
report is the exclusion of the federal expenses on educational programs such as Head
Start, Pell Grant and Job Corps. These are three key federal means-tested programs aimed
at improving the economic conditions of low-income families through education and job
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training. By omitting these fundamental benefits in its calculation, the CBPP’s (2015)
report cannot be considered accurate.
A more accurate estimation is provided by the US House Budget Committee
Majority Staff (2014) which extends the federal expenses on social safety net
programs to nearly $800 billion for the 2012 fiscal year. This estimate
encompassed 92 federally-sponsored programs which can be clustered into the
following categories: education and job training programs, health programs, food
programs, cash programs, housing programs, energy programs, veterans programs,
and social services programs. The table below (Table 1) explains in a detailed
manner the type, number, example and costs of federally-funded welfare programs
as well as the agencies that ensure the supervision of these programs at the fed eral
level.
Table 1. Federal Expenditures on Safety Net Programs
for the Fiscal Year 2012
Programs

N*

Examples

Costs in
$billion

Federal Agency Involved

Education
and Job
Training
Programs

28

Childcare services; Pell
Grant; Workforce
Investment Act; Head
Start; Job Corps; Title I
of the Elementary and
Secondary Education
Act; American
Opportunity Tax Credit

94.4

Department of Education
DHHS*; CNCS*
Department of labor
Department of the Interior
Department of the Treasury
Environment Protection
Agency

Health
Programs

8

Medicaid; CHIP*; IHS*;
Federal Health Centers;
Medicare Part D;
MCHSBG*

291.3

Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS)

Food
Programs

17

SNAP*; NSLP*; SBP*;
WIC*; CACFP*

105.0

Department of Agriculture
DHHS; Homeland Security

54

Cash
Programs

5

SSI*; TANF*; EITC*;
CTC*; Title IV-E (Foster
Care Adoption)

220.0

SSA*
DHHS*; The Treasury

Housing
Programs

22

Tenant-based Rental
Assistance; Project-based
Rental Assistance; Public
Housing; Low-income
Housing Tax Credit;
Home Investment
Partnership Program;
Homeless Assistance
Grants

49.6

Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD)
Department of Agriculture
Department of the Treasury

Energy
Programs

2

Weatherization
Assistance Program;
LIHEAP*

3.9

Department of Energy
DHHS*

Veterans
Affairs

2

Disability Pension; VA
Health

21.0

Department of Veterans
Affairs

Social
Services
Programs

8

Community Development
Block Grant; Economic
Development Assistance
Program; Defender
Services and the Public
Defender of the District
of Columbia; Schools
and Libraries Support

13.0

ARC*; CSOSADC*; HUD
Department of Commerce
Department of
Transportation
The Judiciary; FCC*
Legal Services Corporation

Total

92

798.2

20

* N = Number; CHIP = Children’s Health Insurance Program; IHS = Indian Health Service;
MCHSBG= Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grants; SNAP= Supplemental Nutritional
Assistance Program; NSLP= National School Lunch Program; SBP= School Breakfast Program;
WIC= Women, Infants, and Children; CACFP= Child and Adult Care Food Program; SSI=
Supplemental Security Income; SSA = Social Security Administration; TANF= Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families; EITC= Earned Income Tax Credit; CTC= Child Tax Credit;
LIHEAP= Low-income Home Energy Assistance Program; DHHS= Department of Health and
Human Services; CNCS= Corporation for National and Community Service; ARC= Appalachian
Regional Commission; CSOSADC= Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the
District of Columbia; FCC= Federal Communications Commission

Source: House Budget Committee Majority Staff, 2014
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As seen in the table above, the federal government involvement in combatting
poverty is quite extensive. Twenty different agencies administer 92 programs aimed at
remediating the devastating effects of poverty on children and adults. However, some
programs such as the Workforce Investment Act, the American Opportunity Tax Credit,
the Child Tax Credit and the Veterans Affairs (VA) do not necessarily belong in this list
based on their target population (although the poor may benefit from these programs).
For example, the American Opportunity Tax Credit can be claimed by a family whose
joint annual income is up to $180,000. Similarly, middle-class families with joint income
of up to $149,000 can claim the Child Tax Credit. Moreover, the Workforce Investment
Act serves the unemployed (not necessarily the poor), while the VA provides services
only to people with military backgrounds, not necessarily the poor. Hence, the nearly
$800 billion estimate of federal expenditures on safety net programs for the fiscal year
2012 was slightly over calculated. All adjustments considered, the economic costs of the
federal antipoverty programs could be between 700 and 750 billion dollars in 2012. Yet,
these numbers do not reflect today’s reality in terms of poverty relief efforts in America
for two reasons. First and foremost, relief efforts at state and local levels are excluded
and, second, the costs associated with the implementation of the Affordable Care Act
(ACA)—which does not benefit only the poor—were not available in 2012. Therefore, it
can be concluded that poverty remediation costs weigh heavily on the shoulders of the
nation.
This chapter provided an in-depth exploration of the body of scholarship on
multiple program enrollment and economic self-sufficiency. The vast majority of
researchers have demonstrated preference for single programs. TANF, SNAP, EITC, and
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Medicaid are by far the most widely researched single programs of the social safety net.
Researchers who studied multiple program participation used non-experimental designs
and utilized data collected years before the Great Recession. Considering the large
number of low-income families in America, the literature on economic self-sufficiency is
arguably all but limited. Even the Great Recession failed to trigger a proportional
investigative response from poverty and social welfare researchers. The federal
government continues to spend decent amounts of money on a broad range of social
programs on an annual basis. The gaps in the literature coupled with welfare expenditures
constitute the rationale for the current investigation. A critical examination of the most
common theories, theses, models, and perspectives about poverty and social welfare are
presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV. PERSPECTIVES, THESES, THEORIES, AND MODELS ABOUT
POVERTY AND SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA
Poverty and social welfare have long been considered cross-disciplinary topics.
Therefore, their depth and breadth are being studied and reviewed in several fields,
including social work, sociology, economics, law, philosophy, and political science. By
the same token, theories associated with poverty and/or social welfare emanate from
diverse disciplines. Discussed in this chapter are some of the most widely-disseminated
perspectives, theses, theories and models that have attempted to explain aspects of
poverty and social welfare.
Theoretical Perspectives on the Etiology of Poverty
The etiology of poverty is a matter that has puzzled social researchers for
centuries. Even today theorists struggle to reach an agreement on what should constitute
the causal agent of poverty. The literature has witnessed the emergence of a plethora of
theories stemming from constant efforts by social scientists to explain poverty and its
causes. The individualistic theory, the cultural theory and the structural theory are the
three main theoretical perspectives on poverty found across the literature. These theories
will be critically analyzed in the paragraphs below.
Individualistic theory of poverty. The individualistic theory posits that poverty
results from individual deficiencies, such as lack of skills, laziness, or poor choices.
Proponents of this perspective trace the root of poverty no further than the poor’s own
failure to thrive in society (Huber & Form, 1973; Huber, 1974; Gans, 1995; Kluegel &
Smith, 1986; Rainwater, 1970). The basic tenets of this theory are grounded in the
capitalist ideas of wealth promoted during the Protestant Reformation in which the poor
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were labeled as cursed by God (Weber, 1930, 2001). The individualistic theory of
poverty rests on the premises that (1) America is a land of opportunities; (2) every citizen
can live the American Dream through hard work and discipline in the labor market; and
(3) the government should not interfere with the flow of the labor market by providing
welfare assistance to the poor, except in case of force majeure (Rank, 2004; Stone, 2002).
This is therefore a conservative perspective that promotes the work ethic and a limited
welfare state, although historically liberals as well have promoted work. The difference
lays in the means used, with liberals favoring soft services like counseling and job
training and conservatives favoring mandated services such as time limits and work
participation rates.
Estimates conducted under the auspices of American Enterprise Institute and Los
Angeles Times in 1985 revealed that roughly two-thirds of Americans believed that
individuals are responsible for their own economic hardships (Lewis & Schneider, 1985).
The replication of the study in 2016 demonstrated that Americans’ attitudes about the
cause of poverty have not changed in the past 30 years, as 66 percent of the participants
held the poor accountable for their own fate (Doar, Bowman, & O’Neil, 2016). The
individualistic theory of poverty does not take into consideration the fact that people who
are born with major genetic, cognitive, or physical deficiencies should not be blamed for
these problems. Ryan (1976) coined the term “blaming the victim” to describe the limits
and shortcomings of the individualistic theory. Ryan (1976) pointed out the erroneous
tendency in America to assign “exceptionalistic explanations to universalistic problems”
(p. 19). Another problem with the individualistic theory is the exclusion of
environmental factors in impacting people’s economic conditions. For example, natural
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disasters, recession, unemployment and underemployment, and low-paying jobs are some
of these factors not necessarily inherent to individuals. Social welfare policies such as
EITC and TANF are founded upon the individualistic theory (Campbell & Wright, 2005;
Hasenfeld, 2009; Levitan, Mangum, Mangum, & Sum, 2003; Maskovsky, 2001;
O’Connor, 2001).
Cultural theory of poverty. Oscar Lewis is credited for his work in developing
the cultural theory of poverty which posits that poverty results from (1) self-segregation
of the poor and (2) the transmission of a culture of poverty from parents to children
(Lewis, 1966). According to Lewis (1966), the poor isolate themselves from society
based on their infrequent utilization of social and community resources such as banks,
parks, libraries, hospitals, museums and art galleries. The utilization of these resources
would provide the poor with information and social capital necessary to escape poverty.
Conversely, self-isolation from the mainstream society leads to the perpetuation of an
unfit set of values and norms regarding poverty. Hence, by not taking advantage of the
opportunities available to them in the community, the poor fabricate a culture of poverty
which has been transferred from one generation into another (Lewis, 1966). Children who
are born and raised in impoverished environments tend to assimilate this culture of
poverty even before reaching 8 years old. These children become psychologically
unprepared to exploit the social opportunities presented in their community and thus
seem to be trapped in a cycle of poverty which their parents and grandparents could not
escape.
Murray (1990) extended Lewis’s (1966) work by contending that the culture of
poverty is characterized by criminal activities, illicit drugs, and family disintegration.
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Describing the British underclass, Murray (1990) argued that members of this class
choose to remain poor because of the culture of poverty encouraged by the distribution of
welfare. Hence, cultural theorists tend to blame those who live on public assistance,
questioning their attitude toward hard work as a core American value. These theorists
basically blame public assistance programs themselves for providing perverse incentives
to the poor. Their conclusion implies that welfare programs lead to generational poverty
by discouraging work among able-bodied individuals through unreasonable incentives
(Murray, 1984, 1990).
The cultural theory of poverty has drawn a wave of criticism mainly from social
exclusion theorists who argue that the poor do not have the means to exploit the
opportunities in their communities because of their exclusion from the mainstream
society. Contrary to Lewis who contended that the poor exclude themselves from society,
social exclusion theorists argue that the society excludes the poor from the opportunities
and privileges that the non-poor have access to. Silver (1994) explained:
….people may be excluded from: a livelihood; secure, permanent employment;
earnings; property, credit or land; housing; the minimal or prevailing consumption
level; education, skills and cultural capital; the benefits provided by the welfare
state; citizenship and equality before the law; participation in the democratic
process; public goods; the nation or the dominant race; the family and sociability;
humane treatment, respect, personal fulfilment, understanding. (p. 541)
Social exclusion constitutes a barrier preventing the poor from exiting poverty. In
other words, the poor share similar values as the rest of society, but face more barriers
than other members of the society. Removing these barriers is therefore necessary for
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escaping poverty. Social exclusion rejects the notion of culture of poverty, as povertyborn children manage to exit the cycle of poverty to lead a successful life. This process
may or may not necessitate adaptation to the mainstream culture.
The structural theory of poverty. In stark contrast to the individualistic theory,
the structural theory of poverty posits that poverty is the result of a systemic failure.
Adherents of this perspective argue that the government should constantly take
reasonable steps to reduce inequality by ensuring economic opportunities for its citizens
through creation of jobs, regulation of the minimum wage, and expansion of social safety
net programs (Blank, 1997; Jencks, 1996; Tobin, 1994). Structural theories are consistent
with the work of Emile Durkheim, the French sociologist and philosopher who argued
that social influences exist even in circumstances where individuals resort to taking their
own lives (Durkheim, 1897; 1951).
Theses of Welfare Expansion
Social researchers provide multiple explanations for the exponential growth in
welfare caseloads, particularly from the middle of the 1960s and the middle of the 1970s.
Beardwood (1968) attributed this welfare explosion to the mass exodus of the southern
rural poor African-Americans to the North in a quest for better living conditions between
1945 and 1965. Moynihan (1965a) stressed that the disintegration of the family unit
within the black community led to the formation of single-parent families, mostly headed
by females. So the migration from the south to the north combined with the rise in
female-headed households accounted for the huge increase in welfare rolls in the 1960s.
While Rodgers (1982) underlined the gap between demand (number of people in need)
and supply (lack of jobs) that characterized the 1960s, Patterson (1981) emphasized the
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positive effects of the Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty in reducing
stigmas associated with welfare participation. Patterson (1981) also emphasized the
mobilization of legal and political power that resulted in changes in the administration of
public assistance eligibility determination. Still, McCarty and Zald (1973) and Moynihan
(1965b) pointed to welfare officials as the driving force behind the late 1960s and early
1970s rise in the welfare take-up rate. The continued exploration of the welfare explosion
topic by public policy experts gave birth to competing theories. The first one is the thesis
of “Social Control” proposed by American sociologists and political activists Richard
Cloward and Frances Fox Piven in 1971, while the second one—the thesis of “Mass
Society”—was developed by Danish-born sociologist Kirsten Anderson Grønbjerg in
1977. In the following paragraphs, a close look is attributed to each of these two theses.
Social control thesis. According to Piven and Cloward’s (1971, 1993) thesis, in
western capitalist societies, welfare serves as a thermostat to regulate the political
climate, or a switch to manipulate the behavior of the poor. This theory is thus based on
two fundamental assumptions about welfare: (1) a moderating role characterized by
increases in welfare programs during times of social rebellion; and (2) the promotion of
low-wage work among the poor through decreases in welfare expenditures during periods
of political calm. That is, with a climate of political stability, governmental leaders are
more likely to adopt austerity tactics by cutting spending on welfare programs. By
contrast, during times of political instability, pro-welfare policies are likely to be
implemented in order to restore equilibrium.
Piven and Cloward (1971, 1993) associated the expansion of the federal welfare
programs in the United States between the 1960s and the 1970s with the urban riots that
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ravaged American cities in the 1960s and the Democratic Party’s increasing dependence
on the urban Northern African-American vote in order to win elections. In only three
years (between 1965 and 1968), 160 major American cities were affected by the riots
perpetrated mostly by African-Americans (Feagin & Hahn, 1973). In their book entitled
“Regulating the Poor,” Piven and Cloward (1971, 1993) contended that some of the
“Great Society” programs under the Johnson administration were a direct result of such
political turmoil. In other words, the explosion of welfare during the early stages of the
“War on Poverty” was a political strategy to appease the African-American community
and halt the progression of the 1960s urban riots.
Piven and Cloward (1971, 1993) also asserted that the welfare provision under the
“New Deal” package in the 1930s was implemented not as a result of the “Great
Depression” per se, but because the government felt threatened by growing protests and
incidents of sabotage in the labor market. The socio-political and economic chaos that
surrounded the Great Depression climate prompted the passage and implementation of
antipoverty policies in the 1930s. The distribution of welfare was then shrunk over the
next two decades due to a lack of social and political revolts during the 1940s and the
1950s.
The welfare state literature contains empirical evidence that supports Piven and
Cloward’s (1971, 1993) thesis by demonstrating associations between civil disobedience
and increases in social welfare policies in the latter half of the 1960 decade (Betz, 1974;
Chamlin, 1992; Hicks & Swank, 1983; Isaac & Kelly, 1981; Jennings, 1979; Schram &
Turbett, 1983a). Other researchers, however, inflicted a major blow to Piven and
Cloward’s (1971) Social Control Thesis upon finding no relationships between political
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unrest and growth in welfare expenditures in the late 1960s (Albritton, 1979; Durman,
1973). One explanation to these contradictory findings from Albritton (1979) and
Durman (1973) was provided by Schram and Turbett (1983b):
We hypothesize that the welfare explosion in the late 1960s was in part the result
of a two-step process in which civil disorder impelled the national government to
enact liberalizations of welfare policy which in turn were most actively
implemented by those states most wracked by rioting. (408)
To test their hypothesis, Schram and Turbett (1983b) handcrafted a “Standardized
Riot Severity Score” to measure the rigor, frequency and magnitude of the urban riots
across states during the 1960s and the 1970s (p. 410). Schram and Turbett (1983b) found
relationships between riots and increases in welfare at the state level, not necessarily at
the city level. In fact, responding to civil disorder of great magnitude is more a function
of states rather than cities. Similarly, in the U.S. public assistance system, states and the
federal government control welfare spending more than cities do, both before and after
1996. That is, the urban riots triggered the passage of liberal welfare policies (first-step
process) which, in turn, are enforced primarily in states most severely damaged by social
disturbances. These findings, therefore, not only support the aforementioned hypothesis
but also represent a viable source of empirical evidence for the Piven and Cloward’s
(1971) Thesis of Social Control (Schram & Turbett, 1983b).
One recent study conducted by Chamlin, Burek, & Cochran (2007) tested the
Piven and Cloward (1971) thesis using data from the Wisconsin experiment of the impact
of TANF program participation on workforce participation and welfare exit. Chamlin et
al. (2007) tested the following two hypotheses: (1) “the implementation of TANF
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legislation should lead to an increase in the size of the labor force above and beyond that
which could be accounted for by ongoing social processes” and (2) “the implementation
of TANF legislation should lead to a decline in the size of the welfare population above
and beyond that which could be accounted for by ongoing social processes” (p. 136-137).
These hypotheses are related to the other side of Piven and Cloward’s (1971) thesis of
social control which suggests that welfare is restricted during periods of political stability
in order to regulate the poor’s attitudes and behaviors toward the workforce. The
Wisconsin experiment accumulates workforce data as well as time-limit data on TANF
recipients from 1985 to 2004 and 1991 to 2004, respectively. A sample size of 240 for
workforce participation and 168 for time-limit was collected for analysis (Chamlin et al.,
2007). Results did not corroborate the hypotheses and, ultimately, provided little support
for one side of the Piven and Cloward’s (1971) thesis of social control (Chamlin et al.,
2007).
One way to interpret Chamlin et al.’s (2007) findings can be related to the fact the
integration of TANF recipients into the labor market is contingent upon the strength of
the economy as was the case in the early years that followed the implementation of the
program at the national level (Murray & Primus, 2005; Sheely, 2012). Chamlin et al.’s
(2007) findings can also be interpreted in light of potential barriers to employment faced
by TANF recipients. These include disabilities, low education, age, physical and mental
illness, lack of transportation, lack of affordable childcare (Banerjee & Damman, 2013;
Bloom et al., 2011; Danziger & Seefeldt, 2003; Dworsky & Courtney, 2007; Pavetti,
2002; Sandstrom, Seefeldt, Huerta, & Loprest, 2014; Siegel et al., 2004). Finally, the
small sample involved in the Wisconsin experiment does not allow generalization of
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findings to the entire U. S. population. Therefore, the results of this test are not enough to
refute Piven and Cloward’s (1971) thesis of social control (Chamlin et al., 2007).
Mass society thesis. Grønbjerg’s (1977) Mass Society Thesis is a diametrically
opposing schema to that of Piven and Cloward (1971, 1993). According to Grønbjerg’s
(1977) thesis, citizens who cannot support themselves economically are entitled to
receive public assistance as a natural right. Therefore, the expansion of welfare in the
1960s and 1970s was a signal that the United States was edging toward a “mass society”
defined as a rapid shift in the allocation of welfare assistance by the government to
hitherto excluded individuals and groups (Aigner, 1982).
By evoking the notion of entitlement, Grønbjerg’s (1977) thesis is somewhat an
extension of the liberal view of social welfare which links social assistance to
humanitarian actions from the government to remediate social problems (Wilensky,
1975). By the same token, Grønbjerg’s (1977) thesis draws a similar connotation with
Marshall’s concept of “social citizenship” which emphasizes social rights. These
comprise a vast array of prerogatives ranging from “the right to a modicum of economic
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the
life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall,
1992, 8). So the explosion of welfare facilitated the gradual merger of the “periphery”
with the “center.” That is to say, welfare recipients (periphery) become integral members
of the conventionally accepted society (center) through the expansion of government
assistance (Grønbjerg, 1977).
To test her thesis, Grønbjerg (1977) regressed the outcome (welfare explosion) on
multiple predictors such as voter participation, median education, professional workforce,

67

urbanization, industrialization, and state per capita revenue. These predictor variables
where hypothesized to be factors associated with a rapid change toward “mass society.”
Grønbjerg (1977) also included in her analysis some factors of need such as family
dysfunction, migration, and unemployment. Results demonstrated that (1) the need
factors were better predictors of welfare expansion in the 1960s than were the “mass
society” factors; (2) both the need factors and the “mass society” factors were key
predictors of the large rise in AFDC caseloads in 1970s; and (3) the “mass society”
factors were highly associated with interstate differences in AFDC caseloads between the
1960s and 1970s. Based on these findings, Grønbjerg (1977) rejected in its entirety Piven
and Cloward’s (1971) social control thesis in favor of her mass society hypothesis.
In a comparative analysis of the “Mass Society,” thesis, Schram and Turbett
(1983a) pointed out the fact that Grønbjerg (1977) failed to account for the social control
thesis in the multivariate analysis of the variables. By omitting rioting activities as a
predictor of welfare growth, Grønbjerg (1977) actually introduced her work to the
scientific community in a biased way. Schram and Turbett (1983a) continued their
criticism of Grønbjerg’s (1977) work by contending that the mass society thesis leaves
doors open for “speculation” (p. 619).
Using multiple regression, Schram and Turbett (1983a) tested the mass society
model while controlling for the social control thesis. To do so, Schram and Turbett
(1983a) identified a list of possible welfare growth predictors that include (1) the mass
society indicators (voter participation, median education, professional workforce,
urbanization, industrialization, state per capita revenue) which were actually used in
Grønbjerg’s (1977) analysis; (2) the need indicators (family dysfunction, migration,
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unemployment) which were also included in Grønbjerg’s (1977) work; (3) the social
control indicators (severity of state-level riots). They also included “state median
income” and “average community action expenditures per poor person” (p. 621). As per
the results, median income and riots were the two most statistically significant predictors
of the welfare explosion between the 1960 and 1970 decade while controlling for all the
other variables. Hence, these findings attribute little credence to Grønbjerg’s (1977)
Mass Society Thesis, while providing more empirical support to the social control model
(Schram & Turbett, 1983a).
Theories of Devolution and Racial Disparities in Social Welfare
Perhaps the two most prominent empirically-proven theories about the devolution
of welfare policies and racial disparities in public assistance are (1) Schneider and
Ingram’s Theory of Policy Design and Social Construction and (2) Soss’ Racial
Classification Model. The latter is often seen as an extension of the former. This
proposed research relies on the premises of these two fundamental theoretical
frameworks toward explaining relevant issues in the current welfare state in America.
Through the lenses of these theories, the proposed research will particularly look at how
federal welfare policies affect low-income recipients on their way toward economic selfsufficiency. A critical analysis of these theories is provided below.
Theory of policy design and social construction. Articulated in the 1990s by
Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram, the Theory of Social Construction and Policy Design
is an empirically tested framework that explains the political drives behind the formation
of policy designs (Schneider & Ingram, 1997). This theoretical framework, therefore, sets
the stage for assessing the merits and shortcomings of social policies in addressing social
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problems. The Theory of Social Construction and Policy Design rests on two
fundamental propositions: the “target population proposition” and the “feed-forward
proposition” (Ingram, Schneider, & deLeon, 2007, pp. 98, 101).
Target population proposition. The “Target Population Proposition” posits that
public policies are designed in accordance with the way their end-users (target
population) are politically and socially perceived. That is, a target population constructed
as deserving and powerful will have a greater share of the economic resources, and is
likely to be subjected to supportive policies. On the other hand, a group of people
identified by the government and members of the society as undeserving and powerless
will have access to less economic opportunities but deal with tougher policy guidelines
(Ingram et al., 2007; Schneider & Ingram, 1997). Hence, the unequal treatment
associated with policy designs further extends the economic disparities among social
groups.
Feed-forward proposition. The “Feed-Forward Proposition” implies that policy
designs produce long-lasting impacts on the end-users, affecting their behaviors and
perceptions of themselves in the process. In doing so, policy designs set the stage for
shaping future policies that can generate desirable outcomes. This “feed-forward” process
ensures the continuity of the social construction patterns assigned to social groups,
thereby maintaining or even exacerbating the socio-political-economic differences that
exist between these groups (Ingram et al., 2007; Schneider & Sidney, 2009).
Schneider and Ingram’s Theory of Social Construction and Policy Design has
grown in popularity and emerged as one of the most widely used theoretical frameworks
for assessing social policies. Indeed, over just a 20 year span (from its inception in 1993
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to 2013), this theory was used in 111 empirical studies. Social researchers from various
backgrounds have used this model to guide their inquiries on the effects of public policies
on the intended target populations. The most popular fields of study where this theory
was applied in the last two decades include social welfare, immigration, criminal justice,
health, education, environment and urban affairs (Pierce et al., 2014).
Relevance to social welfare and current study. As a result of the biased
approach adopted by the government in the design of social policies, the federal safety
net is composed of two preponderant classes of programs: one that is designed for
deserving individuals and another one for undeserving ones. The double standard in
public policy approaches to target populations lead to what social scientists have labeled
a “two-tier” welfare system where the privileged population receive the top-tier benefits
and the underprivileged groups are recipients of the bottom-tier benefits (Fraser &
Gordon, 1994; Lieberman, 1998; Orloff, 1996). The top-tier welfare programs provide
benefits to recipients with proven work history and may include but are not limited to the
Unemployment Insurance program, the Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance
program, and the Medicare program. The bottom-tier welfare programs, in contrast, are
designed for needy individuals and families who cannot provide for themselves and
therefore rely on the government for economic survival. Since this class of people is
constructed as undeserving, there are relatively stronger requirements for receiving
benefits (Chang, 2015). The welfare programs that are considered bottom-tier are the
means-tested benefits such as the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program
(TANF), the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP), or the Housing
Choice Voucher program (HCV).
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The difference in treatment between the advantaged and the disadvantaged groups
on the part of the government also widens the gaps of inequality among them. Therefore,
Schneider and Ingram’s Theory of Social Construction and Policy Design increases
awareness about social and economic disparities in the design and implementation of
governmental efforts toward alleviating social problems at local, state and federal levels.
By promoting democratic practices and social justice in the creation of public policies,
this framework holds a substantial implication for the social work profession. With
respect to the proposed study, the Theory of Social Construction and Policy Design will
serve as a framework for the analysis of the effects of the federal safety net programs on
recipients’ empowerment toward self-sufficiency. Particular attention will be paid to the
bottom-tier programs due to the fact that these programs target the disadvantaged
populations.
Racial classification model (RCM). Developed and tested in 2008 by Joe Soss,
Richard C. Fording, and Sanford F. Schram, the Racial Classification Model (RCM)
extends Schneider and Ingram’s groundbreaking work on social construction and policy
design by identifying race as a key element in the choice, transfer and implementation of
welfare policies. The RCM is based on three fundamental propositions.
Proposition 1. The first proposition suggests that welfare policies aim to answer
preconceived questions related to the sociopolitical conditions of “specific target
populations” (Schneider & Ingram, 1997) and are implemented based on the “salient
social classifications and reputations” of these targeted populations. This means, policies
designed to address social problems would become irrelevant in the absence of a target
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group perceived through social classification lenses (Soss, Fording, & Schram, 2008, p.
539).
Proposition 2. The second proposition posits that racial prevalence in a given
welfare program serves as a basis for policymakers to anticipate success or failure
associated with its implementation. That is, the prevalence of African-Americans on
program caseloads may force legislators to adopt policies that emphasize strong
workforce participation. Furthermore, the reputation of these African-Americans in
regard to the labor market may influence the decision of a welfare official in enforcing
more stringent regulations against them as opposed to their White or Hispanic
counterparts (Soss et al., 2008).
Proposition 3. The third proposition asserts that differences must exist among
racial groups in order for them to be tractable by those charged with choosing,
implementing and enforcing welfare policies. When “racial contrasts” form and become
significant, policies are tailored and applied based on the reputations of racial groups in
the mainstream culture. Such contrasts grow even bolder when welfare officials observe
behaviors that are consistent with the way individuals and racial groups are depicted
within the broader social context (Soss et al., 2008).
From the three propositions specified above derive four sets of hypotheses related
to “race/ethnicity,” “social control,” “ideology and innovative problem solving,” and
“task environment” which, in turn, produce multiple distinct hypotheses (Soss et al.,
2008). The latter are related to what Soss et al. (2008) referred to as “second-order
devolution,” the legal authority granted by states to lower levels of governance
concerning the administration of the TANF program (p. 543). According to Soss et al.
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(2008), the transfer of administrative power from states to local governments (secondorder devolution) is expected to be higher in: (1) states that contain a large number of
African-Americans and Hispanics; (2) states that have a weak labor force but a strong
welfare take-up rate; (3) states that show class bias in voter turnout (4) states that invest
heavily in the erection of incarceration facilities; (5) states that embrace a “conservative”
approach to fiscal policy and where citizens’ political viewpoints are highly divergent;
and (6) states with a lower level of population density.
These hypotheses, among others, were tested for the 48 contiguous states
(excluding Nebraska due to its nonpartisan legislature) by means of the Binary Logit
Model. This statistical procedure allows the identification of state-level predictors of
devolution. The overall results strongly support the hypotheses and therefore provide
empirical grounds for the RCM. One possible limitation of the RCM is the fact that the
model only accounts for TANF devolution and, thus, does not provide for the
devolutionary process as pertains to other social welfare programs. Florida and other
states have proposed imposing or strengthening work requirements in a number of second
tier welfare programs, such as Unemployment Insurance, SNAP, and Medicaid, but were
restrained by the Obama administration. If Republicans have their way, there may be a
TANF-like emphasis on work requirements in other programs in the near future.
In fact, TANF’s strong emphasis on work requirements and penalties or a lack
thereof constitutes a perfect match for testing the RCM assumptions. Therefore, the
empirical findings upon which the RCM is built might not necessarily be applicable to
second-order devolution in other programs like the social services block grants (SSBGs).
However, this model, combined with the theory of policy design and social construction,
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constitutes the theoretical foundations for the hypotheses that will be developed in this
dissertation.
Theories of Savings and Economic Self-Sufficiency
Self-sufficiency has always been a desired outcome for policymakers in the
United States as evidenced by the body of legislation that has shaped social welfare in
this country since the 1950s (Bowen et al., 1995; Cancian & Meyer, 2004; Caputo, 1997;
Gowdy & Pearlmutter, 1993; Hawkins, 2005; Hong et al., 2009; Johnson & Corcoran,
2004; Parker, 1994). One purpose of the 1996 law—the latest major social welfare
reform—is to empower poor families with children toward economic independence
(Gowdy & Pearlmutter, 1993; P. L. 104–193). A few emerging theories related to savings
and economic self-sufficiency are discussed below.
Financial capability framework. The financial capability theory is one of the
most recently developed approaches in social work and welfare economics that attempt to
explain the mechanisms of economic self-sufficiency among the poor. This theory
contends that both the acquisition of financial knowledge and the accessibility to
financial transactions are necessary for individuals to reach desired self-sufficiency
outcomes (Johnson & Sherraden, 2007). Both conditions are expected to be met in order
for people, especially low-income families, to reach their economic goals and objectives.
That is, the combination of financial education/literacy and institutional opportunities are
fundamental conditions for disadvantaged populations to become economically
autonomous (Johnson & Sherraden, 2007). Nussbaum (2000) and Robeyns (2005) had
similar views on the financial approach by emphasizing the combined effect of individual
characteristics and environmental factors in determining someone’s financial capabilities.
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The roots of this perspective can be traced back to the seminal work on
capabilities developed in 1987 by Indian economist Amartya Sen and which garnered
him the 1988 Nobel Prize in Economics. Sen (1987) described capabilities in terms of
personal abilities and structural opportunities for individuals to take reasonable steps
toward the fulfillment of their goals. This implies a sense of freedom in making decisions
on their own behalf and accessing the opportunities available in their immediate
environment (Sen, 1993). Sen’s capability theory was bolstered by American philosopher
Martha Craven Nussbaum who argued that internal characteristics are not enough for the
attainment of well-being; the environment should be structured in such a way that
individuals can perform to the fullest extent of their capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000). As an
approach, financial capability is being adopted in social work through the work of the
Elizabeth Johnson and Margaret S. Sherraden who proposed financial education and
savings as concrete means toward economic independence among low-income families
(Johnson & Sherraden, 2007).
Behavioral economic theory. Developed in the late 1980s by Canadian
behavioral finance scientist Herst M. Shefrin and American economist Richard H. Thaler,
the behavioral economic theory is a well-developed framework for understanding savings
and accumulation of assets among families (Okech, 2011). This theory stipulates that
people, including the poor, can save and accumulate possessions through the process of
mental discipline. That is, by setting goals and objectives, individuals may choose to limit
their daily expenses in order to save money for a mid-term or a long-term project such as
buying a home or sending children to college. Under this framework, self-discipline is an
essential factor for saving (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988; Thaler, 1994).
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The behavioral economic theory is built on Adam Smith’s (1759) Theory of
Moral Sentiments which explains human behaviors through a psychological lens (Ashraf,
Camerer & Loewenstein, 2005). Smith (1759, 1976) evoked sympathy as a natural drive
that guides human beings’ feelings toward others (p. 9). The desire to see other people
happy implies working for the greater good of society. Since Smith (1759, 1976)
elaborated on the happiness of others, many scholars consider Adam Smith a protoutilitarian (Campbell, 1971; Campbell & Ross, 1981; Otteson, 2002; Smith, 1759, 1976;
Valcarce, 2010; Witztum & Young, 2013). About two centuries later, progressive social
campaigner Irvin Fisher contributed to the development of Utility Theory, which accounts
for people’s choices of goods and services (Fisher, 1930; Stigler, 1950). Utility Theory
for decision making has been antagonized by and perhaps supplanted by Prospect Theory
introduced by Kahneman and Tversky in 1979. This theory explains the behavior of
people during financially risky situations (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Behavioral perspective. More recently, there has been a shift from the
Behavioral Economic Theory toward the adoption of the Behavioral Perspective which
accounts for the financial comportment of the poor (Duflo, 2006; Hall, 2008;
Mullainathan & Shafir, 2009). The Behavioral Perspective—proposed by Harvard
University economist Sendhil Mullainathan and Princeton University behavioral scientist
Eldar Shafir— posits that the poor share similar natural financial impulses with the
wealthy, but have less room to maneuver than do their wealthy counterparts
(Mullainathan & Shafir, 2009). That is, subjected to the same financial opportunities such
as automatic enrollment in savings plans, the poor would be able to save at a similar rate
as the non-poor. The reality is that the poor do not usually hold jobs that offer automatic
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enrollment in 401(k) plans as do the wealthy. Therefore, the poor earn cash money which
is more volatile and likely to be spent than money directly deposited into a bank account
(Mullainathan & Shafir, 2009). Being marginalized in the banking world and/or the
retirement savings system, the likelihood for them to save is significantly less compared
to the non-poor who participate in savings by institutional default (Mullainathan &
Shafir, 2009). In addition, the poor are more likely to miss on monthly payments of bills
and incur late payment charges than are the non-poor who can set automatic payments of
bills through their bank accounts. Based on their propensity for incurring late payment
fees, the poor have a narrower margin of error than do the non-poor. According to
Mullainathan and Shafir (2009), the government can facilitate the integration of the poor
into the banking system by setting automatic deposits of income-based benefits through
financial institutions.
Institutional theory of savings. Popularly known as Assets Theory, the
Institutional Theory of Savings was developed in the 1990s by Michael Sherraden, a
social work researcher at Washington University in St. Louis. In his book Assets and the
Poor: A New American Welfare Policy, Sherraden (1991) argued that the current incomebased welfare system in the United States is unfair because the middle and upper classes
depend on assets, which the poor do not have access to in order to progress economically.
Sherraden’s (1991) argument is grounded in the fact that the rich often receive tax credits
for homeownership and business while the poor are generally provided with means-tested
assistance. Means-tested welfare benefits were found to be negatively associated with
savings among the poor. Such relationship between welfare receipt and savings can be
explained by the fact that beneficiaries tend to spend the income received from the
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government in order to remain eligible for assistance. In other words, since asset limits
are an eligibility requirement for public assistance, low-income participants cannot save
because saving would disqualify them for benefits (Campbell, 2014; Hurst & Ziliak,
2001; Ziliak, 2003). Without savings the poor are unable to accumulate assets and
become economically self-sufficient.
Sherraden (1991) hypothesized that the poor can save if provided with
opportunities to do so and that the government can play a significant role in helping lowincome families save and accumulate assets through matching funds. Sherraden (1991)
proposed an asset-building strategy known as Individual Development Accounts (IDA) as
a plausible way to test his hypothesis. The IDA program is a preventive measure against
intergenerational poverty which targets low-income individuals and families. Program
participants usually completed 12 hours of financial education and asset-specific training
before starting to save. The amount of money saved is matched by the government up to
a certain point as defined by the program. The IDA program pursues the following goals
and objectives: financial literacy, taste for saving, old debts clearing, credit building, low
income homeownership, entrepreneurship, small business development, and asset
accumulation (Sherraden, 1991). Since early 2000s, there have been demonstration
projects on IDAs across the country with the strongest site in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
Randomized clinical trials with large sample sizes indicated that IDA is a promising
asset-building strategy among low-income families (Grinstein-Weiss et al. 2008, 2013;
Han, Grinstein-Weiss, & Sherraden, 2009). By helping poor families accumulate assets,
IDA is paving the way for a better future for children. In this sense, this program is a
viable option against intergenerational poverty in America.
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The US Congress already proved some proclivity toward IDA by passing the
Assets for Independence Act as Title IV of the Community Opportunities,
Accountability, and Training and Educational Services Human Services Reauthorization
Act of 1998 (P. L. 105-285). For the 2015 fiscal year, this law appropriates $18.95
million to the Department of Health and Human Services for the demonstration and
support of assets-based projects targeting the economic self-sufficiency of low-income
households (USDHHS, 2014b). The expansion of this program is desirable so that more
low income Americans can be empowered toward the attainment and maintenance of
financial self-sufficiency.
Limitations of Theories
However appealing the individualistic, cultural, and structural hypotheses on
poverty might be, none of them provides a thorough explanation or captures the breadth
of the problem in sight. In fact, all three approaches have limitations as individuals
should not be blamed for a systemic failure (Ryan, 1976) nor should the government bear
full responsibility for those who deliberately refuse to live as productive citizens.
Similarly, being born and raised in poverty does not always perpetuate poverty, nor does
receiving welfare benefits always lead to generational poverty. Other limitations are
related to the fact that none of the theories actually captures factors such as religious and
spiritual beliefs, cultural values and meanings of goods, as well as the costs of
maintaining a job in terms of transportation, clothing, fatigue, and childcare arrangements
(Butterfield, Rocha, & Butterfield, 2010; Edin & Lein, 1997). Furthermore, these three
approaches have not been empirically tested and therefore should be considered as views
or perspectives instead of theories.
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Meanwhile, the social control thesis provides no explanations for the “semiwelfare state” that occurred in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina where the U. S.
Congress authorized $62.3 billion to respond to the 2005 disaster (Katz, 2008). By the
same token, this model falls short in explaining the $789 billion economic stimulus
package approved by Congress in 2009 to reverse the Great Recession. In either instance,
no street protests or rioting activities were involved. Instead, both were residual
procedures taken toward reshaping and bolstering the economy after tough times.
Elsewhere, notwithstanding its popularity among scholars, Schneider and
Ingram’s theory of social construction and policy design neither fully accounts for the
rampant inequality and racial disparities in the social welfare system nor explains the
devolutionary process of welfare policies from states to lower levels of administration.
Concerning the transfer of power from states to local government, Lowi (1998) argued
that behaviors can best be shaped at local levels of governance. Policy researchers have
found associations between enforcement of welfare sanctions at state and/or local levels
and racial makeup of welfare rolls (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Fording, 2003; Soss,
Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001). Other studies have shown that the devolution of
welfare policies from state to local authorities created racial differences by exposing
minority enrollees to unfair treatments (Grubb, 1984; Lieberman, 1998). All of these
aforementioned findings, however, proved sporadic in terms of developing a new
theoretical framework that encapsulates the devolution of welfare provisions from states
to counties. Therefore, not until the emergence and embodiment of Soss’ (2008) Racial
Classification Model was the scholarship on social welfare fully equipped with a
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theoretical model that goes beyond the scope of Schneider and Ingram’s theory of social
construction and policy design.
As seen in this chapter, one single theoretical framework would not suffice in
explaining the dynamics of the phenomena of poverty and welfare. Scholars and theorists
across the social science spectrum have been a fundamental role in expanding the
theoretical dialogue about poverty and public assistance. Their work helped the public
understanding the cause of poverty, the rationale for the expansion of public welfare
programs in the 1960s and the 1970s, the devolution revolution, and the accumulation of
assets. Major theoretical views on poverty and welfare were presented mostly in a
competing fashion: individualistic theory versus culture of poverty theory; social control
thesis versus mass society thesis; and institutional theory of savings versus behavioral
economic theory. With the exception of Soss et al.’s (2008) RCM, most theoretical
perspectives have been around for many decades. Yet, there is a lack of empirical
evidence to support or reject the claims of many of these theories discussed above. The
next chapter formulates the study hypotheses and links them to relevant theoretical
frameworks.
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CHAPTER V. STUDY HYPOTHESES
Given the scarcity of research on economic self-sufficiency as a function of
receiving benefits from multiple government programs (Slack et al., 2014), it remains
largely unknown which direction the results of this investigation may go. Nonetheless,
based on the premises of (a) Ingram and Schneider’s theory of policy design and social
construction, (b) Lewis’s culture of poverty theory, (c) Soss et al.’ racial classification
model (RCM), and (d) Piven and Cloward’s social control thesis, it can be anticipated
that the lower-tier means tested benefits do not empower the poor toward economic selfsufficiency. Therefore, the following two hypotheses are posited: (1) Low-income
household members who receive one or more federal means-tested benefits will be less
likely to attain and maintain economic self-sufficiency than their counterparts who do not
participate in federal welfare programs; and (2) Low-income households that enrolled in
more programs will have worse self-sufficiency outcomes than their counterparts that
participate in fewer programs. Figure 2 below presents a graphical representation of the
theoretical framework upon which the study hypotheses are founded.
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Linking Study Hypotheses with the Theory of Policy Design and Social Construction
Ingram and Schneider’s theory of policy design and social construction lays down
motives related to the conceptualization, development, and implications of antipoverty
policies in America. In framing social welfare interventions, policymakers perceive the
ultimate users of these interventions in a dichotomous fashion: the deserving and the
undeserving. This double standard in public policy approaches toward target populations
lead to what social scientists labeled a “two tier” welfare system where the privileged
population receives the top-tier benefits and the underprivileged groups are recipients of
the bottom-tier benefits (Fraser & Gordon, 1994; Lieberman, 1998; Orloff, 1996). The
top-tier welfare programs provide benefits to recipients with proven work history and
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may include but are not limited to the Unemployment Insurance program, the Old Age,
Survivors and Disability Insurance program, and the Medicare program. The bottom-tier
welfare programs, in contrast, are designed for needy individuals and families who
cannot provide for themselves and therefore rely on the government for economic
survival. The welfare programs that are considered bottom-tier include those providing
means-tested benefits such as the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program
(TANF), the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP), and the Housing
Choice Voucher program (HCV).
Because low-income individuals and families who receive these programs are
socially constructed as undeserving and powerless, there are relatively stronger
requirements for receiving benefits (Chang, 2015). This class of people is also subjected
to more stringent regulations rather than being regarded as having an entitlement to a fair
share of the economic resources (Ingram et al., 2007; Schneider & Ingram, 1997). In this
case, the devolution revolution in the welfare state is interpreted as a political maneuver
intended to mold the behavior of the poor toward the labor market. This behaviormolding process involves sanctions for noncompliance, especially among minority
groups who have been socially labeled as having a certain proclivity for escaping the
labor force. Hence, since socio-political and economic biases among social groups
occupy center stage in the design and implementation of antipoverty policies, the purpose
of welfare is not economic self-sufficiency, but the promotion of work ethic.
Schneider and Ingram’s Theory of Social Construction and Policy Design, hence,
increases awareness about social and economic disparities in the design and
implementation of governmental efforts toward alleviating social problems at local, state
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and federal levels. By promoting democratic practices and social justice in the creation of
public policies, this framework holds a substantial implication for the social work
profession. With respect to this research project, this theory serves as the main
framework to test the hypotheses, all of which have to do with low-income populations.
Linking Study Hypotheses with the Culture of Poverty Theory
The rise of neoliberalism in the early 1980s resurrected one tenet of the culture of
poverty theory: welfare receipt is associated with a lack of work ethic which is
transmissible from parents to children (Murray, 1990). The argument here is that welfare
erodes recipients’ desire to join the workforce—the primary pathway toward economic
self-sufficiency. By systematically receiving benefits from the government, recipients can
afford to cover some expenses without going through the hassles of the work shift,
transportation, clothing, etc. In addition, securing a job may jeopardize some welfare
benefits if recipients earn a few dollars above the income requirements for eligibility.
This is known as the benefits cliff, an income cutoff above which low-income households
become ineligible for certain welfare programs (Indiana Institute for Working Families,
2012). Considering the propensity for low-paying jobs among welfare recipients (Bloom
et al., 2011; Dworsky & Courtney, 2007; Pavetti, 2002), it would not make too much
sense to work full time and earn just a little more than what the government actually
provides in the form of public assistance.
However, by becoming somehow economically rational, the poor’s behavior is
deemed irrational by members who are external to their culture. Lewis (1966) argued that
the culture of poverty resulted in people doing things that seemed irrational to nonmembers of the culture. So under the cultural theory of poverty, it is believed that
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welfare, in its current state, produces counterproductive outcomes and thus becomes
more a part of the problem than of the solution (Reagan, 1988). So all things considered,
welfare does not promote economic self-sufficiency but keeps recipients in poverty from
one generation to the next (Lewis, 1966). This is not its purpose in the sense that
policymakers planned to make people dependent on the assistance programs. Perhaps,
there are unintended consequences in policy design.
Linking Study Hypotheses with the Racial Classification Model
The proclaimed goal of economic self-sufficiency is not achievable because it is
being supplanted by racially motivated social-control priorities for TANF as a
whole. TANF is designed to help poor families with children, lead needy parents to
economic self-sufficiency, decrease out of wedlock pregnancies, and promote two-parent
families (P. L. 104-193). However, those are not racially neutral objectives. According to
Soss et al. (2008), states have been given latitude by the central government on how to
operate welfare. Soss et al. (2008) concluded that U.S. states with a higher percentage of
blacks receiving TANF reveal more restrictive and punitive policies for implementing
TANF (regarding work requirements, the lifetime limit, being cut off for not showing up
for appointments, etc.). That is, the implementation of TANF has to do with negative
imagery of the black population. People form negative attitudes about welfare. These
attitudes, in turn, influence the policies intended to help recipients move out of welfare.
Therefore, the racially motivated implementation of welfare policies contradicts the selfproclaimed goal of welfare which is to lead people toward economic self-sufficiency.
This goal has been supplanted by social racial biases. Soss et al.’s (2008) argument dovetails nicely with Ingram and Schneider’s theory of policy design and social construction.
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Linking Study Hypotheses with the Social Control Thesis
Piven and Cloward’s social control thesis can be combined with the racial
differentials argued in Soss et al.’s (2008) work. The motivation to regulate welfare is
infused with the notion to control the black population. According to Piven and
Cloward’s social control thesis, welfare has served as a means to regulate the political
atmosphere in America. The dependence of the Democratic Party on the black voters is
one reason why a Democrat-controlled government tends to expand welfare benefits.
Welfare recipients, in turn, are expected to show up to the polls and cast their ballots in
favor of Democratic politicians. Since 1980, in contrast, Republican-led governments at
the federal level have shrunk the welfare state for political purposes. Allocating too many
benefits to the poor may be upsetting to the white voting bloc. So controlling the
distribution of these benefits is essential to keep white voters happy. Welfare also serves
as a way to restore political equilibrium. As mentioned above, Piven and Cloward (1971)
linked the expansion of welfare to the chaotic political scenes orchestrated by the black
community during the urban riots of the 1960s. Welfare, in this case, is used as a political
strategy to control mayhem. Furthermore, public assistance benefits serve to discipline
the workforce, assuring a supply of low wage labor (Piven & Cloward, 1971). In short,
the goal of the welfare state here is to control the political climate and regulate the
workforce rather than help the poor reach the level of economic self-sufficiency
advocated in the War on Poverty discourse.
This chapter—one of the shortest in this investigation—generated two hypotheses
based on the underlying principles of the theory of policy design and social construction,
the culture of poverty theory, the RCM and the social control thesis. The most direct
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route to self-sufficiency is welfare through decent work. This is one of the stated goals of
the welfare reform of 1996. However, the aforementioned theories argued otherwise.
Welfare is served for different purposes, including creating dependence, further dividing
ethnic groups, shaping the behavior of recipients, and maintaining social order. If this line
of argument is true, then welfare will not lead low-income households to economic selfsufficiency. Such argument is in stark contrast with the self-proclaimed goal of welfare
described above. Hence, this chapter highlighted two opposing positions pertaining to
economic independence among welfare recipients. The next chapter focuses on the
methodology under which this investigation is conducted.
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CHAPTER VI. METHODOLOGY
Research Design
In this study, participants were categorized into two groups of low-income
households: those that received lower-tier federal means-tested benefits (intervention
group) and those that did not receive these benefits, but were likely eligible for them
(comparison group). This research falls under the rubric of quasi-experimental designs
with repeated measures. That is, the study variables were measured for each wave of a
longitudinal dataset (please see Figure 10 below).
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This research attempted to ensure that the intervention group and the comparison
group were comparable by running propensity score matching (PSM) at baseline. PSM
has been heralded as a bias reduction approach in nonexperimental studies that involve
comparison of groups (Dehejia, & Wahba, 2002). Participants in the intervention group
were matched against those in the comparison group based on observed covariates (Apel
& Sweeten, 2010; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). Over the past decade, PSM has received
considerable attention among social researchers across the world and is one of the most
commonly used strategies to decrease preexisting differences among participants in
observational studies. That is, PSM is a mechanism by which a researcher can evaluate
the impact of an intervention in a nonexperimental environment (Apel & Sweeten, 2010).
Although a less rigorous method when compared to experimental designs (Peikes,
Moreno, & Orzol, 2012), PSM was found to be empirically superior to logistic regression
in terms of bias reduction in nonexperimental quantitative research (Cepeda, Boston,
Farrar, & Strom, 2003).
Yet, after using the optimal matching model—a type of PSM reputed for
producing the closest matches possible between the intervention group and the
comparison group—(Gu & Rosenbaum, 1993), the original sample of 12,119 participants
(n = 12,119) was reduced almost by half. Such a huge sample loss was a risk too big to
take, especially when there are other statistical approaches that allow researchers to
control for pre-existing differences between non-randomized groups (see the Data
Analysis section). Sociologists used matching extensively in the 1930s only to find that
the amount of data that was discarded (because no match was identified) was enormous
(Chapin, 1947). Harvard University researcher Gary King and Massachusetts Institute of
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Technology professor Richard Nielsen coined the term “PSM paradox” to caution against
the risk of data quality degradation due to excessive trimming during the matching
process (King & Nielsen, 2016, p. 1). Hence, PSM was avoided in this research
investigation.
Data
This quantitative study used a secondary analysis of a longitudinal dataset to
examine the relationship between participation in multiple public assistance programs
and economic self-sufficiency among beneficiaries. Secondary data analysis has grown
exponentially across social science and public health disciplines (Cheng & Phillips, 2014;
Hofferth, 2005). In 1983, 31 percent of published studies on family research employed
secondary data sources. This number rose to 51 percent and 75 percent in 1993 and 2003,
respectively (Hofferth, 2005). Public and private organizations alike have funded projects
that develop secondary data resources. Some advantages of existing data can be related to
their large sample size, availability and accessibility, relevance, and representation of a
given population (Hofferth, 2005).
All data used in this study were from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP). Established in 1983, the SIPP is a US Census Bureau initiative that
provides up-to-date information about participation in government programs. A
nationally representative dataset, SIPP stands out as a vital source to gauge how
American households fare with respect to income, assets, employment, education, social
program participation, and so forth. Longitudinal in nature, SIPP has undergone
progressive expansion to contain 14 different panels and 124 waves. Each panel is made
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of a certain number of waves. SIPP has also undergone massive improvement over time
in terms of design rigor.
This study specifically analyzed data from the 2008 Panel—the most current
publicly available panel. This panel consists of 16 waves of data collected between
September 2008 and December 2013. Using stratified and systematic sampling methods,
the 2008 SIPP Panel targeted approximately 65,500 households across the United States,
most of which were low-income. About 13,500 eligible households were unreachable due
to environmental constraints. Another 10,000 household members could not complete the
first interview (Wave 1) because the targeted occupants either declined to participate in
the survey or were not available for the interview. About 105,000 individuals in 42,000
households—roughly 81 percent of the targeted sample—participated in the survey at
baseline (first wave of data collection). All household members aged 15 or older were
deemed eligible for the interview process which was conducted in their homes on a fourmonth periodic basis. The panel waves consist of ensuing interviews conducted only with
individuals who participated in prior interviews.
The 2008 SIPP longitudinal public files contain core data and topical modules
data. Each wave of core data provides basic information about a broad range of areas,
including job, business, income, labor force, assets, education, health insurance, welfare
receipt, family, household, and sociodemographic characteristics. The topical modules
explore some topics with more depth and serve as addenda to some core topics. Wave 1
collects information on recipiency history, employment history and tax rebates. Work
disability history, education and training history, marital history, migration history,
fertility history, household relationships, and tax rebates are covered in wave 2. Waves 3
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and 11 deal with participation in TANF and retirement and pension plan coverage,
whereas assets and liabilities, medical expenses, dependent care, child well-being, and
poverty-related issues are captured in waves 4, 7 and 10. While waves 5 and 8 cover
annual income and retirement accounts, taxes, child care and work schedule, wave 6
collects information for adult well-being, child support, child and adult disabilities, and
employer-provided health benefits. Wave 9 covers informal care-giving and adult wellbeing, whereas wave 13 provides information about professional certifications and
educational certificates. Topic modules are not available for waves 12 and 14 through 16.
The current investigation uses the core data due to the cross-wave uniformity of the
information on program participation. Indeed, the core data survey asked the very same
questions in each wave of data collection. As seen above, this cross-wave uniformity
does not exist in the topical modules.
Strengths of SIPP. SIPP has been touted as the most comprehensive large-scale
survey of estimates on income, financial hardship, and participation in government
programs (Bauman, 1999a,b; Beverly, 2001; Czajka & Denmead, 2008; Heflin,
Sandberg, & Rafail, 2009; Meyer, Mok, & Sullivan, 2009; Shaefer & Gutierrez, 2013;
Wu & Eamon, 2010). In other words, SIPP is the flagship income-related dataset in the
United States, ahead of the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey,
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, the National Health Interview Survey, the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics, the Health and Retirement Study, and the Medicare Current
Beneficiary Survey (Czajka & Denmead, 2008). Not only SIPP's strong emphasis on lowincome households but its very large sample size and longitudinal features allow the
evaluation of the effectiveness of programs, whether at local, state, or federal levels. In
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addition, it is worth mentioning that the collection of data for the 2008 SIPP Panel
coincided with both the unfolding and the aftermath of the Great Recession. Since
participation in public assistance programs during economic hardship tends to be higher
than in normal times (TANF excepted), the 2008 SIPP Panel allows assessment of how
low-income households responded to welfare programs. This panel also reflects the
implementation of the 2009 stimulus package which reinforced most of the safety net
programs. Its relatively recent period of time of data collection (September 2008 to
December 2013) makes the 2008 SIPP Panel an invaluable resource to address the
methodological gaps that exist in the current social welfare literature.
Missing Data Management
As with most longitudinal endeavors, this investigation was not exempt from
missing data. 17.6 percent of all cases included in this research had missing values.
Table 2 provides a complete description of the percentages of missing data across waves.
As seen in table 4, at the Year 1 follow-up 6.4 percent of cases had missing values. The
percentage of missing data increased gradually thereafter to reach the level of 6.6 percent
at the Year 2 follow-up, 7.7 percent at the Year 3 follow-up, 12 percent at the Year 4
follow-up, and 17.6 at the 56 month follow-up.
Table 2. Cross-Wave Missing Data Patterns
Waves

n = 4,216

Percent

Wave 1 (Baseline)

N/A

N/A

Wave 2 (4 month follow-up)

173

4.1

Wave 3 (8 month follow-up)

201

4.8

Wave 4 (12 month follow-up)

270

6.4

95

Wave 5 (16 month follow-up)

244

5.8

Wave 6 (20 month follow-up)

260

6.2

Wave 7 (24 month follow-up)

277

6.6

Wave 8 (28 month follow-up)

235

5.6

Wave 9 (32 month follow-up)

249

5.9

Wave 10 (36 month follow-up)

323

7.7

Wave 11 (40 month follow-up)

354

8.4

Wave 12 (44 month follow-up)

458

10.9

Wave 13 (48 month follow-up)

520

12.3

Wave 14 (52 month follow-up)

594

14.1

Wave 15 (56 month follow-up)

740

17.6

Missing data were also evident in the full panel. From baseline to wave 15
participants gradually abandoned the study. Table 3 provides a side-by-side comparison
between the full SIPP panel and the study sample where there was a gradual loss of
participants across the waves. As displayed in Table 3 below, a total cross-wave attrition
rate of 31.3 percent was registered for participants in the full panel. This attrition rate is
almost the double of that recorded for participants in the study sample (17.6 percent).
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Table 3. Attrition Rates Comparison for Full 2008 SIPP Panel
and Study Sample
(please see Sample section for details about
selection of study participants)
Original 2008 SIPP Panel
(n = 105,477)
Waves of
Data

Study Sample
(n = 4,216)

Number of
Participants

Attrition
rate (%)

Number of
households

Attrition
rate (%)

Wave 1

105,477

0.0

4,216

0.0

Wave 2

98,175

7.0

4,035

4.1

Wave 3

95,050

9.9

4,015

4.8

Wave 4

91,071

13.7

3,946

6.4

Wave 5

90,389

14.3

3,972

5.8

Wave 6

88,117

16.5

3,956

6.2

Wave 7

85,392

19.1

3,939

6.6

Wave 8

84,441

20.0

3,981

5.6

Wave 9

82,281

22.0

3,967

5.9

Wave 10

79,377

24.8

3,893

7.7

Wave 11

78,151

26.0

3,862

8.4

Wave 12

77,354

26.7

3,758

10.9

Wave 13

76,048

28.0

3,696

12.3

Wave 14

75,016

28.9

3,622

14.1

Wave 15

72,566

31.3

3,476

17.6
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An analysis of the randomness of missing data was conducted. Researchers have
stressed the importance of determining the mechanisms and patterns of missing data in
order to identify the right course of action to be implemented when handling the issue
(Bennett, 2001; Dong & Peng, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). Rubin (1976)
identified three separate mechanisms in missing data: missing completely at random
(MCAR), missing at random (MAR), and missing not at random (MNAR). In MCAR
data, the mechanism of missingness is unsystematic or unrelated to the observed data.
Under MCAR, missing data are considered a random version or a subset of the overall
sample (Dong & Peng, 2013). Under the MAR assumption, the mechanism of
missingness is systematic or depends on the observed data, but not the
missing/unobserved values. When the missingness is related to or depends on the
unobserved/missing values, data is said to be missing not at random (Little & Rubin,
2002; Rubin, 1976).
Little’s (1988) missing completely at random test, also known as MCAR test,
allows researchers to discover whether data are MCAR or not. Under Little’s (1988)
MCAR test, the null hypothesis is that data are MCAR at the 95 percent confidence level.
That is, any result greater than or equal to 0.05 is not significant and thus researchers
should fail to reject the null hypothesis. If, by contrast, a result is less than 0.05,
researchers should reject the null hypothesis because the data are not MCAR. The
missing data portion in this proposed research is not completely at random. When data
are not MCAR, methodologists recommend that researchers run further analysis of the
missing data to know whether the values are missing at random (MAR) or missing not at
random (MNAR). However, there are currently no available tests to assess missing at
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random (MAR) data (Baraldi & Enders, 2010; Bhaskaran & Smeeth, 2014; Horton &
Kleinman, 2007; White et al., 2011).
Some missing data experts contend that the missing at random (MAR) conditions
may be satisfied when attrition is caused by the mobility of participants (Enders, Dietz,
Montague, & Dixon, 2006; Graham, Hofer, Donaldson, MacKinnon, & Schafer, 1997).
Bhaskaran and Smeeth (2014) argued that the determination of missing at random (MAR)
can be assumed based on prior knowledge and advice from experts, while other scholars
recommend a comparison in mean differences between the missing portion and the nonmissing portion of the sample (Diggle, Liang, & Zeger, S. L., 1995; Schafer & Graham,
2002; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). In the current study the plausibility of missing at
random (MAR) was assessed through the comparison of the means and standard
deviations between participants with missing data and those with no missing data (see
Table 4). As evidenced in Table 4, there are similarities on the key variables between
cases with missing values and those with no missing values. Therefore, it can be assumed
that the missing portion of data selected for this research was missing at random (MAR).
Table 4. Diagnosis of Missing Data Randomness
Cases with
missing values
(n= 1,941)

Cases with no
missing values
(n=2,275)

Mean

SD*

Mean

SD*

Interest earning checking account owned

1.84

.362

1.81

.395

Savings account owned

1.71

.452

1.70

.459

Respondent was born in the United States

1.23

.421

1.22

.414

US Citizenship Status of Respondent

1.14

.347

1.14

.345

Variables
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Highest Degree received

2.75

1.335

2.73

1.392

Hispanic ethnicity

1.79

.405

1.78

.414

Worked less than 35 hours some weeks

.69

1.232

.59

1.262

Race of the respondent

1.34

.577

1.27

.515

Gender

1.62

.485

1.63

.482

Ownership status of living quarters

1.58

.493

1.48

.500

Household type

2.03

.908

1.97

.909

Respondent’s age range

2.23

.747

2.40

.696

Metro status

1.18

.388

1.22

.415

State poverty rate average

2.74

.922

2.65

.897

Means-tested cash or noncash receipt

.59

.493

.57

.495

* Standard deviation

Methodologists often recommend multiple imputation as one of the most effective
methods of missing data management (Baraldi & Enders, 2010; Kang, 2013; Little &
Rubin, 2002; Pigott, 2001; Young & Johnson, 2015). The application of multiple
imputation necessitates a survey nonresponse mechanism deemed ignorable (Pigott,
2001). When survey nonresponse is ignorable, researchers can generate unbiased
estimates by using imputation techniques or discarding missing values (Bollinger &
Hirsch, 2013). Under the Bayesian framework, in which the probability of an event can
be estimated, the notion of ignorability applies to both MCAR and MAR data (Ibrahim &
Molenberghs, 2009). That is, the reason why the missingness occurred can be ignored, as
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the analysis of data can be informed based upon the observed values (Ibrahim &
Molenberghs, 2009; Pigott, 2001). In this investigation, multiple imputation (MI) was
used to replace the missing cases across the waves. Values were imputed for respondents
who participated in the study for at least three years (36 months). In other words, survey
respondents who missed more than five interviews were excluded at baseline. This
approach is consistent with the MAR assumption where the missing values depend on the
observed data. In a long form of data arrangement, the observed values would serve as
benchmarks to estimate the missing values during the imputation process (Young &
Johnson, 2015).
Sample
This study sample was restricted to (1) respondents aged between 18 and 65 at
baseline, (2) individuals with no physical or mental disabilities, and (3) respondents in
households that were at or below 150 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL).
Moreover, a few unusual cases where negative integers were registered for household
total income were removed from the sample. 12,119 respondents met these initial criteria
for sample inclusion. However, in cases where more than one individual per household
met the inclusion criteria, one individual from the household was selected at random.
This was a way to meet the assumption of independence of observations for regression
analysis purposes. After randomly selecting one respondent per household, the sample
size was reduced to 7,153. Furthermore, households that dropped out of the study before
reaching wave 10 were excluded. In other words, participating households with missing
information for more than 5 full waves over the study timeframe were not included in the
final sample. A total of 4,216 low-income households constituted the study sample at
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baseline which was divided into an intervention group (n = 2,436) and a comparison
group (n = 1,780). A complete display of the frequency distributions of each variable in
the final sample is provided in the results section.
Table 5 below provides a case inclusion /exclusion comparative analysis for 7,153
households in the initial sample. Based on the means and standard deviations of the
variables in display, it can be argued that the excluded cases were more or less a random
sample of the overall sample. In other words, there were no significant differences in
means and standard deviations between the included cases and the excluded cases,
making the latter category, in and of itself, a sub-sample.

Table 5. Case Inclusion / Exclusion Comparison in Initial Sample
(n = 7,153)
Included Cases
(n = 4,216)

Excluded Cases
(n = 2,937)

Mean

SD*

Mean

SD*

Variables
Interest earning checking account owned

1.82

.380

1.84

.364

Savings account owned

1.71

.456

1.72

.449

Immigration status of respondent

1.22

.417

1.22

.415

US Citizenship Status of Respondent

1.14

.346

1.15

.360

Highest Degree received

.48

.500

.50

.500

Hispanic ethnicity

1.79

.410

1.81

.393

Worked less than 35 hours some weeks

.64

1.249

.63

1.248

Race of the respondent

1.30

.546

1.64

1.001

Gender

1.63

.483

1.60

.491
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Ownership status of living quarters

1.58

.559

1.69

.529

Household type

2.50

1.461

2.74

1.472

Respondent's age

.55

.498

.65

.478

Metro status

1.26

.501

1.27

.541

Means-tested cash or noncash receipt

.58

.494

.54

.498

School breakfast

.23

1.279

.15

1.295

Medicaid

1.80

.401

1.78

.415

Number of children in the household

1.25

1.433

1.13

1.372

Region

3.02

1.472

3.10

1.547

Food stamps receipt

1.78

.429

1.77

.433

WIC coverage

1.97

1.64

1.97

.170

Residence in public housing project

.55

1.449

.88

1.395

Change in family composition

1.99

.078

2.00

.000

Household non-cash benefits

.58

.494

.54

.498

Household cash benefits

.11

.317

.11

.311

* Standard deviation

Study Variables
Independent variables. Two independent variables (IV) were employed in this
investigation, both of which measured a different aspect of program participation. In this
case, both IVs were closely related to—yet different—from each other. Each IV was
developed to test a specific hypothesis in this study. The independent variable for
Hypothesis 1 was participation in one or more lower-tier federal means tested programs.
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In the 2008 SIPP Panel, the variable RHMTRF accounted for household means-tested
cash or noncash receipt. The question is formulated as follows: Did someone in this
household receive means-tested cash or noncash benefits? The variable RHMTRF
captured the full range of means-tested welfare benefits, including cash and non-cash
assistance. The cash-portion was essentially made up of TANF and SSI benefits. This
predictor variable was not intended to measure other forms of cash benefits such as
EITC, UI, and Social Security. SSI is not available to all of those who live in poverty.
The program primarily targets three groups of people: elderly, blind and disabled who
lack economic support. Poor people under age 65 who do not have disabilities are not
eligible for SSI benefits (P. L. 92-603). Consistent with the purpose of this research,
respondents who reported physical and/or mental disabilities at baseline are eliminated
from the sample. Indeed, work-limiting health issues were found to be negatively
associated with attainment and maintenance of economic self-sufficiency (GarcíaGómez, Jones, & Rice, 2010; Pelkowski & Berger, 2004; Wood et al., 2008). The noncash portion gathers information about foods stamps/SNAP, WIC, Medicaid, free or
reduced-price lunches, free or reduced-price breakfasts, government energy assistance,
and government subsidized rent. Respondents who received one or more of these
aforementioned cash/non-cash benefits are coded as 1 for “Yes.” In contrast, those who
did not receive any of these benefits are coded as 0 for “No.”
For Hypothesis 2, the independent variable was the sum of all means-tested
benefits that a household received. In the original 2008 SIPP dataset, these programs
included food assistance (RCUTYP27), health assistance (RCUTYP57), free-or reduced
school meals (EHOTLUNC and EBRKFST), housing assistance (EGVTRNT and
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EPUBHSE), energy assistance (EEGYAST), and cash assistance (RHCBRF). All of these
variables were coded as 1 for “Yes” and 2 for “No.” The sum of RCUTYP27,
RCUTYP57, EHOTLUNC, EBRKFST, EGVTRNT, EPUBHSE, EEGYAST, and
RHCBRF created the variable BENEFITS which takes the following four values: 1 = one
benefits, 2 = two benefits, 3 = three benefits, and 4 = four benefits. No households
received more than four benefits. Given the nature of Hypothesis 2 (total number of
benefits per household), the analysis was run only for the intervention group.
Outcome variable. As the dependent variable, economic self-sufficiency is
measured through cross-wave differences in a household’s income-to-poverty ratios
(IPR). A household’s total income divided by its poverty threshold is referred to as IPR.
If its income is equal to or exceeds its poverty threshold, a household is deemed “not in
poverty” because its IPR is equal to or greater than 1.0. Conversely, a household is “in
poverty” when its IPR is less than 1.0 (US Census Bureau, 2016). In this research,
participants in both intervention and comparison groups were selected if their total
monthly household income at baseline was at or below 150% of the FPL. This threshold
would correspond to an IPR of 1.5 or less, whereby all participants (poor and near-poor)
are not considered economically self-sufficient.
Researchers have used different poverty cutoff points in studying low-income
populations. In their assessment of economic safety programs among families with
children, Slack et al. (2014) drew a sample of recipients who were at or below 200
percent (2.0 IPR) of the FPL. Cancian et al. (2014) used the same income range as Slack
et al. (2014) in their study on disconnected householders who formerly received TANF
and SNAP. Other researchers opted for more stringent income limits by examining
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individuals whose household income did not exceed 100 percent (1.0 IPR) of the FPL
(Gilbert et al., 2000), or 130 percent (1.3 IPR) of the FPL (Irving, 2013). It becomes
difficult to have one cutoff point across the board because (a) states are granted more
power to determine the eligibility requirements for TANF and (b) SNAP, HCV, WIC,
and Medicaid have different minimum income requirements on the federal poverty
guidelines.
The federal poverty guidelines is another poverty measurement tool which should
not be confused with the federal poverty level. Although closely related, the two
measures are issued by different federal agencies and used for different purposes. The
federal poverty line has been developed by the Census Bureau and used mostly for
research purposes. The poverty guidelines, on the contrary, have been developed by the
US Department of Health and Human Services and are used for program eligibility
determination (Fisher, 1992). In most states, however, households with incomes higher
than 150 percent of the FPL are not eligible for most welfare programs, including
Medicaid, SNAP, TANF, WIC, and housing assistance. The 150% poverty threshold
adopted in this study is consistent with previous research on poverty and social welfare
(Hall et al., 2010).
A dummy variable was created to compartmentalize the outcome variable. Irving
(2013) used similar procedures to measure income among welfare beneficiaries. In the
dataset used for this study, household income is measured by the variable THTOTINC
which was recoded into two categories. The first category contains households with IPRs
less than or equal to 1.5, while the second category is formed of households with IPRs
above 1.5 (self-sufficiency). In this study IPR was calculated by dividing THTOTINC
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(household income) by RHPOV (household poverty level). In such instances, selfsufficiency is operationally defined as the state of being off most welfare programs and
out of poverty. In particular, means-tested benefits such as TANF, SNAP, HCV, and
energy assistance are not designed to continue to provide benefits after the threshold of
150% of the FPL has been reached. The attainment and maintenance of economic selfsufficiency was measured on a quarterly basis (every four months) after baseline.
Participants who reached an income level greater than 150 percent of FPL (IPR >1.5) at
any wave of the survey and maintained their status of self-sufficiency during all
subsequent waves were coded “yes” and “no” if both conditions were not met. The 44
month follow-up (one year before the last wave) was the “cutting off” point for the
attainment of self-sufficiency. Participants who attained self-sufficiency at the 44 month
follow-up were followed through the last wave to see whether self-sufficiency is
maintained or not. By contrast, those who become self-sufficient before the 44 month
follow-up were followed throughout the subsequent waves in order to monitor their
maintenance of self-sufficiency. A quarterly measurement instead of an annual
observation allowed to better control for households who cycled in and out of poverty
over a short period of time.
IPR results from wave 1 through wave 15 were combined into one particular
variable: CUMULIPR. This variable was the final indicator used to measure the
attainment and maintenance of economic self-sufficiency among the participating
households. For CUMULIPR, households that did not attain and maintain their state of
self-sufficiency received a code of 0. On the contrary, those that attained self-sufficiency
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on or before wave 12 (44 month follow-up) and maintained such level for the reminder of
the study (wave 15) received a code of 1.
Control variables. In the literature certain variables have been consistently
found to be correlated with poverty and welfare receipt. This study controlled for all
available covariates in order to reduce effects that confound the relationship between the
predictor variable and the outcome variable. Since this research involved panel data, two
broad categories of covariates were identified: time-varying variables and time-invariant
variables. Both of them are described below.
Time-varying variables. Time-varying variables are those that are not constant
across longitudinal studies. Therefore, responses collected for such variables may change
from one wave to another. In this research, family structure, education level, employment
status, metro status, financial behavior, ownership status, and geographical location were
all considered time-varying covariates. However, because the aim of this study was to
predict outcome from baseline conditions (i.e., the time participants were identified as
belonging to the intervention or comparison group), the covariates were captured at
baseline only.
Family structure. Family structure represents a household’s living arrangements.
Family structure plays a role in the household well-being, as female-headed householders
tend to experience more economic hardship than married couples or cohabiting partners
(Buvinic & Gupta, 1997; Raymo & Zhou, 2012; Snyder, McLaughlin, & Findeis, 2006).
In this research, family structure means the situation in which a household is headed by
an unmarried male individual, an unmarried female individual, or a married couple. In
the 2008 SIPP dataset, family structure was represented by the variable RHTYPE which
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had six original categories. These were simplified as follows: 1 = married couples and 2
= single. Cohabiting households were classified in the single category.
Two other variables also contributed to the assessment of family structure. These
are HNUMP and RFNKIDS which determined the total number of persons in a
household and its number of children under 18, respectively. Both of these variables are
dichotomous. HNUMP was coded as 1 = Less than three and 2 = Three or more, while
CUMKIDS received the values of 1 = Yes and 2 = No.
Education level. Education is a strong predictor of economic self-sufficiency
(Bilenkisi, Gungor, & Tapsin, 2015; De Silva & Sumarto, 2015; Janjua & Kamal, 2011;
Rolleston, 2011). In this study, education constitutes the level of schooling received by
study participants. The variable EDUCATE measures the highest degree received or
grade completed. This variable was originally coded in the 2008 SIPP Panel with 17
values, ranging from first grade to doctoral education. During the recoding process, new
values were assigned to EDUCATE. Respondents with no post-secondary education were
coded as 1, while those with tertiary level of schooling received a value of 2. The latter
category encompasses participants who received any form of post-secondary education in
a vocational, college, or university setting.
Employment status. Employment status is measured based on whether study
participants work less than 35 hours per week or not. Work experience is associated with
higher likelihood of finding employment and becoming self-sufficient (Wood et al.,
2008). In this research, the variable EPTWRK denoted employment status among
respondents. This variable has three categories: not working, part-time employment, and
full-time employment. In order to obtain meaningful results in regression analyses, this
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variable was dummy coded as follows: part-time (coded 1, 0 otherwise) and full-time
(coded 1, 0 otherwise) with unemployed as the reference category.
A series of other employment-related variables were created to assess the labor
market, using data from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The
variables SUNEMPL and SWAGE were formed to measure the average state
unemployment rate and the average state minimum wage, respectively.
Both variables were calculated through a multifold process. First, the original
variable TFIPSST in the 2008 SIPP file was used to identify the states where respondents
lived over the course of this study. Next, the researcher traced back unemployment rates
and minimum wage rates for each state from 2008 to 2012, using BLS data. Then, fiveyear averages of state unemployment rates and minimum wage rates for the 2008-2012
period were calculated to form SUNEMPL and SWAGE. For SUNEMPL the value of 1
indicated an average unemployment rate of 6 percent or more, whereas 2 represented a
rate less than 6 percent. Similarly, under SWAGE states with an average minimum wage
rates of $7 per hour or more were coded as 1, while those with an average hourly rates of
less than $7 received a value of 2.
Metro status. Metro status indicates whether study participants lived in
metropolitan areas or not. Numerous studies have demonstrated that living in
metropolitan areas is associated with better economic outcomes (Clampet‐Lundquist &
Massey, 2008; Dohmen, 2005; Galster, 2002; Kling, Liebman, & Katz, 2007; Kling,
Liebman, Katz, & Sanbonmatsu, 2004; Ludwig et al., 2012; Newman & Harkness, 2002).
The original variable TMETRO which had three categories (metro, not metro, and
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unidentified) was recoded to form a dichotomous variable identified as METRO where 1
means participants lived in metro areas, and 2 otherwise.
Geographical location. Closely related to metro status is geographical location.
Two particular groups of variables determined the impact, if any, of geography on the
outcome variable. In the first group, the variable SPORA was created by (a) averaging
the poverty level for each state for the five-year period during which the survey was
conducted, (b) dividing the 50 states of America and the District of Columbia into
quintiles, (c) assigning each state a value of 1 to 5 for highest to lowest poverty level, and
(d) assigning each study participant the value of their state. SPORA was coded as
follows: (1) states with very high poverty rates, (2) states with high poverty rates, (3)
states with moderate poverty rates, (4) states with low poverty rates, and (5) states with
very low poverty rates. Another variable SPORA1 was added to appraise the average
state poverty level in a binary way: 1 = States with high to very high poverty rates, and 2
= States with very low to moderate poverty rates.
The second group of variables started with TFIPSST, which recorded entries for
all the 50 states and the District of Columbia in which respondents resided between 2008
and 2012. TFIPSST was then simplified into REGION, a variable which divided the
states into the official four regions: Northeast, South, West, and Midwest (US Census
Bureau, 2015a). For these four regions, three dummy variables were created: Northeast
coded 1 and 0 for otherwise; South coded as 1 and 0 for otherwise; West coded as 1 and 0
for otherwise. The Midwest represents the omitted reference category.
Financial behavior. Many researchers have documented the challenges faced by
low-income populations as pertains to savings (Bertrand, Mullainathan, & Shafir, 2004;
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Mullainathan & Shafir, 2009; Sherraden, 1991). Means-tested income support and other
policies often play a negative role in savings due to asset limits as requirements for
benefits. Such policies discourage savings among recipients (Ziliak, 2003; Hurst &
Ziliak, 2001). This research gauged self-beneficial financial decisions among participants
via their involvement in the banking system and their ownership status. Two variables,
EAST2A and EAST2B, determined whether the participants had interest-earning
accounts and savings accounts, respectively. Participants with bank accounts (checking or
savings) were originally coded in the 2008 SIPP file as 1, and 2 otherwise.
Another variable closely related to financial behavior is ETENURE which
identified homeownership status in the original survey. Respondents who owned their
own living quarters were coded as 1, while those who were renters received a code of 2.
The combination of EAST2A, EAST2B, and ETENURE generated FINANBHV, the
variable controlling for financial capability among participating households. Households
with bank accounts and homeownership status were coded as 1 for high financial
capability. In contrast, those with no homeownership status and/or no involvement in the
banking system were coded as 0 for low financial capability.
Time-invariant variables. Contrary to time-varying variables, time-invariant
variables are not subject to change over time. These variables produce the same results
across waves in panel studies. Time-invariant covariates are particularly important in
dealing with missing data, a common problem in longitudinal research. Indeed, baseline
entries collected for these variables can be rolled over and used to replace missing values
in subsequent waves (Young & Johnson, 2015). Immigration status, race/ethnicity,
gender and age were identified as time-invariant covariates in this research.
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Immigration status. As compared with their US-born counterparts, low-income
immigrant householders are less likely to be employed and less likely to become
financially stable (Kaida, 2015; Waters & Eschbach, 1995). In this research, immigration
status captures whether study participants were foreign-born or US-born. . Immigration
status was also controlled through non-U. S. citizenship versus U. S. citizenship. In the
2008 SIPP Panel, EBORNUS and ECITIZEN provided for the country of origin and
citizenship status, respectively. Both variables were dichotomously coded as 1 for Yes
and 0 for No. It would be beneficial to note that ECITIZEN could have also been taken as
a time-varying covariate because noncitizen respondents at baseline could have acquired
US citizenship status within the five-year study span. A meticulous look at the data,
however, indicated that the citizenship status of the respondents remained unchanged
across the waves. It is therefore appropriate to assign this variable under the timeinvariant section.
Race/ethnicity. Race and ethnicity are found to be determinants of “economic
factors” in capitalist societies (Huffman & Cohen, 2004; Leicht, 2008; Light, Roscigno,
& Kalev, 2011; Roscigno, Garcia, & Bobbitt-Zeher, 2007). In this research, the study
participants were distinguished by race and ethnicity. In the SIPP data, the variable
EORIGIN determined whether a participant is Hispanic (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0),
while ERACE identified participants who are White, African-American, Asian and
Residual (other races). Due to small sample size, participants whose race is reported as
“Residual” were removed from the sample. This approach is consistent with previous
research on low-income families (Irving, 2013). Another variable was created by
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recoding ERACE into a dichotomous variable called “RACECODE” which controlled for
White (coded as 1) versus non-White participants (coded as 2).
Gender. In the American society, the labor market is generally perceived as
discriminatory against women based on the fact that researchers have continuously
demonstrated that males are more likely to secure employment and earn more for the
same work than their female counterparts. Hence, there have been associations between
gender and economic opportunities (Bielby & Baron, 1986; Correll & Benard, 2007;
McDonald, Lin, & Ao, 2009; Wilkie, 1991). In this research, the variable ESEX
determined whether study participants identify themselves as male or female. Male
participants are coded as 1 and female as 2. This variable was dichotomized to preserve
the categorical nature of the whole dataset. 40 was chosen as the cutoff point by virtue of
the effect being the greatest after having tested other cutoffs.
Age. Age is another factor associated with economic outcomes (Bjelland et al.,
2010; Lippmann, 2008; Roscigno, Mong, Byron, & Tester, 2007). In the original dataset,
the variable YEAR registered the year in which the respondents were born. The year of
birth allowed the computation of age of the study participants. The variable AGERANGE
was created with a value of 1 for participants who were 40 years old and over and 2 for
those who were less than 40 years old.
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CHAPTER VII: DATA ANALYSIS
Multicollinearity Tests
First and foremost, the researcher performed the multicollinearity test by running
the collinearity diagnostics in multiple regression. The purpose of this procedure is to
check the extent to which two or more predictors are interdependent with respect to an
outcome variable. The “existence” of collinearity among explanatory variables is almost
inevitable, but its “severity” is a red flag in regression analyses (Farrar & Glauber, 1967,
p. 106; Haitovsky, 1969). A variance inflation score (VIF) of 10 and above is an indicator
of multicollinearity among the variables (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980; Myers, 1990).
Multicollinearity can also be detected through tolerance measures. According to Menard
(1995), a tolerance of 0.2 of less is a problematic score (Menard, 1995, pp. 71-72). The
presence of collinearity beyond these thresholds can disturb the predictive capability of
the model by inflating the variance of the explanatory variables. Hence, highly correlated
predictors in a model should be a cause of concern for researchers (Belsley et al., 1980).
As evidenced in the multicollinearity diagnostics table below (Table 6), there
were no predictors with a variance inflation factor (VIF) above 9 and a tolerance score
inferior or equal to 0.2. Under the VIF column, the highest score was 3.053 for the
variable BENEFITS, while the lowest score was 1.041 for EPTWRK. In the same way,
the highest score in the tolerance section was .960 for EPTWRK, whereas the lowest
score was .328 for BENEFITS. Clearly, VIF and tolerance are the object mirror of each
other.
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Table 6. Multicollinearity Diagnostics
Variable

Tolerance

VIF^

Respondent’s age range

.862

1.160

ESEX*

Sex of this person

.907

1.103

EBORNUS*

Immigration status

.395

2.534

ECITIZEN*

US citizenship status of respondent at
baseline
Hispanic or Latino ethnicity

.416

2.404

.612

1.634

Race of the respondent

.801

1.249

Education attainment at baseline

.850

1.177

METRO*

Metro status at baseline

.883

1.133

REGION*

Region of the United States where
respondent lived at baseline

.695

1.439

SUNEMPL*

Average state unemployment rates at
baseline

.715

1.398

SWAGE*

Average state minimum wage rates at
baseline

.576

1.735

SPORA*

Average state poverty rates

.479

2.088

Household type or living arrangement at
baseline
Presence of children under 18 in the
household at baseline

.741

1.349

.364

2.746

Cumulative number of people in
household at baseline

.397

2.522

Financial capability with respect to bank
accounts and homeownership at baseline

.845

1.184

Work or employment status at baseline

.960

1.041

AGERANGE*

EORIGIN*
RACECODE*
EDUCATE*

RHTYPE*
RFNKIDS*

HNUMP*

FINANBHV*

EPTWRK*

Description
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RHMTRF**

Participation in welfare benefits at
baseline
BENEFITS*** Total benefits received by a household at
baseline
CUMULIPR

Attainment and maintenance of economic
self-sufficiency (Dependent Variable)

.342

2.922

.328

3.053

N/A

N/A

* Covariates
** Predictor 1 (Independent variable for Hypothesis 1)
*** Predictor 2 (Independent variable for Hypothesis 2)
^ Variance Inflation Factor
Binomial Logistic Regression
Because the outcome variable is binary, the researcher used logistic regression to
test the study hypotheses. Using IBM SPSS Statistics Version 23.0, the researcher
performed the hierarchical entry of blocks method to control for the covariates. Since
there were two hypotheses to be tested in this research, the investigator proceeded by
running two separate analyses. In each analysis the researcher took into consideration all
the control variables and the relevant independent variable, and left out the other
independent variable. The following 17 control variables were entered in block 1 of each
analysis: age, gender, nativity, citizenship, ethnicity, race, education, metro status,
geographical location, average state unemployment rate, average state minimum wage,
average state poverty rate, household type, presence of children under 18 in the
household, number of people in the household, financial capability, and work status. In
block 2 of each analysis, one of the independent variables—welfare benefits receipt per
household or number of welfare benefits per household—was entered into the equation.
Such hierarchical technique allowed to compare the R2-change associated with entering
the second block, and the additional variance explained by the independent variable after
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accounting for the control variables. Finally, because SIPP used a sample design in which
different households are sampled at different rates, the use of weights is generally
essential to generate unbiased estimates of population characteristics. The inclusion of the
weights variable WHFNWGT in the analysis was thus used to obtain point estimates that
are representative of the survey population. Please refer to the codebook in Appendix 1
for a complete description of the study variables.
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CHAPTER VIII: RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Before moving into the regressions, the frequency distributions of all the variables
for the full sample as well as the intervention and the comparison groups will be
examined. Table 7 below summarizes the frequency distributions for the full sample.
Descriptive statistics for the intervention group and the comparison group are presented
in Table 8. As highlighted in Table 7, the racial/ethnic makeup of the sample was mostly
White (74.1 percent) compared to its non-White proportion (25.9 percent). 21.3 percent
of respondents identified themselves as Hispanic. If the 25.9 percent of non-Whites are
combined with the proportion of Hispanics, the sample then appears to have slightly
higher percentages of minority participants than the general population. Nonetheless,
these percentages are consistent with the over-representation of lower income Americans
selected for this project. More than three-quarters (77.6 percent) of the study participants
identified themselves as US-born citizens, as compared to less than one quarter (22.4
percent) immigrants. As mentioned in the methodology section, the participants in the
sample ranged from 18 to 65 years old, with a mean age of 39.77. Just over half of the
survey respondents (52.2 percent) were under 40 years old, while nearly half of them
(47.8 percent) reported to be 40 years old and over. About two-thirds of the respondents
(62.8 percent) were female, as opposed to just 37.2 percent male. With respect to
educational attainment, roughly half of the sample (52.0 percent) did not pursue or
complete postsecondary education, whereas the remaining half (48.0 percent) did. In
terms of financial capability, just over one-third of the survey respondents (34.7 percent)
indicated high financial capability, whereas the remaining two-thirds (65.3 percent)
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reported low financial capability. As pertains to employment status, one-third of the
survey respondents (33.6 percent) worked less than 35 hours per week; almost another
third of them (32.1 percent) carried full-time employment, while the remaining third
(34.3 percent) was not working or looking for work.
Regarding household structure, slightly over forty percent of the informants (41.7
percent) were married couples, as opposed to 58.3 percent who identified themselves as
single. Closely similar percentages, 44.0 percent and 56.0 percent, were reported in
reference to the presence or absence of children in the households, respectively. Yet
closely similar proportions were also found with regard to the number of people per
household. Indeed, 43.4 percent of the participants lived in households with less than
three people, while 56.6 percent of them lived in households with three or more people.
From a geographical standpoint, roughly one-fifth of the informants (20.4
percent) lived in non-metropolitan areas, as opposed to the vast majority of them (79.6
percent) who lived in metropolitan areas. In addition, a plurality of the participants (42.1
percent) lived in the South, while others resided in the Northeast (14.6 percent), the West
(21.1 percent), and the Midwest (21.1 percent). Moreover, over half of the participants
(56.3 percent) lived in states that had very low-to-moderate average rates of poverty for
the 2008-2012 period, while the remaining 43.7 percent of them resided in states with
high-to-very high average poverty levels for the same timeframe. Furthermore, over half
of the sample (57.7 percent) lived in states where the average minimum wage rates were
less than 7 dollars per week, in contrast of 42.3 percent of them who lived in states with
average minimum wage rates of 7 dollars or more per week. Finally, the participants were
split almost evenly—48.0 percent and 52.0 percent—over states with average

120

unemployment rates of less than 6 percent and states where these rates were 6 percent or
more, respectively.
Table 7. Frequency Distributions of Variables for Full Sample
(N = 4,216)
Variable

%

Mean

SD*

2,201
2,015

52.2
47.8

1.52
-

.500
-

US Nativity
No
Yes

946
3,270

22.4
77.6

1.22
-

.417
-

Hispanic Ethnicity
No
Yes

3,316
900

78.7
21.3

1.79
-

.410
-

Education
No post-secondary
Post-secondary

2,193
2,023

52.0
48.0

1.48
-

.500
-

Household Type
Single
Married

2,458
1,758

58.3
41.7

1.58
-

.493
-

Children in the Home
No
Yes

1,857
2,359

44.0
56.0

1.44
-

.497
-

1.48

.500

48.0
52.0

-

.824
-

Age
Less than 40
40 and over

Average State
Unemployment Rate
Less than 6 percent
6 percent or more

N

2,191
2,025

Work Status
Less than 35 hrs./week
35 hrs./week or more
Not working/looking

1,415
1,355
1,446

33.6
32.1
34.3

2.01
-

Welfare Receipt
No
Yes

1,780
2,436

42.2
57.8

1.42
-

.494
-

1.79

.770

Total Benefits
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None
One or Two
Three to Seven

1,780
1,536
900

42.2
36.4
21.3

-

-

Gender
Male
Female

1,568
2,648

37.2
62.8

1.63
-

.483
-

US Citizenship
No
Yes

587
3,629

13.9
86.1

1.14
-

.346
-

Race
Non-White
White

1,090
3,126

25.9
74.1

1.26
-

.438
-

20.4
79.6

1.20
-

.403
-

43.4
56.6

1.57
-

.496
-

34.7
65.3

1.65
-

.476
-

1.58

.494

57.7
42.3

-

.992
-

Metro
Non-Metro
Metro
People in the Home
Less than three
Three or more
Financial Capability
High
Low
Average State Minimum
Wage
Less than $7 / week
$7 / week or more

862
3,354

1,828
2,388

1,464
2,752

2,434
1,782

Regions
Northeast
South
West
Midwest

615
1,777
891
933

14.6
42.1
21.1
21.1

2.51
-

Poverty Level
High-Very high
Very Low-Moderate

1,843
2,373

43.7
56.3

1.56
-

.496
-

Self-Sufficiency
No
Yes

2,846
1,370

67.5
32.5

.32
-

.468
-

* Standard Deviation
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Based on the frequency distributions depicted in Table 8, there were some major
discrepancies between the intervention group and the comparison group on certain
variables, including age, household type, education, presence of children, and number of
people in the household. Notable—but less drastic—preexisting differences between the
two groups were also observed for the variables race, Hispanic ethnicity, gender, US
citizenship, nativity, and financial behavior. Yet, both groups shared similar frequency
distribution patterns with respect to work status and geographical location which includes
metro status, US regions, average state poverty levels, average state unemployment rates
and average state minimum wage rates. All these aforementioned differences were
controlled in the analyses.
Table 8. Frequency Distributions of Variables for
Intervention Group and Comparison Group
Intervention Group

Comparison Group

Variable
N

%

M

SD*

N

%

M

SD*

Age
Less than 40
40 and over

2,436
1,537
899

100
63.1
36.9

1.63
-

.483
-

1,780
664
1,116

100
37.3
62.7

1.37
-

.484
-

Gender
Male
Female

2,436
743
1,693

100
30.5
69.5

1.69
-

.461
-

1,780
825
955

100
46.3
53.7

1.54
-

.499
-

US Nativity
No
Yes

2,436
660
1,776

100
27.1
72.9

1.27
-

.445
-

1,780
286
1,494

100
16.1
83.9

1.16
-

.367
-

US Citizenship
No
Yes

2,436
455
1,981

100
18.7
81.3

1.19
-

.390
-

1,780
132
1,648

100
7.4
92.6

1.07
-

.262
-

Hispanic Ethnicity
No
Yes

2,436
1,719
717

100
70.6
29.4

1.71
-

.456
-

1,780
1,597
183

100
89.7
10.3

1.90
-

.304
-
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Race
Non-White
White

2,436
750
1,686

100
30.8
69.2

1.31
-

.462
-

1,780
340
1,440

100
19.1
80.9

1.19
-

.393
-

Education
No post-secondary
education
Post-secondary
education

2,436
1,498

100
61.5

1.39
-

.487
-

1,780
695

100
39.0

1.61
-

.488
-

936

38.5

-

-

1,085

61.0

-

-

Metro
Non-metro area
Metro area

2,436
515
1,921

100
21.1
78.9

1.21
-

.408
-

1,780
347
1,433

100
19.5
80.5

1.19
-

.396
-

Region
Northeast
South
West
Midwest

2,436
364
1,017
531
524

100
14.9
41.7
21.8
21.5

2.50
-

.990
-

1,780
251
760
360
409

100
14.1
42.7
20.2
23.0

2.52
-

.996
-

State Unemployment
Rate
Less than 6 percent
6 percent or more

2,436

100

1.48

.500

1,780

100

1.48

.500

1,170
1,266

48.0
52.0

-

-

855
925

48.0
52.0

-

-

Average State Minimum
Wage
Less than $7 per hour
$7 or more per hour

2,436

100

1.57

.496

1,780

100

1.59

.491

1,378
1,058

56.6
43.4

-

-

1,056
724

59.3
40.7

-

-

Average State Poverty
Level
Very low-to-moderate
poverty
High and very high
poverty

2,436

100

1.55

.497

1,780

100

1.57

.495

1,350

55.4

-

-

1,023

57.5

-

-

1,086

44.6

-

-

757

42.5

-

-

Household Type
Single
Married couples

2,436
1,375
1,061

100
56.4
43.6

1.56
-

.496
-

1,780
1,083
697

100
39.2
60.8

1.61
-

.488
-

Presence of Children
No
Yes

2,436
511
1,925

100
21.0
79.0

1.21
-

.407
-

1,780
1,346
434

100
75.6
24.4

1.76
-

.430
-

People in Household
Less than three

2,436
558

100
22.9

1.77
-

.420
-

1,780
1,270

100
71.3

1.29
-

.452
-
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Three or more

1,878

77.1

-

-

510

28.7

-

-

Financial capability
High
Low

2,436
604
1,832

100
24.8
75.2

1.75
-

.432
-

1,780
860
920

100
48.3
51.7

1.52
-

.500
-

Work Status
Less than 35 hours per
week
35 hours or more per
week
Not working, not
looking

2,436
815

100
33.5

2.02
-

.827
-

1,780
600

100
33.7

2.00
-

.819
-

769

31.6

-

-

586

32.9

-

-

852

35.0

-

-

594

33.4

-

-

Welfare Receipt
No
Yes

2,436
0
2,436

100
0.0
100.0

1.00
-

.000
-

1,780
1,780
0

100
100.0
0.0

2.00
-

.000
-

Total benefits
One benefits
Two benefits
Three benefits
Four benefits

2,436
861
675
429
471

100
35.3
27.7
17.6
19.3

2.21
-

1.122
-

1,780
0
0
0
0

100
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

.00
-

.000
-

Self-Sufficiency
No
Yes

2,436
1,906
530

100
78.2
21.8

.22
-

.413
-

1,780
940
840

100
52.8
47.2

1.53
-

.499
-

* SD = Standard deviation
M = Mean

Regressions
In the regression output of each analysis, the researcher first looked at the
between-block proportion of variance change. To ascertain the proximity of the
regression line with respect to the data points, the researcher considered Nagelkerke Rsquare as the coefficient of determination. The researcher also looked at any
improvement in percent classification between the blocks, as well as the odds ratio. It was
expected that due to the large sample size, even small effects would be statistically
significant. Therefore, it was important to assess effect sizes, namely the odds ratios
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associated with the independent variable in each hypothesis. According to Bonett and
Price (2015), odds ratios (OR) are a useful way to interpret the magnitude of effects in
studies that involve binary outcome variables. Odds ratios vary from 0 to +∞ with a score
of 1 indicating no difference in the odds of the occurrence of an outcome (i.e., economic
self-sufficiency in this study) between two group conditions (i.e., households that
participated in federal welfare programs and those that did not in this study). Values that
are below 1 mean a decrease in likelihood of an event occurrence relative to the reference
group, while values above 1 indicate just the opposite (Osteen & Bright, 2010). Standard
tables of interpretation of OR in intervention research provide the following parameters
to assess the magnitude of effects: small = 1.44, medium = 2.47, and large = 4.25. These
effect sizes imply that the OR is greater than 1. When the OR is less than 1, however, the
following sizes apply: small = .69, medium = .40, and large = .24 (Buchholz, Linton,
Courtney, & Schoeny, 2016, p. 57). In this research, the odds ratio is the likelihood of
economic self-sufficiency if a household received one or more welfare benefits in relation
to the likelihood of economic self-sufficiency if a household did not receive any of these
benefits.
Multivariate Analysis for Hypothesis 1: Low-income households that receive one or
more lower-tier federal means-tested benefits will be less likely to attain and maintain
economic self-sufficiency than will their counterparts who do not participate in federal
welfare programs after controlling for the identified covariates.
Proportion of variance explained. As seen in the model summary (Table 9)
below, block 1—which controlled for all the covariates—explained 14 percent of the
variance in attainment and maintenance of economic self-sufficiency (Nagelkerke R-
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square), -2 LL = 13625218.1, χ2 (20) = 1249835.8, p< .05. With the addition of the
independent variable (household welfare benefits receipt), there was a 3 percentage point
R-square change from 14.1 percent in block 1 to 16.6 percent in block 2 (Nagelkerke Rsquare), -2 LL = 13387293.9, χ2 (21) = 1487759.9, p< .05. In other words, the 3
percentage point improvement in Nagelkerke R-square indicates an increase in the
variance accounted for with the addition of the independent variable after controlling for
all the covariates in block 1.
Table 9. Model Summaries, Hypothesis 1
Block 1 Model Summary
Step

-2 Log
likelihood

1

13625218.1

Cox & Snell R Nagelkerke R
Square
Square
.102

.141

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square
Step 1

df

Sig.

Step

1249835.770

20

.000

Block

1249835.770

20

.000

Model

1249835.770

20

.000

Block 2 Model Summary
Step

-2 Log
likelihood

1

13387293.9

Cox & Snell R Nagelkerke R
Square
Square
.120

.166

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square
Step 1

df

Sig.

Step

237924.161

1

.000

Block

237924.161

1

.000

Model

1487759.931

21

.000

Observed and predicted classifications. Based on the following classification
table (Table 10), each block contributed to the improvement of the overall predictive
ability of the model in a statistically significant way. As depicted in the aforementioned
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table, the correct classification in the initial model (beginning block) was 66 percent. This
block represented the null hypothesis which explains the contribution of a model absent
any predictors (independent variable and covariates). The predictors in block 1 increased
the correct classification of the model to 68 percent. Finally, there was an additional 1
percentage point improvement in percent correct classification associated with welfare
receipt in block 2, leading to a 69 percent predictive power of the final model (model fit).
Table 10. Classification Distributions, Hypothesis 1
Classification for Initial Model or Beginning Block (Null Hypothesis)
Observed
Predicted
Attainment and maintenance of
economic self-sufficiency
Percentage
No
Yes
Correct
Step 0 Attainment and
No
7705693
0
100.0
maintenance of economic Yes
3926409
0
.0
self-sufficiency
Overall Percentage
66.2
Classification for Block 1
Observed
Predicted
Attainment and maintenance of
economic self-sufficiency
Percentage
No
Yes
Correct
Step 1 Attainment and
No
6828408
877285
88.6
maintenance of economic Yes
2800583
1125826
28.7
self-sufficiency
Overall Percentage
68.4
Classification for Final Model (Model Fit)
Observed
Predicted
Attainment and maintenance of
economic self-sufficiency
Percentage
No
Yes
Correct
Step 1 Attainment and
No
6681909
1023784
86.7
maintenance of economic Yes
2567063
1359346
34.6
self-sufficiency
Overall Percentage
69.1

Odds ratio. Table 11 below displays the regression coefficients (B) and odds
ratios (Exp(B)) of economic self-sufficiency with regard to all the 18 predictor variables
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included in the equation (model). The next-to-last line in the table shows the effect of the
independent variable, welfare receipt, on the outcome, attainment and maintenance of
self-sufficiency, while controlling for all the other predictors of the model. As seen, the
odds ratio for this variable is .443, indicating that participants in the intervention group
(i.e., those coded “1” on the independent variable) had less than half the odds of attaining
and maintain self-sufficiency than those in the comparison group (those coded “0” on the
independent variable). In other words, those in the intervention group were 2.3 times
(1/.443) less likely to attain and maintain economic self-sufficiency than those in the
comparison group. This is a medium effect size. Therefore, hypothesis 1 was supported.
Table 11. Logistic Regression of Self-Sufficiency: Variables in the Equation,
Hypothesis 1
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
B

S.E.

Wald

.136

.002

7264.697

1 .000

1.146

1.142

1.150

State minimum wage -.003

.002

1.671

1 .196

.997

.993

1.001

Age range

.066

.001

2193.969

1 .000

1.069

1.066

1.072

Gender

.061

.001

1839.984

1 .000

1.063

1.060

1.066

Nativity

.002

.002

.455

1 .500

1.002

.997

1.006

US citizenship

.409

.003

18875.528

1 .000

1.505

1.497

1.514

-.109

.002

2851.193

1 .000

.897

.893

.900

.204

.002

13802.139

1 .000

1.226

1.222

1.231

.001 122208.561

1 .000

.605

.603

.606

.380

.002

40019.567

1 .000

1.462

1.457

1.467

-.016

.002

44.508

1 .000

.984

.980

.989

.002 114513.119

1 .000

1.689

1.684

1.694

Children in the home -.237

.002

11285.550

1 .000

.789

.785

.792

People in the home

-.087

.002

1562.665

1 .000

.917

.913

.921

Financial capability

.391

.001

73768.901

1 .000

1.478

1.474

1.482

Northeast region

-.098

.003

1302.683

1 .000

.906

.901

.911

South region

-.061

.003

479.011

1 .000

.941

.936

.946

State unemployment

Hispanic ethnicity
Race
Education level
Metro status
State poverty rate
Marital status

-.503

.524
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df

Sig. Exp(B)

Lower

Upper

West region

.022

.002

101.939

1 .000

1.022

1.018

1.027

Part-time work

-.065

.002

1501.094

1 .000

.937

.934

.940

Full-time work

-.452

.002

72351.665

1 .000

.636

.634

.638

Welfare receipt

-.815

.002 234212.207

1 .000

.443

.441

.444

Constant

-.709

.007

1 .000

.492

9868.815

Although presence of children was included as a covariate and thus presumably
controlled during the analysis, the researcher still remained unsure about the possibility
that the difference in self-sufficiency may have been due to the presence of children in
the household. In fact, as shown in the frequency distributions of the variables, there was
a major difference between the intervention group and the comparison group in reference
to presence of children in the households. Hence, the researcher thought that it would be
worthwhile to perform a follow-up analysis of only households with children (n = 2359).
This follow-up analysis was to determine whether self-sufficiency outcomes differ
between these two groups, using a sample where the playing field was more or less
leveled.
The tables below (Tables 12-14) present the explained variance, the correct
classification, and the odds ratios for households with children (n = 2,359). As
demonstrated in the tables, the results were quite similar to those found in the analysis of
the full sample with (a) a 3 percentage point R-square change in the explained variance in
attainment and maintenance of self-sufficiency from 15 percent in block 1 (Nagelkerke
R-square), -2 LL = 6795872.3, χ2 (19) = 717935.3, p< .05 to 18 percent in block 2
(Nagelkerke R-square), -2 LL = 6668813.8, χ2 (20) = 844993.7, p< .05, (b) a predictive
capability of 72.5 percent in block 0 to 73.4 percent in block 1 to 75.1 percent in block 2,
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and (c) an odds ratio of .431 for the independent variable (welfare receipt). These
findings corroborated those found for the full sample. That is, the presence or absence of
children in the household was already controlled for in the analysis and thus cannot be
used in the interpretation of the differences between the two groups.
Table 12. Model Summaries, Hypothesis 1,
Households with Children Only
Block 1 Model Summary
Step
1

-2 Log
likelihood

Cox & Snell R Nagelkerke R
Square
Square

6795872.3

.106

.154

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square
Step 1

df

Sig.

Step

717935.297

19

.000

Block

717935.297

19

.000

Model

717935.297

19

.000

Block 2 Model Summary
Step
1

-2 Log
likelihood

Cox & Snell R Nagelkerke R
Square
Square

6668813.8

.124

.179

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square
Step 1

df

Sig.

Step

127058.437

1

.000

Block

127058.437

1

.000

Model

844993.734

20

.000

Table 13. Classification Distributions, Hypothesis 1, Households with Children Only
Classification for Initial Model or Beginning Block (Null Hypothesis)
Observed
Predicted
Attainment and maintenance of
economic self-sufficiency
Percentage
No
Yes
Correct
Step 0 Attainment and
No
4636812
0
100.0
maintenance of economic Yes
1755083
0
.0
self-sufficiency
Overall Percentage
72.5
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Classification for Block 1
Observed

Predicted
Attainment and maintenance of
economic self-sufficiency
No
Yes
4332236
304577

Step 1 Attainment and
No
maintenance of economic Yes
1396481
358602
self-sufficiency
Overall Percentage
Classification for Final Model (Model Fit)
Observed
Predicted
Attainment and maintenance of
economic self-sufficiency
No
Yes
Step 1 Attainment and
No
4347323
289489
maintenance of economic Yes
1299657
455426
self-sufficiency
Overall Percentage

Percentage
Correct
93.4
20.4
73.4

Percentage
Correct
93.8
25.9
75.1

Table 14. Logistic Regression of Self-Sufficiency: Variables in the Equation, Hypothesis 1,
Households with Children Only
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
B

S.E.

Wald

State unemployment

.132

.002

3159.482

1 .000

1.141

1.135

1.146

State minimum wage

-.098

.003

953.862

1 .000

.906

.901

.912

Age range

.389

.002

37381.165

1 .000

1.475

1.469

1.481

Gender

.191

.002

7174.375

1 .000

1.211

1.205

1.216

Nativity

.040

.003

144.676

1 .000

1.041

1.034

1.048

US citizenship

.492

.004

15475.881

1 .000

1.636

1.623

1.648

-.054

.003

423.136

1 .000

.947

.942

.952

.320

.003

15520.912

1 .000

1.377

1.370

1.384

-.603

.002

87632.206

1 .000

.547

.545

.549

Metro status

.274

.003

10467.285

1 .000

1.315

1.308

1.322

State poverty rate

.169

.003

2495.930

1 .000

1.185

1.177

1.193

Marital status

.392

.002

28493.975

1 .000

1.480

1.474

1.487

People in the home

.172

.003

2681.953

1 .000

1.188

1.180

1.196

Financial capability

.474

.002

51909.222

1 .000

1.606

1.600

1.613

-.370

.004

8506.157

1 .000

.691

.686

.696

Hispanic ethnicity
Race
Education level

North region
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df

Sig. Exp(B)

Lower

Upper

South region

-.092

.004

528.257

1 .000

.912

.905

.919

West region

-.030

.003

85.484

1 .000

.970

.964

.977

Part-time work

.103

.003

1648.519

1 .000

1.109

1.103

1.114

Full-time work

-.319

.002

16783.637

1 .000

.727

.723

.730

Welfare receipt

-.841

.002

129026.810

1 .000

.431

.429

.433

-1.096

.010

12217.294

1 .000

.334

Constant

Multivariate Analysis for Hypothesis 2: Low-income households who enrolled in
more programs will have worse self-sufficiency outcomes than will their counterparts
who participate in fewer services after controlling for the identified covariates.
Proportion of variance explained. In the second analysis, the covariates in block
1 explained 9 percent of the variance in attainment and maintenance of economic selfsufficiency (Nagelkerke R-square), -2 LL = 6536998.8, χ2 (20) = 412455.1, p< .05
(Table 15). It should be noted that this proportion of explained variance was different
from that registered in multivariate analysis I. This difference can be explained by the
fact that significance levels were reduced and error variances enlarged by smaller sample
sizes. In fact, households that did not participate in welfare programs at baseline
(comparison group) were incompatible with the purpose of this analysis. These
households were therefore removed for the final sample (n = 2,436).
With the entry of the independent variable (number of welfare benefits per
household) in block 2, the model explained 12 percent of the variance in economic selfsufficiency (Nagelkerke R-square), -2 LL = 6412273.6, χ2 (21) = 537180.4, p< .05. This
three percentage point R-square change between the two blocks was incrementally
associated with the impact of the independent variable. Please see model summary below
for more details.
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Table 15. Model Summaries, Hypothesis 2
Block 1 Model Summary
Step
1

-2 Log
likelihood

Cox & Snell R Nagelkerke R
Square
Square

6536998.8

.061

.094

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square
Step 1

df

Sig.

Step

412455.1

20

.000

Block

412455.1

20

.000

Model

412455.1

20

.000

Block 2 Model Summary
Step
1

-2 Log
likelihood

Cox & Snell R Nagelkerke R
Square
Square

6412273.6

.079

.121

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square
Step 1

df

Sig.

Step

124725.239

1

.000

Block

124725.239

1

.000

Model

537180.379

21

.000

Observed and predicted classifications. As seen in Table 16, the correct
classification of 77.1 percent in block 1 did not improve the 77.4 percent prior correct
classification (block 0). The model predictive capacity was basically unchanged from one
block to another. A similar scenario occurred in block 2 (model fit) where the percentage
accuracy in classification knew no statistical improvement from the previous blocks. In
short, the model correctly predicted 77 percent of the cases, the same percentage as for
the null hypothesis. Please see model classification table below for more details.
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Table 16. Classification Distributions, Hypothesis 2
Classification for Initial Model or Beginning Block (Null Hypothesis)
Observed
Predicted
Attainment and maintenance of
economic self-sufficiency
Percentage
No
Yes
Correct
Step 0 Attainment and
No
5033516
0
100.0
maintenance of economic Yes
1469334
0
.0
self-sufficiency
Overall Percentage
77.4
Classification for Block 1
Observed
Predicted
Attainment and maintenance of
economic self-sufficiency
Percentage
No
Yes
Correct
Step 1 Attainment and
No
4957440
76076
98.5
maintenance of economic Yes
1412704
56630
3.9
self-sufficiency
Overall Percentage
77.1
Classification for Final Model (Model Fit)
Observed
Predicted
Attainment and maintenance of
economic self-sufficiency
No
Yes
Step 1 Attainment and
No
4919479
114037
maintenance of economic
Yes
1377346
91988
self-sufficiency
Overall Percentage

Percentage
Correct
97.7
6.3
77.1

Odds ratio. Table 17 exhibits the regression equation for the logistic regression
of self-sufficiency on all the covariates and the independent variable. The next-to-last line
shows an odds ratio (Exp(B)) of .685 for attainment and maintenance of economic selfsufficiency as a function of number of benefits received per household. This means,
while controlling for all the other predictors in the model, the odds of attaining and
maintaining economic self-sufficiency decreased by approximately one-third for each
additional benefit received. In other words, households were 1.4 (1/.691) times less likely
to become and remain economically self-sufficient with each additional benefit received.
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Although small, this effect is exponential: a household receiving two benefits was 1.4
times less likely to attain and maintain self-sufficiency compared to a household
receiving one benefit; a household receiving three benefits was 2.0 times less likely
(1.42), and a household receiving four benefits was almost 3.0 times less likely (1.43).
Thus, hypothesis 2 was supported.
Table 17. Logistic Regression of Self-Sufficiency: Variables in the Equation,
Hypothesis 2
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
B
SState unemployment
tState minimum wage
eAge range
p
Gender
1
Nativity
a

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig. Exp(B)

Lower

Upper

.053 .002

487.685

1 .000

1.055

1.050

1.060

-.376 .003

12513.129

1 .000

.687

.682

.691

.254 .002

14731.379

1 .000

1.289

1.284

1.294

.059 .002

724.726

1 .000

1.061

1.057

1.066

-.147 .003

1827.555

1 .000

.863

.857

.869

.608 .004

23477.183

1 .000

1.836

1.822

1.850

-.160 .003

3326.349

1 .000

.852

.848

.857

.290 .002

13569.654

1 .000

1.336

1.330

1.343

-.477 .002

52788.761

1 .000

.621

.618

.623

.357 .003

16912.286

1 .000

1.429

1.421

1.436

-.051 .004

201.683

1 .000

.950

.944

.957

Marital status

.145 .002

3999.750

1 .000

1.156

1.150

1.161

Children in the home

.032 .003

108.140

1 .000

1.033

1.027

1.039

People in the home

-.171 .003

3273.036

1 .000

.843

.838

.848

Financial capability

.523 .002

57281.048

1 .000

1.687

1.679

1.694

North region

-.243 .004

3310.230

1 .000

.784

.778

.791

South region

-.091 .004

473.439

1 .000

.913

.905

.920

West region

-.145 .003

1846.663

1 .000

.865

.860

.871

Part-time work

.013 .003

28.308

1 .000

1.014

1.009

1.019

Full-time work

-.271 .003

11575.981

1 .000

.763

.759

.767

Number of benefits

-.369 .001 118688.613

1 .000

.691

.690

.693

Constant

-.682 .011

1 .000

.506

US citizenship
Hispanic ethnicity
Race
Education level
Metro status
State poverty rate

4154.526
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CHAPTER IX: DISCUSSION
Interpretation of Results
This research tested two hypotheses in order to determine whether participation in
federal welfare programs galvanizes low-income households toward economic selfsufficiency. Both hypotheses forecast a negative correlation between welfare
participation and household income. Hypothesis 1 predicted lower odds of attaining and
maintaining self-sufficiency following receipt of welfare benefits compared to
households not receiving such benefits. Hypothesis 2 anticipated a reduction in household
income based on the number of welfare benefits received. Results from binary logistic
regression corroborated both hypotheses, given that (a) households on welfare were two
times less likely to attain and maintain economic self-sufficiency as compared to those
not on welfare and (b) self-sufficiency was negatively related to the number of benefits
received by a household. These results can be interpreted in light of potential preexisting
differences between the intervention group and the comparison group, which were not
accounted for in the analysis. Access to services and social support are two facets of
social capital that could explain the natural sorting mechanism of study participants into
groups.
Access to services. Accessibility to federal welfare programs can arguably be a
byzantine process for low-income families. There exist labyrinths and entanglements in
the American welfare system intended to prevent people from applying. Williamson
(1999) used the term “bureaucratic transaction costs” to describe obstacles faced in
transacting. Under a welfare system set up to prevent people from accessing programs in
the first place, the costs of the transaction make it difficult for some people to receive
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benefits. Under Williamson’s (1999) bureaucratic transaction hypothesis, the
government practically plays a game against its citizens who, for the most part, are
limited in the transaction.
This dovetails perfectly with von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) Game
Theory which describes rational decisions between competitive entities. In this case, the
government intends to limit welfare seekers in the transaction. When prevented from
engaging in free transactions, people are basically captives and counterproductive results
of programs are produced. That is, the lack of bona fide intent on the part of the
government in the design of antipoverty policies would make beneficiaries struggle to
meet program expectations. For instance, the intended goal of TANF is to keep people off
welfare by turning to the workforce for basic support. Unintended results, however, occur
when recipients are disconnected from both welfare and work (Blank & Kovak, 2008,
2009; Loprest, 2011; Loprest & Nichols, 2011). Because poor people tend to lack the
necessary skills to navigate the complexity of the welfare system by themselves, social
capital, in the form of experienced or professional people who can advise them, is critical
in applying for and accessing social services. For example, in the Affordable Care Act,
these experienced people are called navigators. This is – or used to be – an important
role for social workers, for whom linkage of people and programs was an important
function.
Hence, as compared to those in the comparison group, households in the
intervention group were perhaps more able to navigate and overcome the public
assistance bureaucracy aimed at repelling applicants. In other words, participants in the
intervention group may have had assistance from social workers or other navigators than
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their counterparts in the comparison group. As a result, these household members may
have balanced work and welfare in such a way to avoid falling into the benefits cliff. In
welfare, benefits cliffs take place when a household income is far from being adequate yet
is just high enough to prevent enrollment in fundamental programs (Kaz, 2015). In other
words, by earning just a couple of dollars above the income eligibility thresholds,
householders may have to make out-of-pocket payments for key goods and services such
as food, healthcare, or housing. It would have therefore been wise for these householders
to circumvent any benefits cliff at all costs.
Indeed, Edin and Lein (1996) found little self-sufficiency differences between
single mothers who worked and those on welfare who did not work. Those on welfare
understood the costs associated with work in terms of fatigue, clothing, transportation and
childcare. Therefore, the single mothers used welfare a coping mechanism against lowpaying jobs in the labor market. Their work ethic has never been in question as countless
studies found that the poor have similar work aspirations as other people from the middle
class (Schiller, 1973). Instead, this is a rational choice to break even with a welfare
system that is rigged against them in the first place. Since earnings from work are similar
to—or less than—what was provided in multiple welfare programs (Edin & Lein, 1996),
it is likely that recipients may decide to remain on welfare as long as possible or just
work part-time to avoid the benefits cliff. Such coping mechanisms do not apply to
participants in the comparison group.
Social support. It is possible that participating households that did not apply for
welfare benefits but were eligible for these benefits perhaps were more likely to use their
informal safety net, whereas those that did apply may not have had that safety net option
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or have had exhausted it. Stack (1974) wrote about informal support networks used by
single mothers in a Midwestern city. These included childcare assistance, exchange of
goods and services, and temporary shelter assistance. In some cultures, it is a reflection
on the entire family for household members to let one of theirs go to public assistance. So
family members seek welfare not as first resort but as last resort. Conceivably,
households whose informal social support network was intact remained in the
comparison group. By contrast, those whose informal social network support failed or
was nonexistent were classified into the intervention group. Hardcastle, Powers, and
Wenocur (2011) wrote that social support networks include family members, kinship and
social acquaintances (primary group); churches, unions, social clubs (secondary); and
support groups (tertiary) (p. 293). Any support received by households in the comparison
group—whether in the form of childcare, transportation, money, or linkage to
employment—would give them the edge over those in the intervention group that did not
receive such help. Social capital, especially in the form of childcare, transportation, and
linkage to employment would allow participants in the comparison group to seek, find,
and maintain work. This would not be the case for those in the intervention group,
provided that there was a lack of social capital.
Theoretical Inferences
In view of the foregoing interpretation, the findings are consistent with the claims
of the theory of policy design and social construction and the racial classification model
which point out “foul play” in the design and implementation of welfare policies at
national and subnational levels. Legislatively, policymakers set welfare recipients
(minorities, in particular) up for failure. The predetermined twists and turns in the
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policymaking process are impeding factors for self-sufficiency. On the other hand, the
present findings neither refute nor substantiate the claims of the culture of poverty theory
that welfare receipt creates dependence on the government. While it is true that the
intervention group had less self-sufficiency than the comparison group and that more
benefits were associated with lower household income, the quasi-experimental nature of
this research design does not allow for causal inference; indeed, as discussed above, these
findings may be a result of pre-existing group differences.
Consistency with Prior Research
The results are consistent with a line of previous research findings that, contrary
to their ultimate goals, federally-funded means-tested welfare programs actually correlate
with a decrease in labor participation, a sine qua non condition of economic selfsufficiency. Indeed, researchers have found negative associations between several
welfare programs and the labor supply, including Medicaid (Baicker, Finkelstein, Song,
& Taubman, 2014; Moffitt & Wolfe, 1990; Winkler, 1991), food stamps/SNAP (Fraker &
Moffitt, 1988; Hoynes & Schanzenbach, 2012), and housing assistance (Jacob &
Ludwig, 2012; Owens & Baum, 2009). However, the present findings are different from
the work of several other researchers, including Loeb and Corcoran (2001), Hall et al.
(2010), Schoeni and Blank (2000), McKernan, Lerman, Pindus, and Valente (2000), and
O'Neill and Hill (2001).
Hall et al. (2010) found that female immigrants leaving welfare were as likely to
find and maintain employment as their eligible counterparts who did not receive welfare.
These TANF leavers were also more likely to work than poor immigrant females who
were not eligible for welfare due to residency issues. Meanwhile, comparing female
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welfare recipients to their counterparts not on welfare, Loeb and Corcoran (2001) found
no differences in earnings between the two groups. Finally, McKernan et al. (2000),
O'Neill & Hill (2001) and Schoeni & Blank (2000) all conducted large-scale studies that
showed the instrumental role of welfare in raising employment among disadvantaged
women, especially minority single mothers.
There are two possible explanations for such inconsistency with this line of prior
research. First, all the aforementioned studies focused on a single program (TANF),
whereas this research was about enrollment in multiple welfare programs. In other words,
TANF input in the current investigation is comprised of less than 10 percent. Second,
researchers also worked on data collected during times of economic growth, while the
current investigator used data gathered during and after economic downturn. The
enforcement of labor participation under TANF, coupled with the economic boom of the
late 1990s, is arguably the main reason behind the discrepancies in the findings.
Implications
Implications for research. By their nature, the findings hold implications for
research. Although parallel, to some extent, with previous investigative efforts, these
findings represent a new line of research. In fact, no previous studies investigate
concurrent participation in as many means-tested welfare benefits. Moreover, the current
literature focuses primarily on the effectiveness of single programs. Researchers have
also demonstrated a preference for the study of female-headed households with children.
Social scientists’ tendency to recruit samples made of single-gender participants leave
behind married couples. Furthermore, the current body of research on social welfare is
based on relatively old data that might not be relevant to current social welfare policies
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(Slack et al., 2014). The findings of this research contribute to fill all the aforementioned
existing gaps in the literature. By identifying the number of benefits received by a
household as an exponential factor of economic self-sufficiency, the findings contribute
to the expansion of the body of research on poverty and social welfare.
Implications for policy. The findings represent a wake-up call for policymakers
to reassess current welfare interventions and ensure that those at the bottom of society are
not left behind. With only 33 percent of the total sample (n=4,216) attaining and
maintaining economic self-sufficiency, it is evident that the labor market as well as the
benefit programs woefully fail to galvanize low-income households toward financial
independence. So it is time for policymakers to act accordingly. Policymakers should
adopt the policy of a strong labor market and/or that of a holistic approach toward
welfare. The former involves the creation of good-paying jobs, while the latter implies
the perception of welfare as entitlement.
Strong labor market. Since welfare recipients are expected to reach economic
self-sufficiency through the workforce (Peck & Theodore, 2000), it would be important
to assess the relationship between the supply side and the demand side of the labor
market. Although the federal government responded to the Great Recession with the
enactment and implementation of the $789 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act (ARRA), America still struggles to cope with the lasting effects of the 2008
recession. In 2009, when Congress enacted the ARRA, the national unemployment rate
reached 8.3 percent. Three years later, in February 2012, the nation still faced the same
rate of unemployment, prompting talks of a jobless recovery (Carter & Tippins, 2012).
Given the fact that welfare recipients are low-income individuals, the likelihood for them
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to be competitive in today’s economy is thin. Therefore, in America’s current slack labor
market (where there are more job seekers than positions available), welfare recipients
struggle to secure and maintain any decent employment due notably to lack of skills
(Derr & Brown, 2015; Dworsky & Courtney, 2007; Siegel, 2004). The slow-moving
economy in the United States over the past near-decade has triggered a dichotomy
between the supply side and the demand side of the labor force. This disequilibrium in
the workforce represents an enormous barrier to employment among welfare enrollees
(Derr & Brown, 2015; Siegel, 2004). A strong labor market constitutes the availability of
job opportunities that provide health and retirement benefits, good working conditions
and living wages. Under such a labor market, welfare would be provided only as last
resort.
Welfare as entitlement. In the absence of a strong labor market, a holistic
approach toward welfare as entitlement deserves consideration. This consists in the
expansion of welfare programs to assist low-income households and the reduction of
stigmatizing rhetoric toward the poor. In this context, expansion of welfare means a
considerable investment in human capital by improving the living conditions of the poor
and preparing them for better job opportunities (McKeen, 2006; Peck, 2001). In other
words, the entitlement approach implies the empowerment of the poor toward economic
self-sufficiency through the acquisition of the skillset needed to enter the workforce. On a
long run, this could be seen as a win-win scenario for both the recipients of benefits and
the government. In fact, under normal circumstances these recipients would eventually
rely less on public assistance but become productive members of society. The entitlement
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approach toward self-sufficiency has been adopted in the Scandinavia as well as several
countries across mainland Europe (Peck & Theodore, 2000).
Another key element under the entitlement approach is stigma removal. Research
has revealed that stigma prevents participation in federal means-tested programs. Indeed,
only about 30 percent of the poor who are eligible for welfare in the United States take
the option of applying for benefits. So the vast majority of the needy people in this
country opts against participating in welfare programs due to stigma (Blank & Ruggles,
1996; Moffitt, 1983; Stuber & Kronebusch, 2004; Stuber & Schlesinger, 2006).
Considering how vital the welfare programs are to the economic well-being of
disadvantaged individuals and families, the effects of stigma should not be taken lightly.
According to Titmuss (1968), the means-tested notion in welfare policies is itself a
stigmatizing and demeaning measure which contributes to negative stigma. For example,
the public might have a more favorable view attitude toward Medicare (not means
tested), as opposed to Medicaid (means-tested). Kerbo (1976) argued that stigma can
create a state of passivity in recipients of public assistance which may result in the
preclusion of efforts toward self-efficacy. Therefore, Congress should find ways to
lessen stigma in the design and implementation of the welfare policies.
One simple yet significant way the U.S. Congress can act is by
benchmarking its own success with SNAP. SNAP moved toward Electronic Benefit
Transfer (EBT) cards to prevent frauds and remove stigma associated with paper
food stamps. The adoption of a new name, “SNAP,” in lieu of “Food Stamps” in
2008 was another smart move from the U.S. Congress to further reduce stigma
around the program (US Department of Agriculture, 2014). Before that change, the
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SNAP take-up rate was unsatisfactory, with 32.6 percent, 50.2 percent and 65.5
percent of participants in 1976, 2003, and 2007, respectively. By 2011, 83.3
percent of eligible families received SNAP (USDHHS, n. d.).
Some would argue that the higher SNAP take-up rate over the past decade has
been influenced by the 2008 recession which resulted in much more widespread need.
Indeed, ARRA substantially increased SNAP benefits between 2009 and 2013. However,
in a comparative analysis of participation change in SNAP and TANF programs
over the latest recession, Derr and Brown (2015) found that SNAP had a 89.4 percent
change between 2007 and 2012, while TANF only managed to record a 7.0 percent
increase for the same time period. In other words, the SNAP participation rate grew from
11,789,594 average monthly cases in 2007 to 22,329,713 average monthly cases in 2012,
while the average monthly cases for TANF varied only slightly from 1,753,891 in 2007
to 1,876,426 in 2012. Thus, how a program is shaped and portrayed by Congress and by
states conveys a message to end-users. A positive message is likely to increase
participation, while a negative view implies diversion toward program selection or
nonparticipation altogether (Stuber & Kronebusch, 2004, 2006).
Stigma removal in the US welfare state cannot be achieved by Congress alone,
given the fact that the stigmatization of the poor has been found to come from various
sources. These stem from landlords and local housing authorities (Teater, 2011) to the
media, employers, and caseworkers (Jarrett, 1996). Therefore, any effort toward
addressing this issue should be broad-based. The media in particular could play a
paramount role in conveying positive stories about welfare, thereby decreasing stigma
(Gans, 1995; Jarrett; 1996). For instance, journalism played a crucial role in paving the
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path to the War on Poverty (WOP) agenda (Keefe, 2010; Skidmore, 2009). This began in
1962 with the publication of The Other America: Poverty in the United States by political
activist and radio commentator Michael Harrington. Harrington’s (1962) work focused
on dilapidated communities in which 40 to 50 million Americans lived. In 1963,
influential journalist Dwight Macdonald put Harrington’s (1962) work in the political
spotlight through a review of the book in The New Yorker. By reading this popular
periodical, President Kennedy came across Harrington’s (1962) work and the deplorable
living conditions for almost half of the nation.
Although Kennedy had also observed poverty first-hand in West Virginia during a
1960 campaign event, it was Macdonald’s review of Harrington’s work that prompted the
president to act (Keefe, 2010). President Kennedy ordered members of his government to
start drafting a plan to address poverty in America—a plan that his successor Lyndon
Johnson expanded under the “Great Society” project. Hence, the media was instrumental
in raising awareness about poverty, an indispensable step for the passage of the WOP
programs in the 1960s (Keefe, 2010; Skidmore, 2009).
Under the entitlement approach, the federal government will also have to invest
more on antipoverty interventions and assert more control over their implementation.
More important, the government should adopt a new measure of poverty which
agglomerates all anti-poverty programs. This is arguably the most direct way to measure
the full impact of these programs on poverty reduction. The current official poverty
measure does not account for the federal welfare programs, both cash and in-kind. It is
time for policymakers to choose a more reflective tool. For example, when taken into
consideration in poverty calculation, three lower-tier means-tested programs—SNAP,
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HCV, and TANF— lifted 15.6 million Americans out of poverty in 2012, including 7.1
million children. For the same fiscal year, these programs also raised 7 million people out
of deep poverty, including 2.8 million children (Sherman & Trisi, 2015).
By all accounts, the federal government seems to fully adopt neither a strong
labor market nor a system of entitlement programs. In other words, the federal
government is just adopting parts of each of these two approaches. If the government
continuously attempts to win both ways by misfiring on both the labor market and the
welfare state, then low-income households will continue to find themselves in economic
limbo. Indeed, these households will lose both ways. So it is important for the
government to define how the problem of poverty should be addressed. The current
research proposes a strong labor market and/or a welfare state as solution. Anything in
between could be detrimental to the very people that policymakers claim to help.
In fact, claiming to help people and actually helping them are two different things.
There had not been much social mobility for the welfare recipients over the 5-year span
of the current study. Could this be a result of the ruling class regulating the poor?
Through their social control thesis described earlier, Piven and Cloward (1971) argued
that welfare programs, despite their claims, are not really intended to help the poor.
Rather, the architects of these programs want to assert control over the poor, shaping their
behavior, and keeping them down. The current state of the welfare system seems to
support the regulating the poor theory advanced by Piven and Cloward in 1971. After all,
Moffitt (2015) found that the existing American welfare system is more beneficial to
households with higher income than those with lower income. The government can
always redeem itself by adopting one of the two policy recommendations mentioned in
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this research. This way, the government would send the right signal that its goal is to help
the poor progress through the social pipeline.
Implications for practice. Human services workers can learn from these findings
in serving poor individuals and families. More specifically, the findings could help social
welfare organizations and workers better understand why welfare clients sometimes fail
to meet some expectations with respect to employment. The findings compel workers to
conclude that the system does not provide all the ingredients necessary for low-income
people to become financially independent. Public assistance itself is disempowering for
beneficiaries, staff, and organizations. From a participant’s perspective, the mechanisms
of the welfare programs prevent clients from developing a sense of worth and personal
agency (Kerbo, 1976). Instead, the requirements for participation in these programs tend
to diminish participants’ conceptions about their own capabilities. These clients usually
develop mistrust toward the government because of the tiring and devaluing process of
merely getting services. This process of disempowerment is consistent with the letter and
spirit of the culture of poverty theory upon which most welfare programs are crafted and
implemented. As mentioned earlier, the culture of poverty theory seeks to shift the blame
on the poor, making them look lazy in the eyes of the public. As Ryan (1976) would
argue, however, the poor should not bear the blame for situations that are above and
beyond their power.
Disempowerment takes place when people make several attempts to secure
employment that turn out to be unsuccessful. Disempowerment also occurs when a
welfare recipient working for a landscaping company cuts grass for the whole day under
blistering sunrays only to earn a wage of 9 or 10 dollars per hour. Such a wage is not
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enough for workers to bring food on the table or put a roof over the heads of their
families. Disempowerment also happens when a poor client on welfare has to settle for
part-time jobs. Part-time jobs with no fringe benefits are tough to keep. With a decline in
the adjusted value of the federal minimum wage, hardworking individuals may end up
not having enough to support their families. In other words, as jobs in the current labor
market provide no decent wages and fringe benefits, it could be said that the workplace
has left hard-working individuals and their families and not the reverse. Breitkreuz and
Williamson (2012) used the term “self-sufficiency trap” to lament the lack of sustainable
workforce conditions for the poor to achieve the work-centered goal of social welfare
policies.
From a caseworker’s perspective, there is usually not enough time devoted to the
assessment and reassessment of clients’ situations. Usually, eligibility workers abide by
the requirements of the job by completing applications for as many welfare clients as
possible. That is, their jobs may be constrained by requirements to act on a given number
of applications in a day.
From an organization perspective, the situation is not different. There happens to
be a lack of efforts from human service organizations directed at empowering staff for a
better relationship with clients. The business-minded approach adopted by social service
organizations precludes them from considering welfare recipients as an equally important
element of the equation. During the late 1960s/early 1970s services and payments were
separated in AFDC. TANF with its emphasis on services to promote employment would
seem to provide an opportunity to increase the attention to service. The emphasis,
however, has been on compliance rather than an effort to understand the client. Hence,
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the main purpose of human service agencies is to satisfy the requirements imposed by the
funders. Antipoverty foundations should bring the cause of the poor to the front stage,
forging relevant discussions and providing funding for research on economic selfsufficiency.
Thus, the findings call upon human services workers to mobilize for advocacy on
behalf of the poor. Since the Reagan administration, advocacy on behalf of the poor has
seemed to enter an era of muteness (Hasenfeld & Garrow, 2012). This era is
characterized by a sense of powerlessness which prevents public assistance recipients,
social workers, and human services administrators from making their voices heard. If the
goal of the Reagan administration was to eventually extinguish the advocacy flame
among social policy practitioners, there is no doubt that this administration was
successful in doing so. In effect, social advocacy on behalf of disadvantaged populations
is no longer supported by famous advocacy groups who once championed their cause.
Indeed, some leaders of these nonprofit organizations decided to abandon the fight or
simply change their focus (Baumgartner et al. 2009, p. 256). These findings call for a
concerted effort from clients, caseworkers and program administrators and all other
stakeholders toward bettering the conditions of the poor through empowerment and
advocacy.
As a concept, advocacy has been at the center of the social work field. Since its
inception a century ago, the social work profession has pledged a long-term commitment
to social justice. In fact, the core values and principles of the profession as well as its
Code of Ethics compel social workers to advocate with and on behalf of oppressed
populations (National Association of Social Workers [NASW], 2008). Defending the
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cause of socio-economically disadvantaged groups has been the hallmark of social work
throughout history. This has been what sets the field apart from other disciplines. Social
workers are trained to become advocates for the poor and are expected to play that role
whenever possible. Social workers need to stand up and speak out against social policies
that cause prejudice to clients, staff, organizations and the greater society.
Elsewhere, it would be beneficial for the country to adopt preventive measures
and a more client-centered approach in social welfare. Hawkins (2006) recommended
that social workers embrace a preventive approach toward social problems. This
approach should be based on collaborative efforts between social workers and
community leaders at all levels of governance and target the well-being of
individuals. The Unites States takes credit for implementing Social Security in
1935, which has since prevented most elders from dropping into poverty. There are
still poor older people, but far less than in earlier decades. The Old Age Insurance (OAI)
Program has been credited with reducing poverty among older people, as a result of a half
century of expanding coverage and benefits after 1935. It should be noted that OAI is a
universal, not means-tested, program.
What stood alone in the 1935 law was its purpose. It is a poverty-prevention
approach among the elderly population. So the nation can look for inspiration in its
own past to counteract poverty though preventive measures. Meanwhile, in order to
increase the probability for employment among welfare recipients, there should be
a more client-centered approach where individuals can be guided towards their own
areas of interest. In addition, social workers should use their person-in-environment
assessment skills to detect potential barriers to employment. With adequate support,
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recipients will eventually overcome these barriers to join the labor market (Banerjee &
Damman, 2013).
Implications for social work education. The findings can be used in classroom
environments to prepare social work students for inevitable encounters with poor welfare
recipients. Students should learn not to be a priori judgmental toward clients who struggle
economically. Given the level of unpopularity of welfare in the mainstream media, some
social work students may harbor preconceived ideologies against welfare recipients. Thus
the results of this research can be utilized by students to debunk stigma in their quest to
empower and advocate on behalf of their clients. The findings also resonate with KrumerNevo, Weiss-Gal, and Monnickendam’s (2009) plea for poverty-aware courses in social
work education. The findings provide empirical evidence which can be utilized to
corroborate or refute certain welfare-related claims within the classroom. For example,
as mandated by the Council on Social Work Education (CSWE), social policy courses
cover several areas of poverty, namely theoretical perspectives and historical
development of welfare programs. When discussing these topics, policy instructors can
bring the findings of this research to stimulate critical thinking within the classroom. The
findings can also be brought into legislative advocacy classrooms where the focus is
usually on raising awareness about public policies that adversely impact people, primarily
at macro levels. Moreover, schools can also organize poverty-related symposiums,
colloquiums, and conferences. Hence, social work professors and field instructors can
build on these findings to raise awareness about the plight of the poor as recommended
by the profession’s values and ethics.
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Limitations
As is true for all studies, this research investigation is not exempt from
limitations. Underreporting and seam bias were two major shortcomings associated with
this study. These were of methodological sources and therefore beyond the researcher’s
ability to control them. Indeed, researchers using secondary data may often find
themselves powerless vis-à-vis some methodological limitations related to the data
collected in the first place. In addition to the two limitations above, which are inherent to
the original data collection, this study is limited in terms of its timeframe, model,
variable, and lack of randomization. These limitations pertain to model specification and
research design. All limitations in this study are described below.
Underreporting. According to Gundersen and Kreider (2008), self-reported data
may contain inaccurate information, as interviewees may choose to underreport benefits,
assets and earnings. Indeed, there is a tendency or a belief on the part of many
respondents that doing so would jeopardize their eligibility for benefits. The social safety
net in America does not encourage savings and accumulation of assets because of its
counterproductive program eligibility requirements (Hurst & Ziliak, 2001; Sherraden,
1991). Hence, households in the intervention group were probably more likely to
underreport their income, especially to a government surveyor. This has to do with the
fear of losing benefits due to too much income, a concern not applicable to households
who opted against receiving welfare. The latter group of households arguably would be
comfortable reporting their income in a comparatively more accurate fashion. Therefore,
intervention group respondents may have earned as much income as or even more
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income than their counterparts in the control group, but all this may have been
undermined with underreporting.
Seam bias. Seam bias has been identified as the greatest weakness of the SIPP
longitudinal data (Burkhead & Coder, 1985; Coder, Burkhead, Feldman-Harkins, &
McNeil, 1987; Hill, 1994; Kalton & Miller, 1991; Martini, 1989; Moore, 2008;
Ryscavage, 1993; Weidman, 1986; Young, 1989; Weinberg, 2002). By definition, seam
bias refers to “a pronounced tendency for reported program turnover to occur between
waves more often than within waves” (Czajka, 1983, p. 93). That is, longitudinal survey
estimates tend to display striking inaccuracies mostly between the last month of a wave
and the beginning of the next one. As of the 2004 panel, however, SIPP has improved
the interview questionnaires in an attempt to address its seam bias. SIPP surveyors used
dependent interviewing techniques to prompt respondents toward recalling and reviewing
pertinent responses provided during a previous wave in order elicit more accurate
answers. Dependent interviewing strategies have significantly improved the 2004 and
2008 SIPP Panels, but could not eliminate the seam bias completely (Moore et al., 2008).
Study timeframe. Arguably, the five-year timeframe within which this research
was conducted is too short to determine whether self-sufficiency was maintained or not.
That is, participating households that did not attain and maintain economic selfsufficiency during this five-year period are not necessarily condemned in their current
situation. These households may well have become economically self-reliable shortly
after the end of the study. Similarly, households that have reached and maintained
economic independence over the course of the study may have relapsed in the months or
years that followed the predetermined termination of the study. Therefore, the results of
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this research could have been different had the timeframe been ten or twenty years
instead of just five years.
Model limitation. Although accepted as the appropriate data analysis model for
this particular investigation, binary logistic regression sacrificed the precision of the data.
For example, participating households with a monthly income of 0 were classified within
the same “non-self-sufficient” bracket as those with a monthly income of 150 percent of
the FPL. In the same vein, respondents whose monthly household income was 151
percent of the FPL were grouped together with those whose monthly income way
exceeded that threshold to form the self-sufficient bracket. In other words, by limiting the
outcome variable to just two categories, binary logistic regression excludes crucial
information that could be used to differentiate sub-groups of survey respondents and
scrutinize multiple layers of self-sufficiency.
Variable limitation. This study is limited by the fact that the selection of
variables is limited to those available in the SIPP dataset; thus other potential predictors
of self-sufficiency could not be investigated. For example, the 2008 SIPP Panel did not
include key welfare programs such as the EITC—one of the nation’s biggest and most
direct weapons against poverty. The EITC dispatched about 67 billion dollars to more
than 27 million working families and individuals in 2015, lifting 6.5 million people out of
poverty in the process, including 3.3 million children (Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, 2016; US Internal Revenue Service, 2017). So it would be interesting to know
whether the inclusion of EITC would make a difference in self-sufficiency outcomes for
welfare recipients. Further, the survey data collection method does not allow for rich, indepth analysis of respondents’ perspectives and perceptions.

156

Lack of randomization. Because the participants were not randomly assigned
into the intervention group and the control group, this study does not have the legs to
withstand inferential scrutiny. Hence, the quasi-experimental design limits the ability to
draw causal conclusions.
Recommendations for Future Research
Future research endeavors should attempt to address the limitations raised in the
current study. In particular, the use of administrative data can be helpful in thwarting or
counteracting possible biases associated with underreporting. It is worth noting that
experimental designs might not be suitable for large-scale welfare studies on ethical
grounds. That is, it would unethical to voluntarily withhold benefits from participants in
the control group for a considerable period of time. Thus, quasi-experimental studies are
highly encouraged. Finally, researchers interested in replicating this study could consider
using the upcoming 2014 SIPP Panel.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1. Codebook of Variables
Variable
Codes

Description

Variable Values

ID

Person longitudinal key

None

WHFNWGT

Household weight

None

AGERANGE

What is the respondent's age range?

0 = Less than 40
1 = 40 and over

ESEX

What is the sex of the respondent?

0 = Female
1 = Male

EBORNUS

1 111
Immigration status. Was respondent
0 = No
born in the United States?
1 = Yes

ECITIZEN

Citizenship. Is respondent a citizen of
the United States?

0 = No
1 = Yes

EORIGIN

Hispanic or Latino ethnicity. Des the
respondent consider himself or herself
Hispanic?

0 = No
1 = Yes

RACECODE

Does respondent consider
herself/himself to be White or nonWhite?
Education level. What is the highest
level of school has respondent
completed or received?

0 = Non-White
1 = White

EDUCATE

METRO

SPORA

0 = No post-secondary
education
1 = Post-secondary
education
Cumulative metro status. Does
0 = No
respondent live in a metro area or non- 1 = Yes
metro area?
Average state poverty rates. What is
0 = States with high and
the average poverty level for the past
very high average rates
five years in the state where
of poverty
respondent had lived?
1 = States with very low
to moderate average rates
of poverty
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RHTYPE

Household type or living arrangement.
What type of household does
respondent live in?

0 = Single
1 = Married couple

ETENURE

Ownership status. Is the living quarter
owned by respondent (or someone in
the household), or rented or occupied
without payment of cash rent?

0 = Rented or occupied
without payment
1 = Owned by respondent
or someone in the
household

RFNKIDS

Presence of children under 18 in the
household. Are there children under
18 in the household?

0 = No
1 = Yes

EHHNUMPP

Number of people in household
(household size). What is the total
number of persons in this household?

1 = Less than three
2 = Three or more

EAST2A

Interest earning checking account
owned. Does respondent own an
interest earning checking account?

0 = No
1 = Yes

EAST2B

Savings account owned. Does
respondent own a savings account?

0 = No
1 = Yes

FINANBHV

Financial capability as measured by
homeownership and possessions of
bank accounts. Does the respondent
own a home and possess bank
accounts?

0 = Low financial
capability (no possession
of homes and/or bank
accounts)
1 = High financial
capability (possession of
homes and/or bank
accounts)

EPTWRK

Work status. Has respondent worked
less than 35 hours some weeks?

1 = Yes
2 = No
3 = Not working, not
looking

RHMTRF

Household means-tested cash or
noncash receipt (dichotomous
independent variable). Does this
household receive means-tested cash
or noncash benefits?

0 = No
1 = Yes
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BENEFITS*

Total household means-tested cash
and noncash benefits. How many
benefits does the household receive at
baseline? This variable is a
combination of seven other variables
(see footnotes).

1 = One benefit
2 = Two benefits
3 = Three benefits
4 = Four benefits

CUMULIPR**

Attainment and maintenance of
economic self-sufficiency
(dichotomous outcome variable). Has
the household attained economic selfsufficiency on or before Wave 12 and
maintained it through the remainder of
the study (Wave 15)?

0 = No
1 = Yes

* RCUTYP27 (receipt of food assistance)
RCUTYP57 (receipt of health assistance)
EHOTLUNC (receipt of free-or reduced price school lunch)
EBRKFST (receipt of free or reduced-price school breakfast)
EGVTRNT (receipt of subsidized housing)
EEGYAST (receipt of energy assistance)
RHCBRF (receipt of cash assistance)
** This variable is a cumulative ratio of household income (THTOTINC) and
household poverty level (RHPOV).
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Appendix 2. State Minimum Wages for 2008-2012
States

Year
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Alabama

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Alaska

$7.15 $7.25 $7.75 $7.75 $7.75

Arizona

$6.90 $7.25 $7.25 $7.35 $7.65

Arkansas

$6.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

California

$8.00 $8.00 $8.00 $8.00 $8.00

Colorado

$7.02 $7.28 $7.24 $7.36 $7.64

Connecticut

$7.65 $8.00 $8.25 $8.25 $8.25

Delaware

$7.15 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

District of
Columbia
Florida

$7.55 $8.25 $8.25 $8.25 $8.25

Georgia

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Hawaii

$7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Idaho

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Illinois

$7.75 $8.00 $8.25 $8.25 $8.25

Indiana

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Iowa

$7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Kansas

$6.55 $2.65 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Kentucky

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Louisiana

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

$6.79 $7.25 $7.25 $7.31 $7.67
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Maine

$7.25 $7.25 $7.50 $7.50 $7.50

Maryland

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Massachusetts

$8.00 $8.00 $8.00 $8.00 $8.00

Michigan

$7.40 $7.40 $7.40 $7.40 $7.40

Minnesota

$6.15 $6.15 $6.15 $6.15 $6.15

Mississippi

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Missouri

$6.65 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Montana

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.35 $7.65

Nebraska

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Nevada

$6.85 $7.55 $8.25 $8.25 $8.25

New Hampshire

$7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

New Jersey

$7.15 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

New Mexico

$6.50 $7.50 $7.50 $7.50 $7.50

New York

$7.15 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

North Carolina

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

North Dakota

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Ohio

$7.00 $7.30 $7.30 $7.40 $7.70

Oklahoma

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Oregon

$7.95 $8.40 $8.40 $8.50 $8.80

Pennsylvania

$7.15 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Puerto Rico

$6.55 $6.55 $6.55 $6.55 $6.55

Rhode Island

$7.40 $7.40 $7.40 $7.40 $7.40
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South Carolina

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

South Dakota

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Tennessee

$5.58 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Texas

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Utah

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Vermont

$7.68 $8.06 $8.06 $8.15 $8.46

Virginia

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Washington

$8.07 $8.55 $8.55 $8.67 $9.04

West Virginia

$7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Wisconsin

$6.50 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Wyoming

$6.55 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25

Source: Based on Bureau of Labor Statistics data gathered by
Labor Law Center.
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